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
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
ARTES SCIENTIA VERITAS











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1

CHARACTERISTICKS

VOLUME II.

A N

QUIRY

CONCERNING


TRUTH and MERIT.

T H E

R A L I S T S;

A

OSOPHICAL RHAPOSY.



in the Year M.DCC.XLIX.



T R E A T I S E IV.

VIZ.

A N

I N Q U I R Y
C O N C E R N I N G

Virtue, or Merit.

Formerly Printed from an Imperfect Copy :
Now Corrected, and Publish'd intire.

— — — *Amoto queramus seria ludo.*
Hor. Sat. 1.

Printed first in the Year M.DC.XCIX.

THE
A. E. C. M.
N A T U R A L
H I S T O R Y

BY
J. G. C. H.

IN
TWO VOLUMES

WITH
PLATES

BY
J. G. C. H.

IN
TWO VOLUMES

WITH
PLATES



A N

B
1886
C5

I N Q U I R Y, &c. 1741

BOOK I.

PART I.

SECT. I.

RELIGION and VIRTUE appear in ~~one~~ many respects so nearly related, that they ^{of the} are generally presum'd inseparable Companions. And so willing we are to believe well of their Union, that we hardly allow it just to speak, or even think of 'em apart. It may however be question'd, whether the Practice of the World, in this respect, be answerable to our Speculation. 'Tis certain that we sometimes meet with instances which seem to make against this general Supposition. We have known People, who have

Book t.ing and Affection towards Mankind, as might seem
 ~~ to force an Acknowledgment of their being *virtuous*. And, in general, we find mere moral Principles of such weight, that in our dealings with Men,
 Occasion of this INQUIRY. we are seldom satisfy'd by the fullest Assurance given us of their Zeal in Religion, till we hear something further of their Character. If we are told, a Man is religious; we still ask, "What are his Morals?" But if we hear at first that he has honest moral Principles, and is a Man of natural Justice and good Temper, we seldom think of the other Question, "Whether he be *religious* and *devout*?"

THIS has given occasion to enquire, "What "*Honesty or Virtue* is, consider'd by it-self; and "*in what manner* it is influenc'd by Religion: "*How far Religion necessarily implies Virtue*; and "*whether it be a true Saying, That it is impossible for an Atheist to be virtuous, or share any real degree of Honesty, or MERIT.*"

AND here it cannot justly be wonder'd at, if the Method of explaining Things shou'd appear somewhat unusual; since the Subject-Matter has been so little examin'd, and is of so nice and dangerous Speculation. For so much is the religious part of Mankind alarm'd by the Freedom of some late Pens; and so great a Jealousy is rais'd every-where on this Account; that whatever an Author may suggest in favour of Religion, he will gain little Credit in the Cause, if he allows the least Advantage to any other Principle. On the other side, the Men of Wit and Raillery, whose pleasantest Entertainment is in the exposing the weak sides of Religion, are so desperately afraid of being drawn into any serious Thoughts of it, that they look upon a Man as guilty of foul Play, who assumes the air of a Free Writer, and at the same time preserves any regard for the Principles of Natural Religion. They are apt to give as little quarter as they receive; And are resolv'd to think as ill of the Moralists, their Antagonists, as their Antagonists can po-

Concerning V I R T U E .

7

think of them. Neither of 'em, it seems, will al-^{so} follow the least Advantage to the other. 'Tis as hard ~~to~~^{as} to persuade one sort, that there is any Virtue in Religion; as the other, that there is any Virtue out of the Verge of their particular Community. So that, between both, an Author must pass his time ill, who dares plead for *Religion* and *Moral Virtue*, without lessening the force of either; but allowing to each its proper Province, and due Rank, wou'd hinder their being made Enemys by Detraction.

HOWEVER it be: If we wou'd pretend to give the least new light, or explain any thing effectually, within the intended Compas of this *Inquiry*; 'tis necessary to take Things pretty deep; and endeavour, by some short Scheme, to represent the Original of each Opinion, whether natural or unnatural, relating to the *Divinity*. And if we can happily get clear of this thorny part of our Philosophy; the rest, 'tis hop'd, may prove more plain, and easy.

S E C T. II.

IN THE Whole of Things (or in the Universe) *state*
either all is according to a good Order, and the *Opinj*
most agreeable to a general Interest: or there is that
which is otherwise, and might possibly have been
better constituted, more wisely contriv'd, and with
more advantage to the general Interest of Beings, or
of the Whole.

If every thing which exists be according to a good Order, and *for the best*; then of necessity there is no such thing as real *ILL* in the Universe, nothing *ILL* with respect to the Whole.

WHATSOEVER, then, is so as that it cou'd not really have been better, or any way better order'd, is perfectly *good*. Whatsoever in the Order of the *World* can be call'd *ILL*, must imply a possibility in the nature of the thing to have been better con-
triv'd

An INQUIRY

Book I. triv'd, or order'd. For if it cou'd not; it is perfect, and as it shou'd be.

State of Opinions. **W**HATSOEVER is really ILL, therefore, must be caus'd or produc'd, either by *Design* (that is to say, with Knowledg and Intelligence) or, in defect of this, by Hazard, and mere *Chance*.

If there be any thing ILL in the Universe from *Design*, then that which disposes all things, is no ore good designing Principle. For either the *one* designing Principle is it-self corrupt; or there is some other in being which operates contrarily, and is ILL.

If there be any ILL in the Universe from mere *Chance*; then a designing Principle or Mind, whether Good or Bad, cannot be the Cause of *all* things. And consequently if there be suppos'd a designing Principle, who is the Cause only of Good, but cannot prevent the Ill which happens from Chance, or from a contrary ill Design; then there can be suppos'd in reality no such thing as a superior good Design or Mind, other than what is impotent and defective: For not to correct, or totally to exclude that Ill of Chance, or of a contrary ill Design, must proceed either from *Impotency*, or *Ill-will*.

WHATSOEVER is superior in any degree over the World, or rules in Nature with Discernment and a Mind, is what, by universal Agreement, Men call **GOD**. If there are several such superior Minds, they are so many *Gods*: But if that single, or those several Superiors are not in their nature necessarily good, they rather take the name of **DAEMON**.

To believe therefore that every thing is govern'd, order'd, or regulated for *the best*, by a designing Principle, or Mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect **THEIST**.

To believe nothing of a designing Principle or Mind, nor any Cause, Measure, or Rule of Things but *Chance*; so that in Nature neither the Interest of *the Whole*, nor of any *Particulars*, can be said to *in the least design'd, pursu'd, or aim'd at*; is to be a perfect **ATHEIST**.

concerning VIRTUE.

To believe no *one* supreme designing Principle Par
Mind, but rather *two*, *three*, or more, (tho in
their nature *good*) is to be a POLYTHEIST.

To believe the governing Mind, or Minds, not
absolutely and necessarily good, nor confin'd to what
is best, but capable of acting according to mere
Will or Fancy; is to be a DEMONIST.

THERE are few who think always consistently
or according to one certain Hypothesis, upon any
Subject so abstruse and intricate, as the *Cause of all
Things*, and the *Economy or Government of the Universe*. For 'tis evident in the Case of the most
devout People, even by their own Confession, that
there are Times when their Faith hardly can sup-
port 'em in the Belief of a supreme Wisdom; and
that they are often tempted to judge disadvantage-
ously of a Providence, and just Administration in
the Whole.

THAT alone, therefore, is to be call'd a Man's
Opinion, which is of any other the most habitual
to him, and occurs upon most occasions. So that
'tis hard to pronounce certainly of any Man, that
he is an Atheist; because unless his whole Thoughts
are at all Seasons, and on all Occasions, steddy
bent against all Supposition or Imagination of *De-
sign in Things*, he is no *perfect Atheist*. In the
same manner, if a Man's Thoughts are not at all
times steddy and resolute against all Imagination of
Chance, Fortune, or ill Design in Things, he is no
perfect Theist. But if any-one believes more of
Chance and Confusion than of Design; he is to be
esteem'd more *an Atheist* than *a Theist*, from that
which most predominates, or has the ascendent.
And in case he believes more of the Prevalency of
an ill-designing Principle, than of a good one, he is
rather a *Demonist*; and may be justly so call'd,
from the Side to which the Ballance of his Judg-
ment *most inclines*.

An INQUIRY

look t. At t these sorts both of *Dæmonism*, *Polytheism*,
 ~~~ *Atheism*, and *Theism*, may be \* mix'd. Religion  
*itself* excludes only perfect *Atheism*. Perfect *Demonists* un-  
 doubtedly there are in Religion; because we know  
 whole Nations who worship a *Devil* or *Fiend*, to  
 whom they sacrifice and offer Prayers and Supplica-  
 tions, in reality on no other account than because they  
 fear him. And we know very well that in some Reli-  
 gions, thiere are those who expressly give no other  
 Idea of God, than of a Being arbitrary, violent, caus-  
 ing ill, and ordaining to Misery; which in effect is the  
 same as to substitute a *Dæmon*, or *Devil*, in his room.

Now since there are these several Opinions con-  
 cerning a superior Power; and since there may be  
 found perhaps some Persons, who have no form'd  
 Opinion at all upon this Subject; either thro *Scepti-  
 cism*, Negligence of Thought, or Confusion of Judg-  
 ment: the Consideration is, how any of these Op-  
 nions, or this want of any Opinion, may possibly  
 consist with *VIRTUE* and *MERIT*; or be compati-  
 ble with an honest or moral Character.

\* As thus:

1. *Theism* with *Dæmonism*: 2. *Dæmonism* with *Polytheism*:
3. *Theism* with *Atheism*: 4. *Dæmonism* with *Atheism*:
5. *Polytheism* with *Atheism*: 6. *Theism* (as it stands in oppo-  
 sition to *Dæmonism*, and denotes Goodness in the superior *Deity*)  
 with *Polytheism*: 7. The same *Theism* or *Polytheism* with  
*Dæmonism*: 8. Or with *Dæmonism* and *Atheism*.

1. As when *the one* chief Mind, or Sovereign Being, is (in the  
 Believer's sense) divided between a good and an ill Nature, by  
 being the Cause of ill as well as Good: Or otherwise when *Two*  
 distinct and contrary Principles subsist; one, the Author of all  
 Good, the other of all ill.

2. As when there is not *one*, but *several* corrupt Minds who  
 govern; which Opinion may be call'd *Polydæmonism*.

3. As when Chance is not excluded; but God and Chance divide.

4. As when an evil *Dæmon* and Chance divide.

5. As when many Minds and Chance divide.

6. As when there are more principal Minds than one, but  
 agreeing in Good, with one and the same Will and Reason.

7. As when the same System of Deity or corresponding Deity  
 subsists, together with a contrary Principle, or with several  
 contrary Principles or governing Minds.

8. As when the last Case is, together with Chance.

PART II.

SECT. I.

WHEN we or Constit  
and confis  
least account of a pi  
petent Knowledg of  
der to find our-selves  
ing to the Constitution  
For to what End in N  
Species of Creatures,  
serve ; will be hard fo.  
But to what End the many Proportions and various  
Shapes of Parts in many Creatures actually serve ;  
we are able, by the help of Study and Observation,  
to demonstrate, with great exactness.

We know that every Creature has a private Good  
and Interest of his own ; which Nature has compel'd  
him to seek, by all the Advantages afforded him,  
within the compass of his Make. We know that  
there is in reality a right and a wrong State of every  
Creature ; and that his right-one is by Nature for  
warded, and by himself affectionately sought. There  
being therefore in every Creature a certain *Interest* or *Interest*  
*Good* ; there must be also a certain END, to which <sup>or</sup> *End*  
every thing in his Constitution must *naturally* refer. *tures.*  
To this END if any thing, either in his Appetites,  
Passions, or Affections, be not conducing, but the  
contrary ; we must of necessity own it ill to him.  
And in this manner he is ill, with respect to himself ;  
as he certainly is, with respect to others of his kind,  
when

any ordinary Frame *A Cn*  
of Art or Nature ; *stitutio*  
d it is to give the  
without a com-  
; need not won-  
ny things relat-  
... *Nature* her-self, *Whole*  
.....y things, even whole <sup>and</sup> *Parts,*  
or to what purpose they

## An INQUIRY

any such Appetites or Passions make him any injurious to 'em. Now, if by the natural Constitution of any rational Creature, the same Inabilitys of Appetite which make him ill to Others, make him ill also to Himself; and if the same Regard of Affections, which causes him to be good in one sense, causes him to be good also in the other; then is that Goodness by which he is thus useful to others, a real Good and Advantage to himself. And thus Virtue and Interest may be found at last to agree.

Of this we shall consider particularly in the latter part of our Inquiry. Our first Design is, to see if we can clearly determine what that Quality is to which we give the Name of Goodness, or VIRTUE. Shou'd a Historian or Traveller describe to us a certain Creature of a more solitary Disposition than ever was yet heard of; one who had neither Mate nor Fellow of any kind; nothing of his own Likeness, towards which he stood well-affected or inclin'd; nor any thing without, or beyond himself, for which he had the least Passion or Concern: we might be apt to say perhaps, without much hesitation, "That this was doubtless a very melancholy Creature, and that in this unsociable and fullenn'd kind of Life." But if we were affir'd that notwithstanding all Appearances, the Creature enjoy'd himself extremely, had a great relish Life, and was in nothing wanting to his own Good we might acknowledg perhaps, "That the Creature was no Monster, nor absurdly constituted as <sup>37.</sup> himself." But we shou'd hardly, after all, be induc'd to say of him, "That he was a good Creature such as he was, and therefore the Creature was still perfect <sup>as</sup> himself, and indeed, we might be forc'd to acknowledge, "he was a good Creature; if he cou'd be w

to be absolute and compleat in himself ; without Part, any real relation to any thing in the Universe besides." For shou'd there be any where in Nature a System, of which this living Creature was to be consider'd as a Part ; then cou'd he no-wise be allow'd good ; whilst he plainly appear'd to be such a Part, as made rather to the harm than good of that System or Whole in which he was included.

If therefore, in the Structure of this or any other Animal, there be any thing which points beyond himself, and by which he is plainly discover'd to have relation to some other Being or Nature besides his own ; then will this Animal undoubtedly be esteem'd a Part of some other System. For instance, if an Animal has the Proportions of a Male, it shews he has relation to a Female. And the respective Proportions both of the Male and Female will be allow'd, doubtless, to have a joint relation to another Existence and Order of things beyond themselves. So that the Creatures are both of 'em to be consider'd as Parts of another System : which is that of a particular Race or Species of living Creatures, who have some one common Nature, or are provided for, by some one Order or Constitution of things subsisting together, and co-operating towards their Conservation and Support.

In the same manner, if a whole Species of Animals contribute to the Existence or Well-being of some other ; then is that whole Species, in general, a Part only of some other System.

For instance ; To the Existence of the Spider, that of the Fly is absolutely necessary. The heedless Flight, weak Frame, and tender Body of this latter Insect, fits and determines him as much a Prey, as the rough Make, Watchfulness, and Cunning of the former, fits him for Rapine, and the ministering part. The Web and Wing are suited to each other. And in the Structure of each of these Animals, there is as apparent and perfect a relation to the other, as in our own Body's there is a relation

Book 1. of Limbs and Organs ; or, as in the Branches or  
 Leaves of a Tree, we see a relation of each to the  
 other, and all, in common, to one Root and Trunk.

In the same manner are Flys also necessary to  
 the Existence of other Creatures, both Fowls and  
 Fish. And thus are other Species or Kinds subser-  
 vient to one another ; as being *Parts of a certain  
 System*, and included in one and the same *Order  
 of Beings*.

So that there is a System of all Animals ; an  
*Animal-Order* or *Economy*, according to which the  
 animal Affairs are regulated and dispos'd.

*System  
 o' the  
 Earth.* Now, if the whole System of Animals, toge-  
 ther with that of Vegetables, and all other things  
 in this inferior World, be properly comprehended  
 in one *System* of a Globe or Earth : And if, again,

*Planetary System.* this *Globe or Earth* it-self appears to have a real De-  
 pendence on something still beyond ; as, for ex-  
 ample, either on its Sun, the Galaxy, or its Fellow-  
 Planets : then is it in reality a PART only of some  
 other System. And if it be allow'd that there is in

*Universal System.* like manner a SYSTEM of all Things, and a Uni-  
 versal Nature ; there can be no particular Being or  
 System which is not either good or ill in that general  
 one of the Universe : For if it be insignificant  
 and of no use, it is a Fault or Imperfection, and  
 consequently ill in the general System.

THEREFORE if any Being be wholly and  
 really ILL, it must be ill with respect to the Uni-  
 versal System ; and then the System of the Uni-  
 verse is ill, or imperfect. But if the ill of one pri-  
 vate System be the Good of others ; if it makes  
 still to the Good of the general System (as when one  
 Creature lives by the Destruction of another ; one  
 thing is generated from the Corruption of another  
 or one planetary System or Vortex may swallow  
 another) then is the Ill of that private System  
 real Ill in it-self ; any more than the pain of his  
 tooth is Ill, in a System or Body which is

intimated, that without this occasion of Pain, it wou'd Part 2.  
suffer worse, by being defective.

So that we cannot say of any Being, that it is ~~§. I.~~  
~~wholly and absolutely ill~~, unless we can positively ~~Agree~~  
~~know and ascertain, that what we call It is no ill.~~  
where Good besides, in any other System, or with  
respect to any other Order or Oeconomy what-  
soever.

But were there in the World any intire Species ~~Relating~~  
of Animals destructive to every other, it might be ~~§. L~~  
justly call'd an ill Species; as being ill in the ~~Animal-~~  
~~System~~. And if in any Species of Animals (as in  
Men, for example) one Man is of a nature pernici-  
ous to the rest, he is in this respect justly stil'd an  
ill Man.

We do not however say of any-one, that he is ~~Good~~  
an ill Man because he has the Plague-Spots upon <sup>and if</sup> ~~Man~~  
him, or because he has convulsive Fits which make  
him strike and wound such as approach him. Nor  
do we say on the other side, that he is a good ~~Man~~,  
when having his Hands ty'd up, he is hinder'd from  
doing the Mischief he designs; or (which is in a  
manner the same) when he abstains from executing  
his ill purpose, thro a fear of some impending Pun-  
ishment, or thro the allurement of some exterior  
Reward.

So that in a sensible Creature, that which is not ~~Good~~  
done thro any Affection at all, makes neither Good <sup>nor ill</sup> ~~nor ill~~  
nor Ill in the nature of that Creature; who then  
only is suppos'd ~~Good~~; when the Good or Ill of the  
System to which he has relation, is the immediate  
Object of some Passion or Affection moving him.

Since it is therefore by Affection merely that  
a Creature is esteem'd good or ill, natural or un-  
natural; our business will be, to examine which  
are the good and natural, and which the ill and un-  
natural Affections.

## S E C T. II.

*Private  
or Self-  
Affec-  
tion.*

**I**N the first place then, it may be observ'd, that if there be an Affection towards any Subject consider'd as private Good, which is \* not really such, but imaginary; this Affection, as being superfluous and detracting from the Force of other requisite and good Affections, is in it-self vicious and ill, even in respect of the private Interest or Happiness of the Creature.

If there can possibly be suppos'd in a Creature such an Affection towards Self-Good, as is actually, in its natural degree, conduced to his private Interest, and at the same time inconsistent with the publick Good; this may indeed be call'd still a vicious Affection: And on this Supposition a Creature \* cannot really be good and natural in respect of his Society or Publick, without being ill and unnatural towards himself. But if the Affection be then only injurious to the Society, when it is immoderate, and not so when it is moderate, duly temper'd, and allay'd; then is the *immoderate* degree of the Affection truly vicious, but not *the moderate*. And thus, if there be found in any Creature a more than ordinary Self-concernment, or Regard to private Good, which is inconsistent with the Interest of the Species or Publick; this must in every respect be esteem'd an ill and vicious Affection. And this is what we commonly call † SELFISHNESS, and disapprove so much, in whatever Creature we happen to discover it.

ON the other side, if the Affection towards private or Self-good, however *selfish* it may be esteem'd, is in reality not only consistent with publick Good, but in some measure contributing to it; if it be such, perhaps, as for the good of the Species in general, every individual ought to share: 'tis so

\* *Intra*, p. 52, &c. 107, 6, &c.  
† VOL. I. pag. 81.

Part 2. or blameable in any sense, that it Part 2.  
be known'd absolutely necessary to consist  
of a Creature Good. For if the want of such an §. 2.  
part as that towards Self-preservation, be inju-  
ry to the Species ; a Creature is ill and unsta-  
ble thro' this Defect, as thro' the want of any  
natural Affection. And this no-one would  
be pernicious, if he saw a Man who minded  
Precipices which lay in his way, nor made  
Intinction of Food, Diet, Clothing, or what-  
ever related to his Health and Being. The same  
be aver'd of one who had a Disposition  
render'd him averse to any Commerce with  
mankind, and of consequence unfitted him thro'  
*of Temper* (and not merely thro' a Defect of  
Species) for the propagation of his Species or

as the Affection towards Self-good, may be  
Affection, or an ill-one. For if this private  
can be too strong (as when the *excessive Love of*  
this a Creature for any generous Act) then is  
subtly vicious ; and if vicious, the Creature  
mov'd by it, is viciously mov'd, and can  
be otherwise than vicious in some degree,  
mov'd by that affection. Therefore if thro' such  
soft and passionate *Love of Life*, a-Creature  
sently induc'd to do Good (as he might be  
the same terms induc'd to do Ill) he is no  
good Creature for this Good he executes,  
Man is the more an honest or good Man  
for pleading a just Cause, or fighting in a  
war, for the sake merely of his Fee or Stipend.  
AT SO EVER therefore is done which hap-  
pens to be advantageous to the Species, thro an  
act merely towards Self-good, does not imply  
more Goodness in the Creature than as the Af-  
fection-self is good. Let him, in any particular,  
so well; if at the bottom, it be that selfish  
alone which moves him ; he is in himself  
us. Nor can any Creature be consider'd

## An INQUIRY

Book I. otherwise, when the Passion towards Self-good, ~~is~~ ever so moderate, is his real Motive in the do that, to which a natural Affection for his Ki ought by right to have inclin'd him.

*Temper.* AND indeed whatever exterior Helps or Succes an ill-dispos'd Creature may find, to push him towards the performance of any one good Aētic there can no Goodness arise in him till his Temper be so far chang'd, that in the issue he comes earnest to be led by some immediate Affection, *reelly*, and not *accidentally*, to Good, and against I

For Instance; if one of those Creatures dispos'd to be by Nature tame, gentle, and favourable Mankind, be, contrary to his natural Constituti fierce and savage; we instantly remark the Bre of Temper, and own the Creature to be unhappy and corrupt. If at any time afterwards, the same Creature, by good Fortune or right Manageme comes to lose his Fierceness, and is made tame, gentle, and treatable; like other Creatures of his Kind, it is acknowledg'd that the Creature thus rest becomes good and natural: Suppose, now, that Creature has indeed a tame and gentle Carri but that it proceeds only from the fear of his Keeper which if set aside, his predominant Passion initial breaks out; then is his Gentleness not his real Temper; but his true and genuine Nature or natural Temper remaining just as it was, the Creature is as ill as ever.

NOTHING therefore being properly either Genius or Illness in a Creature, except what is in the natural Temper; " A good Creature is such a one as by the natural Temper or Bent of his Affection is carry'd primarily and immediately, and not secondarily and accidentally, to Good, and against Evil. And an ill Creature is just the contrary; *viz.* " " who is wanting in right Affections, of *so* enough to carry him directly towards Good, " bear him out against Evil; or who is carry'd by other Affections directly to Evil, and against G

Part 2.   
the publick Good, or good of the Species  
above-mention'd ; then is the *natural* Temp.  
ily good. If, on the contrary, any requi- §. 3.  
rement be wanting ; or if there be any one su-  
perior, or weak, or any-wise disserviceable,  
tary to that main End ; then is the natural  
, and consequently the Creature himself, in  
unfore corrupt and ill.

THE is no need of mentioning either *Envie*,  
*Frowardness*, or other such hateful Passions ;  
in what manner they are ill, and constitute  
creature. But it may be necessary perhaps to  
that even as to *Kindness* and *Love* of the  
natural fore (such as that of any Creature for  
pring) if it be immoderate and beyond a cer-  
taine, it is undoubtedly vicious. For thus  
that *Tenderness* destroys the Effect of Love, and  
a *Pity* renders us uncapable of giving suc-  
Hence the Excess of motherly Love is own'd  
*vicious Fondness* ; over-great Pity, *Effeminacy*  
*shew* ; over-great Concern for Self-preserved  
*Cowardice* ; too little, *Rashness* ;  
ie at all, or that which is contrary (*viz.* a  
leading to Self-destruction) a *mad* and de-  
Depravity.

### S E C T. III.

to proceed from what is esteem'd mere  
*deeds*, and lies within the reach and capa-  
city *sensible Creatures*, to that which is call'd  
S E O R M E R I T, and is allow'd to Man

Creature capable of forming general No- Refex  
Things, not only the outward Beings which  
m<sup>self</sup>es to the Sense, are the Objects of the  
; but the very Actions themselves, and the  
of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their

jects of Sense. The Shapes, Motions, Colours, and Proportions of these latter being presented to our Eye; there necessarily results a \* Beauty or Deformity; according to the different Measure, Arrangement and Disposition of their several Parts. So in Behaviour and Actions, when presented to our Understanding, there must be found, of necessity, an apparent Difference, according to the Regularity or Irregularity of the Subjects.

*Moral  
Beauty  
and De-  
formity.* THE MIND, which is Spectator of Auditor of other Minds, cannot be without its Eye and Ear; so as to discern Proportion, distinguish Sound, and scan each Sentiment or Thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its Censure. It feels the Soft and Harsh, the Agreeable and Disagreeable, in the Affections; and finds a Foul and Fair, a Harmonious and a Dissonant, as really and truly here, as in any musical Numbers, or in the outward Forms or Representations of sensible Things. Nor can it † withhold its Admiration and Ecstasy, its Aversion and Scorn, any more in what relates to one than to the other of these Subjects. So that to deny the common and natural Sense of a SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL in Things, will appear an † Affectation merely, to any-one who considers duly of this Affair.

ore our Eyes, and acting on our Part 2,  
we sleep ; so in the *moral* and ~~and~~  
Forms and Images of Things §. 3.  
nd incumbent on the Mind, at  
n when the real Objects them-

Characters or Pictures of *Mor-*  
*al* of necessity figures to it-self,  
out with it, the Heart cannot  
tral ; but constantly takes part  
However false or corrupt it be  
is the difference, as to Beauty  
tween one *Heart* and another,  
, one *Behaviour*, one *Sentiment*  
accordingly, in all disinterested  
e in some measure of what is  
and disapprove what is dishonest

al Motions, Inclinations, Pas-  
ind consequent Carriage and Be-  
s in the various Parts of Life,  
as or Perspectives represented to  
adily discerns the Good and Ill  
or Publick ; there arises a new  
the Heart : which must either  
affect what is just and right,  
; contrary ; or, corruptly affect  
fect what is worthy and good.

alone it is we call any Creature *Publick*  
when it can have the Notion *Good an*  
*t*, and can attain the Specula-  
that is morally good or ill, ad-  
, right or wrong. For tho we  
ill Horse *vicious*, yet we never  
or of any mre Beast, Idiot, or  
r so good-natur'd, that he is

ire be generous, kind, constant,  
he cannot reflect on what he  
thers do, so as to take notice  
of

*Book I.* But when, either thro Superstition or ill Custom, there come to be very gross Mistakes in the assignment or application of the Affection; when the Mistakes are either in their nature so gross, or so complicated and frequent, that a Creature cannot well live in a natural State; nor with due Affections, compatible with human Society and Civil Life; then is the Character of **VIRTUE** forfeited.

*VICE in Opinion.* AND thus we find how far **WORTH** and **VIRTUE** depend on a knowledg of *Right* and *Wrong*, and on a use of Reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the Affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural Affection by which the Species or Society is upheld, may, on any account, or thro any Principle or Notion of Honour or Religion, be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and proper object of Esteem. For such a Principle as this must be wholly vicious: and whatsoever is acted upon it, can be no other than Vice and Immorality.

*Virtuous Worship.* And thus if there be any thing which teaches Men either Treachery, Ingratitude, or Cruelty, by divine Warrant; or under colour and pretence of any present or future Good to Mankind: if there be any thing which teaches Men to \* persecute their Friends thro Love; or to torment Captives of War in sport; or to offer † human Sacrifice; or to torment, mangle, or mangle themselves, in a religious Zeal, before their God; or to commit any sort of Barbarity, or Brutality, as amiable or becoming: be it Custom which gives Applause, or Religion which gives a Sanction; this is not, nor ever can be *Virtue*, of any kind, or in any sense; but must remain still horrid Depravity, notwithstanding any Fashion, Law, Custom or Religion, which may be ill and vicious *it-self*; but can never alter the eternal Measures, and immutable independent Nature of **Worth** and **VIRTUE**.

Animals, have been esteem'd *Worthy*, and Part 2<sup>d</sup>  
even as *Deities*; shou'd it appear to any-  
Religion or Belief of those Countrys,  
such a Creature as a Cat, preferable to  
was *Right*; and that other Men, who had  
religious Opinion, were to be treated  
till converted; this wou'd be certainly  
and wicked in the Believer: And every Ac-  
grounded on this Belief, wou'd be an *iniquous*,  
and vicious Action.

thus whatsoever causes a Misconception or *Right*  
judgement of the Worth or Value of any Ob-<sup>and</sup>  
as to diminish a due, or raise any undue,  
or, or unsocial Affection, must necessarily be  
cation of *Wrong*. Thus he who affects or  
Man for the sake of something which is re-  
honourable, but which is in reality vicious,  
self vicious and ill. The beginnings of this  
tion may be noted in many Occurrences;  
an ambitious Man, by the Fame of his  
Attempts, a Conqueror or a Pirate by his  
Enterprizes, raises in another Person an  
and Admiration of that immoral and inhu-  
character, which deserves Abhorrence: 'tis  
at the Hearer becomes corrupt, when he se-  
approves the ill he hears. But on the other  
ie Man who loves and esteems another, as  
ing him to have that Virtue which he has not,  
ly counterfeits, is not on this account either  
or corrupt.

**MISTAKE** therefore *in Fact* being no Cause  
of ill Affection, can be no Cause of Vice.  
**Mistake of Right** being the Cause of unequal  
, must of necessity be the Cause of vicious  
, in every intelligent or rational Being.

as there are many Occasions where the  
of *Right* may even to the most discerning part  
kind appear difficult, and of doubtful Deci-  
's not a slight Mistake of this kind which can't  
the Character of a virtuous or worthy Man.

But

## An INQUIRY.

Book I. lutely to master those Attempts of their Ant~~~~~nists; this is the greatest *Proof* imaginable, th~~Trial of~~ strong Principle of Virtue lies at the bottom, ~~Virtue.~~ has posseſ'd it-self of the natural Temper. Wh~~en~~ if there be no ill Passions stirring, a Person ma~~y~~ indeed more *cheaply virtuous*; that is to say, he conform himself to the known Rules of Vi~~tue~~ without sharing so much of a virtuous Princip~~al~~ another. Yet if that other Person, who has Principle of Virtue so strongly implanted, com~~plaint~~ laist to lose those contrary Impediments suppos~~ed~~ him, he certainly loses nothing in Virtue; bu~~t~~ the contrary, loſing only what is vicious in his Per~~son~~, is left more intire to Virtue, and posſeſſes a higher degree.

Degrees  
of Vir-  
tue.

Thus is *Virtue* shar'd in different degrees by rational Creatures; such at least as are call'd *ratiōnālis* but who come short of that sound and well-blissh'd Reason, which alone can constitute a *Affection*, a uniform and steady *Will* and *Resolve*. And thus Vice and Virtue are found variously in and alternately prevalent in the several Characters of Mankind. For it seems evident from our *Inq* that how ill soever the Temper or Passions may be with respect either to the sensible or the moral objects; however passionate, furious, lustful or any Creature may become; however vicious the Mind be, or whatever ill Rules or Principles it be by; yet if there be any Flexibleness or favourable Inclination towards the least moral Object, the appearance of moral Good (as if there be any thing as *Kindness*, *Gratitude*, *Bounty*, or *Compa-*) there is still something of *Virtue* left; and the C~~reature~~ is not wholly vicious and unnatural.

Thus a Ruffian, who out of a ſense of Fid and Honour of any kind, refufeſ to diſcover his ſociates; and rather than betray them, is con~~tingent~~ to endure Torments and Death; has certainly a Principle of Virtue, however he may misapply it. Twas the ſame Case with that Malefactor,

rather than do the Office of Executioner to his Com- Part 3,  
panions, chose to keep 'em company in their Exe- §, I,  
cution.

IN short: As it seems hard to pronounce of any Man, " That he is *absolutely an Atheist* ;" so it appears altogether as hard to pronounce of any Man, " That he is *absolutely corrupt or vicious* ;" there being few, even of the horridest Villains, who have not something of *Virtue* in this imperfect sense. Nothing is more just than a known saying, " *That it is as hard to find a Man wholly Ill, as wholly Good:*" because wherever there is any good Affection left, there is certainly some *Goodness* or *Virtue* still in being.

AND, having consider'd thus of *VIRTUE*, *What it is in it-self*; we may now consider how it stands with respect to the Opinions concerning a Deity, as above-mention'd,

## P A R T III.

### S E C T. I.

THE Nature of *VIRTUE* consisting (as has *caus'd*:  
been explain'd) in a certain just Disposition, or *VICE*:  
proportionable Affection of a rational Creature  
towards the moral Objects of Right and Wrong; nothing  
can possibly in such a Creature exclude a Principle of  
*Virtue*, or render it ineffectual, except what

1. EITHER takes away the natural and just  
Sense of Right and Wrong.

2. OR creates a wrong Sense of it.

3. OR causes the right Sense to be oppos'd, by  
contrary Affections.

ON the other side, nothing can assist, or advance of the  
the Principle of *Virtue*, except what either in some *fit*  
*manner nourishes and promotes* a Sense of Right and  
Wrong; or preserves it genuine and uncorrupt; or  
VOL. II. causes

~~book 1.~~ causes it, when such, to be obey'd; by subduing and subjeeting the other Affections to it.

*of VIR-* *UE.* W E are to consider, therefore, how any of the above-mention'd Opinions on the Subject of a DEITY may influence in these Cases, or produce either of these three Effects.

*of moral life.* I. AS to the first Case; THE TAKING AWAY THE NATURAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

I T will not surely be understood, that by this is meant the taking away the Notion of what is good and ill in the Species, or Society. For of the Reality of such a Good and Ill, no rational Creature can possibly be insensible. Every-one discerns and owns a publick Interest, and is conscious of what affects his Fellowship or Community. When we say therefore of a Creature, " That he has wholly lost the Sense of Right and Wrong ; " we suppose that being able to discern the Good and Ill of his Species, he has at the same time no Concern for either, nor an Sense of Excellency or Baseness in any moral Action relating to one or the other. So that except merely with respect to a private and narrowly-confin'd Self good, 'tis suppos'd there is in such a Creature no Liking or Dislike of Manners ; no Admiration, or Love of any thing as morally good ; nor Hatred or any thing as morally ill ; be it ever so unnatural or deform'd.

*of moral life.* T H E R E is in reality no rational Creature whatsoever, who knows not that when he voluntarily offends or does harm to any-one, he cannot fail to create an Apprehension and Fear of like harm, and consequently a Resentment and Animosity in every Creature who observes him. So that the Offender must needs be conscious of being liable to such Treatment from every-one, as if he had in some degree offended All.

T H U S Offence and Injury are always known as punishable by every-one ; and equal Behaviour (which is therefore call'd MERIT) as rewardable and well deserving from every-one. Of this even the wicked

## *VIRTUE.*

Creature living must have a *Sense*. So that if there be any further meaning in this *Sense* of Right and Wrong; if in reality there be any *Sense* of this kind which an absolute wicked Creature has not; it must consist in a real Antipathy or Aversion to Injustice or Wrongs, and in a real Affection or Love towards Equity and Right, for its own sake, and on the account of its own natural Beauty and Worth.

\* *Right and Wrong therefore being Natural Affection it-self, and natural to us as natural Affection.*

\* *Inyros*, p. 267, 272, 273.  
C 2

*Book 1.* being a first Principle in our Constitution and M  
there is no speculative Opinion, Persuasion or  
*How im-*  
*pair'd:* belief, which is capable *immediately* or *directly* to  
elude or destroy it. That which is of original and p  
Nature, nothing beside contrary Habit and Cusson  
*By oppo-*  
*sites affec-*  
*tion, or*  
*anti-*  
*paticy:* second Nature) is able to displace. And this  
fection being *an original one* of earliest rise in  
Soul or affectionate Part; nothing beside contr  
Affection, by frequent check and controul, can o  
rate upon it, so as either to diminish it in part,  
destroy it in the whole.

'Tis evident in what relates to the Frame  
Order of our Bodys; that no particular odd M  
or Gesture, which is either natural to us, and c  
sequent to our Make, or accidental and by H  
acquir'd, can possibly be overcome by our Immed  
Disapprobation, or the contrary Bent of our W  
ever so strongly set against it. Such a Change c  
not be effected without extraordinary Means,  
the intervention of Art and Method, a strict  
tention, and repeated Check. And even thus,  
ture, we find, is hardly master'd; but lies fullen,  
ready to revolt, on the first occasion. Much mo  
this *the Mind's* Case in respect of that natural A  
ction and anticipating Fancy, which makes the S  
of Right and Wrong. 'Tis impossible that this  
instantly, or without much Force and Violence  
effac'd, or struck out of the natural Temper, ever  
means of the most extravagant Belief or Opinio  
the World.

*Not by  
Opinion  
merely.*

NEITHER *Theism* therefore, nor *Atheism*,  
*Dæmonism*, nor any religious or irreligious Belie  
any kind, being able to operate immediately o  
rectly in this Case, but indirectly, by the interver  
of opposite or of favourable Affections casually ex  
by any such Belief; we may consider of this I  
in our last Case, where we come to examine  
*Agreement or Disagreement of other Affections*  
*this natural and moral one* which relates to R  
and Wrong.

## SECT. II.

§. 2.

**IL AS** to the second Case, *viz.* THE WRONG Corruption  
of moral  
Sense. SENSE OR FALSE IMAGINATION OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

THIS can proceed only from the Force of Custom and Education in opposition to Nature; as may be noted in those Countries where, according to Custom or politick Institution, certain Actions naturally foul and odious are repeatedly view'd with Applause, and Honour ascrib'd to them. For thus 'tis possible that a Man, forcing himself, may eat the Flesh of his Enemys, not only against his Stomach, but against his Nature, and think it nevertheless both right and honourable; as supposing it to be of considerable service to his Community, and capable of advancing the Name, and spreading the Terror of his Nation.

BUT to speak of the Opinions relating to a Cause of  
this Corruption. DEITY; and what effect they may have in this place. As to Atheism, it does not seem that it can directly have any effect at all towards the setting up a Fable Species of Right or Wrong. For notwithstanding a Man may thro' Custom, or by licentiousness of Practice, favour'd by Atheism, come in time to lose much of his natural moral Sense; yet it does not seem that Atheism shou'd of it-self be the cause of any estimation or valuing of any thing as fair, noble, and deserving, which was the contrary. It can never, for instance, make it be thought that the being able to eat Man's Flesh, or commit Bestiality, is good and excellent in it-self. But this is certain, that by means of corrupt Religion, or SUPERSTITION, Supernatural  
things many things the most horribly unnatural and inhuman, come to be receiv'd as excellent, good, and laudable in themselves.

Now is this a wonder. For where-ever any thing, in its nature odious and abominable, is by religious advanc'd, as the suppos'd Will or Pleasure

Book I. of a supreme Deity; if in the eye of the Believer it appears not indeed in any respect the less ill or odious on this account; then must the Deity of necessity bear the blame, and be consider'd as a Being naturally ill and odious, however courted, and solicited, thro Mistrust and Fear. But this is what Religion, in the main, forbids us to imagine. It every-where prescribes Esteem and Honour in company with Worship and Adoration. Whence therefore it teaches the Love and Admiratio[n] of a DEITY, who has any apparent Character of *Ill*; it teaches at the same time a Love and Admiratio[n] of *that Ill*, and causes that to be taken for good and amiable, which is in it-self horrid and detestable.

For instance: if JUPITER be He who is ador'd and reverenc'd; and if his History represents him amorously inclin'd, and permitting his Desires of this kind to wander in the loosest manner; 'tis certain that his Worshippers, believing this History to be literally and strictly true, must of course be taught a greater Love of amorous and wanton Acts. If there be a Religion which teaches the Adoration and Love of a GOD, whose Character it is to be captious, and of high resentment, subject to Wrath and Anger, furious, revengeful; and revenging himself, when offended, on others than those who gave the Offence: and if there be added to the Character of this GOD, a fraudulent Disposition, encouraging Deceit and Treachery amongst Men; favourable to a few, tho for slight causes, and cruel to the rest: 'tis evident that such a Religion as this being strongly enforc'd, must of necessity raise even an Approbation and Respect towards the Vices of this kind, and breed a suitable Disposition, a capricious, partial, revengeful, and deceitful Temper. For even Irregularities and Enormities of a heinous kind must in many cases appear illustrious to one, who considers them in a Being admir'd and contemplated with the highest Honour and Veneration.

This indeed must be allow'd; that if in the Part: Cult or Worship of such a Deity there be nothing ~~more~~<sup>less</sup> beyond common Form, nothing beside what proceeds from mere Example, Custom, Constraint, or Fear; if there be, at the bottom, no real Heartiness, no Esteem or Love imply'd; the Worshipper perhaps may not be much misled as to his Notion of Right and Wrong. If in following the Precepts of his suppos'd God, or doing what he esteems necessary towards the satisfying of such his DEITY, he is compel'd only by Fear, and, contrary to his Inclination, performs an Act which he secretly detests as barbarous and unnatural; then has he an Apprehension or Sense still of Right and Wrong, and, according to what has been already observ'd, is sensible of Ill in the Character of his God; however cautious he may be of pronouncing any thing on this Subject, or so thinking of it, as to frame any formal or direct Opinion in the case. But if by insenti le degrees, as he proceeds in his religious Faith and devout Exercise, he comes to be more and more reconcil'd to the Malignity, Arbitrariness, Partiality, or Revengefulness of his believ'd DEITY; his Reconciliation with these Qualitys themselves will soon grow in proportion; and the most cruel, unjust, and barbarous Acts, will, by the power of this Example, be often consider'd by him, not only as just and lawfull, but as divine, and worthy of imitation.

For whoever thinks there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is just and good, must suppose that there is such a thing as Justice and Injustice, Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong; according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. If the mere Will, Decree, or Law of God be said absolutely to constitute Right and Wrong, then are these latter words of no significance at all. For thus if each part of a Contradiction were affirm'd for Truth by the supreme Power, they wou'd consequently become true. Thus

~~Book I.~~ If one Person were decreed to suffer for another's fault, the Sentence wou'd be *just* and *equitable*. And thus, in the same manner, if arbitrarily, and without reason, some Beings were destin'd to endure perpetual Ill, and others as constantly to enjoy Good; this also wou'd pass under the same Denomination. But to say of any thing that it is *just* or *unjust*, on such a foundation as this, is to say nothing, or to speak without a meaning.

And thus it appears, that where a real Devotion and hearty Worship is paid to a supreme Being, who in his History or Character is represented otherwise than as really and truly just and good; there must ensue a Loss of Rectitude, a Disturbance of Thought, and a Corruption of Temper and Manners in the Believer. His Honesty will, of necessity, be supplanted by his Zeal, whilst he is thus unnaturally influenc'd, and render'd thus immorally devout.

~~Reli-~~ To this we need only add, that as the *ill Character* of a God does injury to the Affections of Men, and disturbs and impairs the natural Sense of Right and Wrong; so, on the other hand, nothing can more highly contribute to the fixing of right Apprehensions, and a sound Judgment or Sense of Right and Wrong, than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, represented such as to be actually a true Model and Example of the most exact Justice, and highest Goodness and Worth. Such a View of divine Providence and Bounty, extended to *All*, and expres'd in a constant good Affection towards the *Whole*, must of necessity engage us, within our Compass and Sphere, to act by a like Principle and Affection. And having once the Good of our Species or Publick in view, as our End or Aim, 'tis impossible we shou'd be misguided by any means to a *false Apprehension* or *Sense* of Right or Wrong.

As to this second Case therefore; RELIGION (according as the kind may prove) is capable of doing great Good or Harm; and ATHEISM nothing pernici-

another way. For however it may be in Part 3. occasion of Mens losing a good and true Sense of Right and Wrong ; it will not, §. 34. ~~surely~~, be the occasion of setting up a sense of it ; which only false Religion, or bad Opinion, deriv'd commonly from Superstition and Credulity, is able to effect.

## S E C T. III.

W<sup>E</sup> AS TO THE last Case, THE OPPOSITION <sup>Oppos:</sup>  
MADE BY OTHER AFFECTIONS TO THE <sup>tion of</sup>  
MORAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. <sup>the Affec-</sup>  
<sup>tions.</sup>

It is evident, that a Creature having this sort of *good Affection* in any degree, must necessarily act according to it ; if it happens not to be oppos'd, either by some settled sedate Affection towards a conceiv'd private Good, or by some strong and forcible Passion; as of *Lust* or *Hate*, which may not only subdue the Sense of Right and Wrong, but the very Sense of private Self-t<sup>e</sup>lf; and over-rule even the most familiar Opinions of what is conducing to Self-interest.

IT is not our business in this place to examine the several Means or Methods by which this affection is introduc'd or increas'd. We are to consider only how the Opinions concerning a Deity influence one way or another.

AT it is possible for a Creature capable of reflection, to have a Liking or Dislike of moral Sense, and consequently a Sense of Right and Wrong, such time as he may have any settled Notion of God, is what will hardly be question'd : it being not expected, or any-way possible, that a creature such as *Man*, arising from his Childhood and gradually, to several degrees of Reason and Education, shou'd, at the very first, be taken up with speculations, or more refin'd sort of Reflections, the Subject of God's Existence.

*Rise of Moral Sense.* Book I. LET us suppose a Creature, who wanting Reason, and being unable to reflect, has, notwithstanding many good Qualities and Affections; as Love to his Kind, Courage, Gratitude, or Pity. 'Tis certain that if you give to this Creature a reflecting Faculty, it will at the same instant approve of Gratitude, Kindness, and Pity; be taken with any shew or representation of the social Passion, and think nothing more amiable than this, or more odious than the contrary. And this is to be capable of VIRTUE and to have a Sense of RIGHT and WRONG.

BEFORE the time, therefore, that a Creature can have any plain or positive Notion one way or other, concerning the Subject of a God, he may be suppos'd to have an Apprehension or Sense of Right and Wrong, and be possess'd of Virtue and Vice in different degrees; as we know by Experience of those, who having liv'd in such places, and in such a manner as never to have enter'd into any serious Thoughts of Religion, are nevertheless very different among themselves, as to their Characters of Honesty and Worth: some being naturally modest, kind, friendly, and consequently Lovers of kind and friendly Actions; others proud, harsh, cruel, and consequently inclined to admire rather the Acts of Violence and mere Power.

DEITY. Now, as to the Belief of a DEITY, and how Men are influenc'd by it; we may consider, in the first place, on what account Men yield Obedience, and act in conformity to such a supreme Being. It must be either in the way of his POWER, as presupposing some Disadvantage or Benefit to accrue from him: or in the way of his EXCELLENCE and WORTH, as thinking it the Perfection of Nature to imitate and resemble him.

*Hiprand Fear.* If (as in the first Case) there be a Belief or Conception of a DEITY, who is consider'd only as powerful over his Creature, and inferring Obedience to his absolute Will by particular Rewards and Punishments: and if on this account, thro' Hop-

or ~~use~~ or ~~use~~ or ~~enjoyment~~, the creature part 3.  
to the Good he hates, or restrain'd ~~use~~  
~~power~~ to which he is not otherwise in §. 3.  
service; there is in this Case (as has  
been shewn) no Virtue or Goodness what-  
ever in the Creature, notwithstanding his good  
is intrinsically of as little Worth, as if he  
is natural way, when under no dread or  
by force. There is no more of *Rebissade*,  
*and fury* in a Creature thus reform'd, than  
*fierceness* or *Grovelling* in a Tiger strongly  
*Instructed* and *Sobriety* in a Monkey under  
one of the Whip. For however orderly  
such Animals, or Man himself upon like  
y be induc'd to act, whilst the Will is  
n'd, nor the Inclination wrought upon,  
and prevails and forces Obedience; the  
is *servile*, and all which is done thro it,  
*sic*. The greater degree of such a Sub-  
Obedience, is only the greater *Servility*;  
may be the Object. For whether such a *Fear*.  
is a good Master, or an ill one, he is nei-  
ther less servile in his own nature. Be the  
superior ever so perfect, or excellent, yet  
Submission caus'd in this Case, thro this  
is or Motive, is only the lower and more  
tude, and implies the greater Wretched-  
ness in the Creature, who has those  
Self-love so predominant, and is in his  
vicious and defective, as has been ex-

the second Case. If there be a Belief or *Honor*  
of a *Deity*, who is consider'd as *wor-* and  
, and admir'd and reverenc'd as such;  
stood to have, besides mere Power and  
the highest Excellence of Nature, such  
him justly amiable to All; and if in  
this Sovereign and mighty Being is re-  
ver, as he is historically describ'd, there  
is a high and eminent regard to what

*Book I.* is good and excellent, a Concern for the good *All*, and an Affection of Benevolence and Love towards the *Whole*; such an Example must undeniably serve (as above explain'd) to raise and increase the Affection towards Virtue, and help to subdue all other Affections to that alone.

No 2. is this Good effected by *Example* in For where the Theistical Belief is intire and perfect there must be a steady Opinion of the Superiority of a Supreme Being, a Witness and Spectator of human Life, and conscious of whatsoever is or acted in the Universe: So that in the perfect Recess, or deepest Solitude, there must be *Our* presum'd remaining with us; whose Presence must be of more moment than that of the most august Assembly on Earth. In such a Presence it is evident, that as the *Shame* of guilty Actions must be greatest of any; so must the *Honour* be, of doing, even under the unjust Censure of a Being. And in this Case, 'tis very apparent how con*a perfect Theism* must be to Virtue, and how Deficiency there is in *Atheism*.

*Fear and Hope.* *WHAT* the *FEAR* of future *Punishment* and the *HOPE* of future *Reward*, added to this Belief, further contribute towards Virtue, we come to consider more particularly. So much in this while may be gather'd from what has been above; That neither this *Fear* or *Hope* can be of the kind call'd *good Affections*, such as knowledgeg'd the Springs and Sources of all truly *good*. Nor can this *Fear* or *Hope*, as intimated, consist in reality with Virtue, or *merit*; if it either stands as *essential* to any Performance, or as a *considerable Motive* to any of which some better Affection ought, alone, *bien a sufficient Cause*.

*Self-love,* *Religious* sort of Discipline, the Principle of *S*elf-love, which is naturally so prevailing in us, being moderated or restrain'd, but rather

danger every day, by the exercise of Part 3. which makes a Subject of more extended Self-interest; there may be reason to apprehend lest the §. 3. of this kind shou'd extend it-self in general to all the Parts of Life. For if the Habit be to occasion, in every particular, a stricter regard to Self-good, and private Interest; it is manifestly diminish the Affections towards the Good, or the Interest of Society; and induces a certain Nærtowness of Spirit, which (as I have said) is peculiarly observable in the devout and Zealots of almost every religious Nation.

It is, too, most be confess'd; That if it be *not* ~~an~~ <sup>the</sup> *chief* <sup>object</sup> ~~object~~ <sup>in</sup> *Religion*, to love God for his own sake; the over-weight given to private Good expected from the Rule of Necessity prove a diminution of Piety. For God is belov'd only as the Cause of Good, he is no otherwise belov'd than as their Instrument or Means of Pleasure by any Creature. Now the more there is of this Affection towards *private Good*, the less room there is for the other sort towards *Goodness it-self*, a good and deserving Object, worthy of Love & admiration for its own sake; such as God verily acknowledg'd, or at least by the greatest of civiliz'd or refin'd Worshippers.

It is in this respect that the strong Desire and Love of Life may also prove an Obstacle to Piety, as to Virtue and publick Love. For the more this Affection is in any-one, the less will he be able to have true *Resignation*, or Submission to the Rule and Order of the *Divinity*. if that which he calls *Resignation* depends only *Faith* & expectation of infinite Retribution or Reward. he discovers no more Worth or Virtue here, in any other Bargain of Interest: The meaning of his Resignation being only this, "That he resigns his present Life and Pleasures, conditionally

## An INQUIRY

Book 1. "tionally for THAT which he himself cont  
 ues " to be beyond an Equivalent ; eternal living  
 " State of highest Pleasure and Enjoyment."\*

BUT notwithstanding the Injury which the Principle of Virtue may possibly suffer, by the Inc of the selfish Passion, in the way we have been rationing ; 'tis certain, on the other side, that *Belief of Principle of Fear of future Punishment, and future Reward, how mercenary or servile soe Life ; it may be accounted, is yet, in many Circumstances, a great Advantage, Security, and Supportant-  
 Dangerous.*

IT has been already consider'd, that notwithstanding there may be implanted in the Heart a Sense of Right and Wrong, a real good Affection towards the Species or Society ; yet by the viol of Rage, Lust, or any other counter-working fision, this good Affection may frequently be trou'l'd and overcome. Where therefore there is thing in the Mind capable to render such ill Passions the Objects of its Aversion, and cause them easi-  
 ly to be oppos'd ; 'tis apparent how much a Temper in time must suffer, and a Character by grees change for the worse. But if Religion terposing, creates a Belief that the ill Passions of kind, no less than their consequent Actions, are Objects of a Deity's Animadversion ; 'tis certain such a Belief must prove a seasonable Remedy ag Vice, and be in a particular manner advantag to Virtue. For a Belief of this kind must be pos'd to tend considerably towards the calmin the Mind, and disposing or fitting the Person better Recollection of himself, and to a stricter fervance of that good and virtuous Principle, w needs only his Attention, to engage him wholl its Party and Interest.

*Raving.* AND as this Belief of a future Reward Punishment is capable of supporting those who ill Practice are like to apostatize from Virtue.

*the Opinion* and wrong I thought, the mind part 3.  
bent against the honest Course, and de- even to an Esteem, and deliberate Prefe- §. 3.  
a vicious one; the Belief of the kind men-  
may prove on this occasion the only Relief  
sty.

erson, for instance, who has much of  
s and natural Rectitude in his Temper, but  
so much Softness, or Effeminacy, as unfits  
ear Poverty, Crosses or Adversity; if by ill  
he meets with many Trials of this kind, it  
rtainly give a Sourness and Distaste to his  
and make him exceedingly averse to that  
e may falsely presume the occasion of such *Belief of*  
*or Ill.* Now if his own Thoughts, or *future*  
upt Insinuations of other Men, present it  
his Mind, "That his HONESTY is the *oc-*  
*of this Calamity, and that if he were de-*  
*l from this Restraint of VIRTUE and Ho-*  
*ny, he might be much happier;" tis very ob-*  
at his Esteem of these good Qualitys must  
ortion diminish every day, as the Temper  
neasy, and quarrels with it-self. But if he  
to this Thought the Consideration, "That  
ty carrys with it, if not *a present*, at least  
*the Advantage, such as to compensate that*  
*of private Good which he regrets;*" then  
a injury to his good Temper and honest  
be prevented, and his Love or Affection  
Honesty and Virtue remain as it was before.

same manner, where instead of *Regard* or *Improv-*  
here is rather *an Aversion* to what is good *ing.*  
sots (as, for instance, where *Lenity* and *For-*  
are despis'd, and *Revenge* highly thought of,  
w'd) if there be this Consideration added,  
*Lenity* is, by its Rewards, made the cause  
greater Self-good and Enjoyment than what  
ind in *Revenge;*" that very Affection of  
nd *Mildness* may come to be industriously  
D 2

## An INQUIRY

~~Book 2.~~ nourish'd, and the contrary Passion depreſſ'd. And thus Temperance, Modesty, Candour, Benignity, and other good Affections, however despis'd at first, may come at laſt to be valu'd for their own ſakes, the contrary Species rejected, and the good and proper Object belov'd and prosecuted, when the Reward or Punishment is not fo much as thought of.

*Rewards  
and  
Punish-  
ments,  
In the  
State,* THUS in a civil STATE or PUBLICK, we ſee that a virtuous Administration, and an equal and just Distribution of Rewards and Punishments, is of the highest service; not only by restraining the Vitiouſ, and forcing them to act uſefully to Society; but by making Virtue to be apparently the Interest of every-one, ſo as to remove all Prejudices againſt it, create a fair reception for it, and lead Men into that path which afterwards they cannot eaſily quit. For thus a People rais'd from Barbarity or despotick Rule, civiliz'd by Laws, and made virtuous by the long Course of a lawful and juſt Administration; if they chance to fall ſuddenly under any Misgovernmenſt of unjust and arbitrary Power, they will on this account be the rather animated to exert a stronger Virtue, in opposition to ſuch Violence and Corruption. And even where, by long and continu'd Arts of a prevailing Tyranny, ſuch a People are at laſt totally oppreſſ'd, the ſcatter'd Seeds of Virtue will for a long time remain alive, even to a ſecond Generation; e'er the utmoſt Force of miſapply'd Rewards and Punishments can bring them to the abject and compliant State of long-accuſtomed Slaves.

BUT tho' a right Distribution of Justice in a Government be ſo eſſential a cause of Virtue, we muſt obſerve in this Caſe, that it is Example which chiefly influences Mankind, and forms the Character and Dispoſition of a People. For a virtuous Adminiſtration is in a manner neceſſarily accompani'd with Virtue in the Magiſtrate. Otherwiſe it cou'd be of little effect, and of no lo-  
bljduration. But where it is ſincere and well e-

, there Virtue and the Laws must necessarily Part 3.  
be affected and belov'd. So that as to Punishments  
Rewards, their Efficacy is not so much from the  
Expectation which they raise, as from a natural  
Love of *Virtue*, and Detestation of *Villany*, which  
is known'd and excited by these publick Expressions  
of Approbation and Hatred of Mankind in each  
For in the publick Executions of the greatest  
Miseries, we see generally that the Infamy and Odi-  
ousness of their Crime, and the Shame of it before  
the world, contribute more to their Misery than all  
the Pain; and that it is not the immediate Pain, or  
it-self, which raises so much Horror either in  
the Spectators or Spectators, as that ignominious kind  
of Pain which is inflicted for publick Crimes, and  
which is the consequence of Justice and Humanity.

So as the Case of Reward and Punishment stands In the  
in the Publick, so, in the same manner, as to Family,  
the Family. For Slaves and mercenary Servants,  
are known'd and made orderly by Punishment, and the  
Master of their Master, are not on this account  
good or honest. Yet the same Master of the  
using proper Rewards and gentle Punishments  
is his Children, teaches them Goodness, and  
by help instructs them in a Virtue, which after-  
they practise upon other grounds, and without  
thinking of a Penalty or Bribe. And this is  
we call a *Liberal Education* and a *Liberal Ser-*  
*the contrary Services and Obedience, whether*  
*to God or Man, being illiberal, and unworthy*  
*Honour or Commendation.*

the Case of Religion, however, it must be In Reli-  
gion, that if by the *Hope of Reward* be un-  
dermined the Love and Desire of virtuous Enjoy-  
ment or of the very Practice and Exercise of Vir-  
tue another Life; the Expectation or Hope of this  
is so far from being derogatory to Virtue,  
it is an Evidence of our loving it the more sin-  
cere and for its own sake. Nor can this Prin-  
D 3 ciple

## An INQUIRY

be justly call'd *selfish*: for if the Love of Virtue for Virtue's sake, cannot be esteem'd so great natural Aversion to Death; if it be thro' Love of something else than *virtus*; or thro' the Unwillingness of parting with nothing else than what is purely of this kind; then is it no longer any sign or token of real virtue.

Thus a Person loving Life for Life's sake, and Virtue not at all, may by the Promise or Hope of Life, and Fear of Death, or other Evil, be induc'd to practise Virtue, and even endeavour to be truly virtuous, by a Love of what *endeavour* to be practises. Yet neither is this *very Endeavour* to be esteem'd a *Virtus*. For tho' he may intend to be *virtus*; he is not become so, for having only intended, or aim'd at it, the love of the Reward. But as soon as he is come to have any Affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect such Good for its own sake, as good and amiable in it-self; then is he in full degree good and *virtus*, and not till then.

Such are the Advantages or Disadvantages which accrue to Virtue from Reflection or Interest. For tho' the Habit upon private Multiplicity of interested Virtues, are of little Import to real Merit or Virtue; yet there is a thought to have no quarrel with true Interest or Self-enjoyment.

Whoever therefore, by any strong P<sup>r</sup> or settled Judgment, thinks in the main, that *Happiness*, and *Vice Miseria*, can be caus'd Security, and *Vice Misery*, can be requir'd. Or tho' he has no such Theory respect to his own Nature and Constitution, Circumstances of human Life; yet if he has extreme Powers concern'd in the pre-

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§. 3.

immediately interposing in behalf of Part 3,  
the Virtuous, against the Impious and  
will serve to preserve in him, how-  
just Esteem of Virtue, which might other-  
merably diminish. Or shou'd he still be  
of the immediate Interposition of Prov-  
the Affairs of *this present Life*; yet if he  
God dispensing Rewards and Punish-  
Vice and Virtue in *a future*; he carrys  
still the same Advantage and Security; *Conti-*  
Belief is steady, and no-wise wavering  
For it must be observ'd, that an Ex-  
and Dependency, so miraculous and great  
ut naturally take off from other inferior  
ties and Encouragements. Where infinite  
are thus inforc'd, and the Imagination  
urn'd towards them, the other common  
al Motives to Goodness are apt to be neg-  
i lose much by Dis-use. Other Interests  
so much as computed, whilst the Mind  
ansported in the pursuit of a high Ad-  
al Self-interest, so narrowly confin'd with-  
res. On this account, all other Affec-  
tions Friends, Relations, or Mankind, are  
ly regarded, as being *worldly*, and of little  
n respect of the Interest of *our Soul*. And  
ought is there of any immediate Satisfac-  
g from such good Offices of Life, that it  
ry with many devout People zealously to *Inpru-*  
*mporal Advantages of Goodness, all na-*  
*dent fits of Virtue; and magnifying the con-*  
*Zeal,*  
*siness of a vicious State, to declare, " That*  
*only for the sake of future Reward, and*  
*future Punishment, they wou'd divest*  
*es of all Goodness at once, and freely*  
*em'selves to be most immoral and pro-*

From whence it appears, that in some  
ere can be nothing more \* fatal to Virt-

Book I. tue, than the weak and uncommon Belief of a  
ture Reward and Punishment. For the stress he  
laid wholly here, if this Foundation come to /  
there is no further Prop or Security to M.  
Morals, And thus Virtue is supplanted and  
tray'd.

*Atheism.* Now as to ATHEISM: tho it be plainly di-  
cient, and without remedy, in the case of *ill Ju-  
ment on the Happiness of Virtue*; yet it is not,  
deed, of necessity the Cause of any such *ill Ju-  
ment*. For without an absolute Assent to any I-  
pothesis of Theism, the Advantages of Virtue n  
possibly be seen and own'd, and a high Opin-  
of it establish'd in the Mind. However, it m  
be confess'd, that the natural Tendency of Athe-  
is very different.

"Tis in a manner impossible, to have any ga-  
opinion of the Happiness of Virtue, without c-  
eiving high thoughts of the Satisfactions result-  
from the generous Admiration and Love of it: A  
nothing beside the Experience of such a Love  
likely to make this Satisfaction credited. The  
Ground and Support therefore of this Opinion  
*Happiness in Virtue*, must arise from the pow-  
feeling of this generous moral Affection, and  
Knowldg of its Power and Strength. But this  
certain, that it can be no great strengthening to  
moral Affection, no great support to the pure L  
of Goodness and Virtue, to suppose there is  
ther Goodness nor Beauty in the WHOLE it-self;  
any Example, or Precedent of good Affection in  
superior Being. Such a Belief must tend rather  
the weaning the Affections from any thing amir-  
or self-worthy, and to the suppressing the very H  
and familiar Custom of admiring natural Beau-  
or whatever in the Order of things is according  
just Design, Harmony, and Proportion. For  
little dispos'd must a Person be, to love or adm-  
*any thing as orderly in the Universe, who thinks*  
*Universe it-self a Pattern of Disorder?* How

ence or respect any particular subordinate Part 3, of a Part ; when even THE WHOLE it-self ~~would~~ ought to want Perfection, and to be only a vast infinite Deformity ?

THING indeed can be more melancholy, than the Thought of living in a distracted Universe, hence many Ills may be suspected, and where is nothing good or lovely which presents it-thing which can satisfy in Contemplation, or by Passion besides that of Contempt, Hatred, &c. Such an Opinion as this may by degrees r the Temper, and not only make the Love of to be less felt, but help to impair and ruin the inciple of Virtue, viz. natural and kind Affection.

IN the whole ; whoever has a firm Belief of Theism, whom he does not merely call good, but in reality he believes nothing beside real nothing beside what is truly suitable to the Character of Benignity and Goodness ; such in believing Rewards or Retributions in an life, must believe them annex'd to real Good- and Merit, real Villany and Baseness, and not occidental Qualities or Circumstances ; in which they cannot properly be stil'd Rewards or Punishments, but capricious Distributions of Happiness or Unhappiness to Creatures. These are the only Terms ch the Belief of a World to come, can happily ce the Believer. And on these Terms, and use of this belief, Man perhaps may retain his and Integrity, even under the hardest Thoughts an Nature ; when either by any ill Circum- or untoward Doctrine, he is brought to that innate Opinion of Virtue's being naturally an to Happiness in Life.

is, however, is an Opinion which cannot be d consistent with sound Theism. For what : decided as to a future Life, or the Rewards inishments of hereafter ; he who, as a sound believes a reigning Mind, sovereign in Na- id ruling all things with the highest percep- tion

*An INQUIRY.*

Book I. tion of Goodness, as well as of Wisdom and Power  
 must necessarily believe Virtue to be naturally good  
~~Theism.~~ and advantageous. For what cou'd more strongly  
 imply an unjust Ordinance, a Blot and Imperfection  
 in the general Constitution of Things, than to sup-  
 pose Virtue the natural Ill, and Vice the natural  
 Good of any Creature?

*Atheism* *and* *Theism.* And now last of all, there remains for us to consider a yet further Advantage to Virtue, in the *Theistical Belief* above the *Atheistical*. The Proposition may at first sight appear over-refin'd, and a sort which is esteem'd too nicely philosophically. But after what has been already examin'd, the Subject perhaps may be more easily explain'd.

*Effect of each.* There is no Creature, according to what has been already prov'd, who must not of necessity be ill in some degree, by having any Affection or Aversion in a stronger degree than is suitable to his own private Good, or that of the System to which he join'd. For in either Case the Affection is ill avitius. Now if a rational Creature has that Degree of Aversion which is requisite to arm him against any particular Misfortune, and alarm him against the Approach of any Calamity; this is regular and well. But if after the Misfortune is happen'd, his Aversion continues still, and his Passion rather grows upon him; whilst he rages at the Accident, and exclaims against his private Fortune Lot; this will be acknowledg'd both vicious *in present*, and *for the future*; as it affects the Temper and disturbs that easy Course of the Affections which Virtue and Goodness so much depend. On the other side, the patient enduring of the Calamity and the bearing up the Mind under it, must be acknowledged immediately virtuous, and *preservative* of *Virtue*. Now, according to the Hypothesis of those who exclude a general Mind, it must be confess'd that there can nothing happen in the Course of things deserve either our Admiration, and Love, or Anger, and Abhorrence. However, as that

## K II.

## T I.

## I.

what VIRTUE is, and to <sup>Obligation</sup> what belongs. It remains <sup>tion to</sup> Obligation there is to <sup>VIR-</sup> T U E,

to embrace it, deserve the name of must have all his Inclinations of Mind and con- g with the Good of his which he is included, and of

To stand thus well af- fctions right and intire, not but of Society and the Integrity, or VIRTUE. to them, or to have their upption, and VICE.

own, that in the Passions <sup>Difficulty</sup> of Creatures, there is a <sup>adjusted</sup> interest of a Species, or com- demonstrated in the case al Kindness, Zeal for Po- agation and Nurture of the and Company, Compa- the rest of this kind. Nor is Affection of a Creature species or common Nature, him, as it is to any Organ, mal Body, or mere Ve- E getable,

## An INQUIRY

*Book 4.* ever kind, is naturally improving to the Temper, ~~and~~ advantageous to social Affection, and highly affi-  
tant to *Virtue*; which is it-self no other than the  
Love of Order and Beauty in Society. In the meanest  
Subjects of the World, the Appearance of *Order* gains  
upon the Mind, and draws the Affection towards  
it. But if *the Order of the World it-self* appears just  
and beautiful; the Admiration and Esteem of *Order*  
must run higher, and the elegant Passion or Love of  
Beauty, which is so advantageous to *Virtue*, must  
be the more improv'd by its Exercise in so ample  
*Religious* and magnificent a Subject. For 'tis impossible that  
*Affec-*  
*tion.* such a *Divine Order* shou'd be contemplated without \* Extasy and Rapture; since in the common  
Subjects of Science, and the liberal Arts, whatever  
is according to just Harmony and Proportion, is so  
transporting to those who have any Knowledge or  
Practice in the kind.

Now if the Subject and Ground of this divine  
Passion be not really just or adequate (the Hypothesis  
of *Theism* being suppos'd false) the Passion still in it-  
self is so far natural and good, as it proves an Ad-  
vantage to Virtue and Goodness; according to what  
has been above demonstrated. But if, on the other  
fide, the Subject of this Passion be really adequate  
and just (the Hypothesis of *Theism* being real, and  
not imaginary) then is the Passion also just, and be-  
comes absolutely due and requisite in every rational  
Creature.

*Conclu-*  
*sion.*

HENCE we may determine justly the Relation  
which *VIRTUE* has to *Piety*; the first being no  
compleat but in the latter: Since where the latter  
wanting, there can neither be the same Benignity,  
Firmness, or Constancy; the same good Composi-  
tion of the Affections, or Uniformity of Mind.

AND thus the Perfection and Height of *VIRTUE*  
must be owing to *the Belief of a God*.

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\* *Intra*, pag. 256, 259, &c. And VOL. III. p. 24, 25.  
3 B Q

## BOOK II.

## PART I.

## SECT. I.

We have consider'd what VIRTUE is, and to whom the Character belongs. It remains <sup>to inquire,</sup> What Obligation there is <sup>to</sup> VIRTUE, or under what Rases to embrace it.

have found, that to deserve the name of Virtue, a Creature must have all his Inclinations and Affections; his Dispositions of Mind and Temper, and agreeing with the Good of his Species, or that System in which he is included, and of which he constitutes a PART. To stand thus well affected to have one's Affections right and entire, not respect of one's self, but of Society and the Species. This is Rectitude, Integrity, or VIRTUE. Not wanting in any of these, or to have their contrary, is Degravity, Corruption, and VICE.

It has been already shewn, that in the Passions of particular Creatures, there is a <sup>difficulty</sup> ~~affection~~ in relation to the Interest of a Species, or common Nature. This has been demonstrated in the case of parental Affection, parental Kindness, Zeal for Protection, Concern for the Propagation and Nurture of the Species, Love of Fellowship and Company, Compunctional Succour, and the rest of this kind. Nor can any-one deny that this Affection of a Creature is the Good of the Species or common Nature, *proper and natural* to him, as it is to any Organ, Member of an Animal Body, or mere Vegetable.

Book 1, getable, to work in its known Course, and re-  
 way of Growth. 'Tis not more *natural* for  
 Stomach to digest, the Lungs to breathe, the G-  
 to separate Juices, or other Intrails to perform  
 several Offices; however they may by parti-  
 Impediments be sometimes disorder'd or obstr.  
 in their Operations.

*Unions with a Kind or Species.* THERE being allow'd therefore in a Cre-  
 such Affections as these towards the common N-  
 or System of the Kind, together with those  
 which regard the private Nature, or Self-system,  
 will appear that in following the first of these  
 fections, the Creature must on many Occasions  
 tradict and go against the latter. How else sh-  
 the Species be preserv'd? Or what wou'd sh-  
 that implanted natural Affection, by which a C-  
 ture thro so many Difficultys and Hazards pres-  
 its Offspring, and supports its Kind?

*Opposi-  
 tion from  
 Self-in-  
 terest.* IT may therefore be imagin'd, perhaps,  
 there is a plain and absolute Opposition betw-  
 these two Habits or Affections. It may be  
 sum'd, that the pursuing the common Interest  
 publick Good thro the Affections of one kind,  
 be a hindrance to the Attainment of private  
 thro the Affections of another. For it being  
 for granted, that Hazards and Hardships, of w-  
 ever sort, are naturally the Ill of the private S-  
 and it being certainly the Nature of those pub-  
 Affections to lead often to the greatest Hard-  
 and Hazards of every kind; 'tis presently ind-  
 " That 'tis the Creature's Interest to be without  
 " publick Affection whatsoever."

THIS we know for certain; That all  
 Love, Friendship, Gratitude, or whatever else  
 this generous kind, does by its nature take plac-  
 the self-interesting Passions, draws us out of our-sel-  
 and makes us disregardful of our own Conven-  
 and Safety. So that according to a known \*

say, that which is of a social Part i. shou'd of right be abolish'd. Thus every sort, Indulgence, Tenderness, &c. and in short, all natural Affection shou'd be entirely suppress'd, and, as mere Folly, and vice of Nature, be refined and overcome ; of this manner, there might be nothing remaining in us, which was contrary to a direct Self-love, which might stand in opposition to a ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~all~~ Pursuit of the most narrowly Self-interest.

~~concerning~~ to this extraordinary Hypothesis must be taken for granted, "That in the System of a Kind or Species, the Interest of the ~~particular~~ Nature is directly opposite to that of the ~~particular~~ one ; the Interest of Particulars directly opposite to that of the Publick in general." —  
What Constitution ! in which it must be considered there is much Disorder and Untowardness ; to what we observe elsewhere in Nature. As in a vegetable or animal Body, the Part or Member shou'd be suppos'd in a good and prosperous ~~is to it-self~~, when under a contrary Disposition in an unnatural Growth or Habit ~~as to its~~

that this is in reality quite otherwise, we <sup>Reconcile</sup> labour to demonstrate ; so as to make appear that what Men represent as an ill Order Constitution in the Universe, by making ~~moral~~ <sup>Re</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> Ill, and Depravity ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> or Advantage of a Creature, is in Nature the contrary. That to be well affected to the Publick Interest and one's own, is not consistent, but inseparable : and that moral Justice, or Virtue, must accordingly be the Advantage, and Vice the Injury and Disadvantage of a Creature."



or to be impair'd in  
or Member, is no Inconve-  
the least notice.

Proportions of the Mind, their *Inward Proper-  
tion*.

Dependency, the Connexion  
tions which constitute the  
easily be understood by any-  
th his while to study this in-  
is certain that the Order or  
d Part is, in it-self, no less  
that of the Body. However,

of us endeavour to become

Nor is any-one ashame'd of  
in such a Subject. For tho  
ill is generally own'd to be  
mper; tho 'tis allow'd that  
and that it actually varys  
uch to our disadvantage; yet  
ught about, we inquire not.  
selves to consider thorowly by  
oods our *inward Constitution*  
be impair'd or injur'd. The

bodily Surgeons talk of, is *Conti-  
nency*, by Surgeons of another *nusity*.

a Whole and Parts is not ap-  
sue. We know not what the  
any Affection, indulging any  
exsing any proper and natural  
on. Nor can we conceive  
thou'd have such a sudden  
ole Mind, as to make the  
Sufferer. We suppose rather  
ate his Faith, commit any

## An INQUIRY

## SECT. II.

*Contra-  
dictory  
Natura-*

**T**HREE are few perhaps, who when they consider a Creature void of natural Affection, and wholly destitute of a communicative or social Principle, will suppose him, at the same time, either tolerably happy in himself, or as he stands abroad, with respect to his Fellow-Creatures or Kind. 'Tis generally thought, that such a Creature as this, finds slender Joy in Life, and finds little Satisfaction in the mere sensual Pleasures which remain with him, after the Loss of social Enjoyment, and whatever can be call'd *Humanity* or *Good-nature*. We know

*Dissolute* that to such a Creature as this, 'tis not only *incident*, or *immo-*  
*rall state*, to be morose, rancorous and malignant; but that,

*of necessity*, a Mind or Temper thus destitute of Mildness and Benignity, must turn to that which is contrary, and be wrought by Passions of a different kind. Such a Heart as this must be a continual Seat of perverse Inclinations and bitter Aversions, rais'd from a constant ill Humour, Sourness, and Disquiet. The Consciousness of such a Nature, so obnoxious to Mankind, and to all Beings which approach it, must overcloud the Mind with dark Suspicion and Jealousy, alarm it with Fears and Horror, and raise in it a continual Disturbance; even in the most seeming fair and secure State of Fortune, and in the highest degree of outward Prosperity.

*Insolite.* This, as to the *compleat immoral State*, is what of their own accord, Men readily remark. When there is this *absolute Degeneracy*, this *total Apostacy* from all Candour, Equity, Trust, Sociableness, or Friendship; there are few who do not see and acknowledge the Misery which is consequent. Selden is the Case misconstru'd, when *at worst*. The misfortune is, we look not on this Depravity, no

*In part.* consider how it stands, *in less degrees*. The Calmity, we think, does not of necessity, hold proportion with the Injustice or Iniquity. As it

idately immoral and inhuman, were indeed the Part 1. & misfortune and misery ; but that to be so, in ~~any~~  
~~degree~~, shou'd be no misery nor harm at all ! §. 2.  
1 to allow, is just as reasonable as to own, is the greatest Ill of a Body to be in the ut-  
manner distorted and maim'd ; but that to  
e use only of one Limb, or to be impair'd in  
me single Organ or Member, is no Inconve-  
or Ill worthy the least notice.

¶ Parts and Proportions of the Mind, their *Inward Prefer-  
Relation and Dependency, the Connexion tion.*  
ame of those Passions which constitute the  
r Temper, may easily be understood by any-  
ho thinks it worth his while to study this in-  
Anatomy. 'Tis certain that the Order or  
etry of this *inward Part* is, in it-self, no less  
nd exact, than that of the *Body*. However,  
parent that few of us endeavour to become  
wits of this sort. Nor is any-one ashame'd of  
epeft Ignorance in such a Subject. For tho  
tatest Misery and Ill is generally own'd to be  
*Disposition*, and *Temper* ; tho 'tis allow'd that  
may often change, and that it actually varys  
ny occasions, much to our disadvantage ; yet  
his Matter is brought about, we inquire not.  
ever trouble our-selves to consider thorowly by  
means or methods our *inward Constitution*  
at any time to be impair'd or injur'd. The  
*Continui*, which bodily Surgeons talk of, is *Conti-*  
apply'd in this case, by Surgeons of another *busy*.  
The Notion of a *Whole* and *Parts* is not ap-  
plied in this Science. We know not what the  
is, of straining any Affection, indulging any  
; Passion, or relaxing any proper and natural  
er good Inclination. Nor can we conceive  
particular Action shou'd have such a sudden  
ce on the whole Mind, as to make the  
an immediate Sufferer. We suppose rather  
*Man may violate his Faith, commit any*

## An INQUIRY

Vickedness unfamiliar to him before, engage in any Vice or Villany, without the least prejudice to himself, or any Misery naturally following from the ill Action. "Tis thus we hear it often said, " Such a Person has done ill indeed: But what is he the worse for it?" Yet speaking of any Nature thorowly savage, curst, and inveterate, we say truly, " Such a one is a plague and torment to himself: " And we allow, " That thro' certain Humour, or Passion, and from Temper merely, a Man may be compleatly miserable; let his outward Circumstances be ever so fortunate." Judgments sufficiently demonstrate that we are accustom'd to think with much coherency on moral Subjects; and that our Notions, in this respect, are not a little confus'd, and contradictory. Now if the Fabrick of the Mind or Temper of the System of the Affectio-<sup>n</sup>n's be such to us as it really is; if we saw it in- sible to remove hence any one good or orderly section, or introduce any ill or disorderly one, out drawing on, in some degree, that dissolute which at its height is confess'd to be so mis- 'twou'd then undoubtedly be confess'd to be so ill, immoral, or unjust Action cou'd be com- without either a new inroad and breach Temper and Passions, or a farther adva- that Execution already begun; whoever ad- fested in prejudice of his Integrity, Good- Worth, wou'd of necessity act with greater towards himself, than he who scrupled ne- low what was poisonous, or who with hands shou'd voluntarily mangle or ward Form or Constitution, natur-

convulsive Fits, where a Creature strikes Part t.  
self or others, 'tis a simple Mechanism,  
, or Piece of Clock-work, which acts; §. 3.  
ie Animal.

so e v e r therefore is done or acted by <sup>Spring of</sup> ~~Actions.~~  
al *as such*, is done only thro some Affec-  
tion, as of Fear, Love, or Hatred mov-

as it is impossible that a weaker Affec-  
d overcome a stronger, so it is impossible  
here the Affections or Passions are strongest  
, and form in general <sup>the most consider-</sup>  
<sup>s or Number;</sup> thi-  
Animal must incline: And according to  
ice he must be govern'd, and led to Action.

Affections or Passions which must influence <sup>Affec-</sup>  
in the Animal, are either,  
<sup>tions,</sup>  
<sup>& natural Affections, which lead to the Good</sup> <sup>three</sup>  
<sup>kinds.</sup>  
UBLICK.

the Self-affection, which lead only to the  
THE PRIVATE.

such as are neither of these; nor tending  
my Good of THE PUBLICK OR PRIVATE;  
ry-wise: and which may therefore be just-  
*natural Affections.*

according as these Affections stand, a  
must be virtuous or vicious, good or ill.  
atter sort of these Affections, 'tis evident,  
vicious. The two former may be vicious  
s, according to their degree.

seem strange, perhaps, to speak of natu- <sup>Degrees</sup>  
ions as *too strong*, or of Self-affections as <sup>of Affec-</sup>  
<sup>tion.</sup>

But to clear this Difficulty, we must call  
what has been already explain'd, " That  
Affection may, in particular Cases, be ex-  
and in an unnatural degree:" As when  
overcoming as to destroy its own End, and  
ie Succour and Relief requir'd; or as when  
Offspring proves such a Fondness as de-  
barent, and consequently the Offspring it-self.

And

tle to others of the same Character, and equally  
tural and useful as to their End. And this muſt  
ceſſarily be the occaſion of Partiality and Inju-  
riſt only one Duty or natural Part is earnestly  
low'd; and other Parts or Dutys neglected, w-  
ſhou'd accompany it, and perhaps take place at  
prefer'd.

THIS may well be allow'd true in all othe-  
r ſpecks; ſince even RELIGION itſelf, conſider'd  
a Paſſion, not of the ſelfiſh but nobler kind, ma-  
ſome Characters be ſtrain'd beyond its natural  
portion, and be ſaid alſo to be in too high a de-  
gree. For as the End of Religion is to render us  
perfect, and accomplish'd in all moral Dutys  
Performances; if by the height of devout Extasy  
Contemplation we are rather diſabled in this reſpect,  
and render'd more unapt to the real Dutys and  
aſces of civil Life; it may be ſaid that Religio-  
n indeed is then too ſtrong in us. For how, poſ-  
ſan we call this SUPERSTITION, whiſt the O-  
bject of the Devotion is acknowledg'd juſt, and the I-  
orthodox? 'Tis only the Excess of Zeal, which  
in this Caſe, is ſo tranſporting, as to render the  
vout Person more remiſs in ſecular Affairs, and  
concern'd for the inferior and temporal Interes-  
of Mankind.

NOW as in particular Caſes, publick Affection  
on the one hand, may be too high; ſo private Af-  
fection, on the other hand, be too weak. For if a Cu-  
ture be ſelf-neglectful, and insenſible of Dutys;  
it he want ſuch a degree of Paſſion in any

is useful to preserve, sustain, or defend himself; this Part must certainly be esteem'd vicious, in regard of the ~~the~~ Design and End of Nature. She her-self discovers §. 3. this in her known Method and stated Rule of Operation. "Tis certain, that her provisionary Care and Concern for the whole Animal, must at least be equal to her Concern for a single Part or Member. Now to the several Parts she has given, we see, proper Affections, suitable to their Interest and Security; so that even without our Consciousness, they act in their own Defence, and for their own Benefit and Preservation. Thus *an Eye*, in its natural State, fails not to shut together, of its own accord, unknowingly to us, by a peculiar Caution and Timidity; which if it wanted, however we might intend the Preservation of our Eye, we shou'd not in effect ~~be able to~~ <sup>desire</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>to</sup> preserve it, by any Observation or Fore-<sup>sight</sup> cast of our own. To be wanting therefore in those principal Affections, which respect the Good of the whole Constitution, must be a Vice and Imperfection, as great surely in the principal part (the Soul or Temper) as it is in any of those inferior and subordinate parts to want the self-preserving Affections which are proper to them.

And thus the Affections towards private Good become necessary and essential to Goodness. For tho' no Creature can be call'd good, or virtuous, merely for possessing these Affections; yet since it is impossible that the publick Good, or Good of the System, can be preserv'd without them; it follows that a Creature really wanting in them, is in reality wanting in some degree to Goodness and natural Rectitude; and may thus be esteem'd vicious and defective.

"Tis thus we say of a Creature, in a kind way of Reproof, that he is *too good*; when his Affection towards others is so warm and zealous, as to carry him even beyond his Part; or when he really acts beyond it, not thro' too warm a Passion of ~~that~~ <sup>one</sup> ~~but~~ <sup>and</sup> thro' an over-cool one of another, or thru'

Book 2. want of some Self-passion to restrain him within  
due Bounds.

IT may be objected here, that the having the natural Affections too strong, (where the Self-affections are overmuch so) or the having the Self-affections defective or weak (where the natural Affections are also weak) may prove upon occasion the only Cause of a Creature's acting honestly and in moral proportion. For, thus, one who is to a fault regardless of his Life, may with the smallest degree of natural Affection do all which can be expected from the highest Pitch of social Love, or zealous Friendship. And thus, on the other hand, a Creature excessively timorous may, by as exceeding a degree of natural Affection, perform whatever the perfectest Courage is able to inspire.

To this it is answer'd, That whenever we arraign any Passion as *too strong*, or complain of any as *too weak*; we must speak with respect to a certain Constitution or *Economy* of a particular Creature, or Species. For if a Passion, leading to any right end, be only so much the more serviceable and effectual, for being strong; if we may be asfur'd that the strength of it will not be the occasion

*Degrees of Affection* between it-self and other Affections; then con-

sequently the Passion, however strong, cannot be condemn'd as vicious. But if to have *all* the Passions in equal proportion with it, be what the Constitution of the Creature cannot bear; so that only *some* Passions are rais'd to this height, whilst *other* are not, nor can possibly be wrought up to the same proportion; then may those strong Passions, tho' of the better kind, be call'd excessive. For being in unequal proportion to the others, and causing an *ill Ballance* in the Affection at large, they must of course be the occasion of Inequality in the Conduct, and incline the Party to a wrong moral Practice.

*ies or Kinds below us. As for the Creatures who have no manner of Power or Means by Nature for their defence against them by Nature for their defence against, nor any-thing by which they can make 'tis necessary they shou'd have an extrao-  
degree of Fear, but little or no Animosity, might cause 'em to make resistance, or in-  
n to delay their Flight. For in this their  
es, and to this the Passion of Fear is ser-  
by keeping the Senses on the watch, and  
he Spirits in readiness to give the start.  
thus Timorousness, and an habitual strong  
f Fear, may be according to the OEcconomy  
cular Creature, both with respect to him-  
to the rest of his Species. On the other  
rage may be contrary to his OEcconomy,  
ore vicious. Even in one and the same  
is is by Nature differently order'd, with  
ifferent Sexes, Ages, and Growths. The  
tures of the grazing kind, who live in  
different from the wilder, who herd not,  
Pairs only, apart from Company, as is  
stutable to their rapacious Life. Yet is  
even among the former inoffensive kind,  
portionable to their Make and Strength.  
danger, when the whole Herd flies, the  
ikes head against the Lion, or what-  
ading Beast of Prey, and shews him-  
of his Make. Even the Female of this  
we see, by Nature, in some degree,  
; so as not to fly a common Danger.  
or Doe, or any other inoffensive and  
s Creature: 'tis no way unnatural or  
, when the Enemy approaches, to*

Book 1. desert their Offspring, and fly for Safety. But ~~such~~ Creatures who are able to make Resistance, and ~~are~~ by Nature arm'd offensively; be they of the poor ~~of the~~ Insect-kind, such as Bees or Wasps; 'tis natural 'em to be rouz'd with Fury, and at the hazard their Lives, oppose any Enemy or Invader of the Species. For by this known Passion in the Creature the Species it-self is secur'd; when by Experience 'tis found that the Creature, tho' unable to repel the Injury, yet voluntarily exposes his Life for the Punishment of the Invader; and suffers not his Kind to be injur'd with Impunity. And of all other Creatures, *Man* is in this Sense the most formidable since if he thinks it just and exemplary, he may possibly in his own, or in his Country's Cause, revenge an Injury on any-one living; and by throwing away his own Life (if he be resolute to that degree) is almost certain Master of another's, however strongly guarded. Examples of this nature have often serv'd to restrain those in Power, from using it to the utmost Extent, and urging their Inferior to Extremity.

*Mea-  
sure.  
Tone.* UPON the whole: It may be said properly to the same with the Affections or Passions in an Animal-Constitution, as with the Cords or Strings of Musical Instrument. If these, tho' in ever so just proportion one to another, are strain'd beyond a certain degree, 'tis more than the Instrument will bear. The Lute or Lyre is abus'd, and its Effect lost. On the other hand, if while some of the Strings are duty strain'd, others are not wound up to their due proportion; then is the Instrument still in disorder and its Part ill perform'd. The several Species of Creatures are like different sorts of Instruments. And even in the same Species of Creatures (as in the same sort of Instrument) one is not intirely like the other, nor will the same Strings fit each. The same degree of Strength which winds up one, and the several Strings to a just Harmony and Content, may in another burst both the Strings & Instru-

at it-self. Thus Men who have the liveliest Part . . .  
d are the easiest affected with Pain or Plea- —  
e need of the strongest Influence or Force §. 3.

Affections, such as Tenderness, Love, So-  
, Compassion, in order to preserve a right  
c<sub>z</sub> *within*, and to maintain them in their *Pal-*  
d in the just performance of their Part : *Lance*.  
hers, who are of a cooler Blood, or lower  
d not the same Allay or Counter-part; nor  
by Nature to feel those tender and indearing  
s in so exquisite a degree.

ight be agreeable, one wou'd think, to in-  
s into the different *Tunings* of the Passions,  
us Mixtures and Allays by which Men be-  
different from one another. For as the <sup>TEM-</sup>  
mprovements of Temper are made in hu- <sup>PER.</sup>  
d; so the greatest Corruptions and Dege- <sup>B. 7. or</sup>  
are discoverable in this Race. In the other <sup>wo. 7. in</sup>  
f Creatures around us, there is found ge-  
n exact Proportionableness, Constancy and  
ty in all their Passions and Affections; no  
the care of the Offspring, or of the So-  
which they are united; no Prostitution of  
es; no Intemperance, or Excess, in any kind.  
ler Creatures, who live as it were in Citys (as  
Ants) continue the same Train and Har-  
Life: Nor are they ever false to those Af-  
which move them to operate towards their  
Good. Even those Creatures of Prey, who  
farthest out of Society, maintain, we see,  
conduct towards one another, as is exactly  
o the Good of their own Species. Whilst  
otwithstanding the Assistance of Religion,  
Direction of Laws, is often found to live  
onsernity with Nature; and by means of  
it-self, is often render'd the more barba-  
l inhuman. Marks are set on Men: Di-  
s form'd: Opinions decreed, under the  
*Penalty's*: Antipathys instill'd, and Aver-  
II. F

## An INQUIRY

sions rais'd in Men against the generality of their own Species. So that 'tis hard to find in any Region a human Society which has *human Laws*. No wonder if in such Societys 'tis so hard to find a Man who lives NATURALLY, and as a Man.

BUT having shewn what is meant by a Passion's being *in too high*, or *in too low* a degree; and that, "To have any natural Affection *or* any Self-affection, is yet, strictly speaking, a Vice and Imperfection: we come now to the plainer and more essential part of Vice, and which alone deserves to be consider'd *as such*: that is to say,

1. " WHEN either the publick Affections are weak or deficient;
2. " OR the private and Self-affections too strong.

3. " OR that such Affections arise as are neither either of the publick or private System."

OTHERWISE than *thus*, it is impossible any Creature can be such as we call ILL or VITIOUS. So that if once we prove that it is really not the Creature's Interest to be thus *viciously* affected, but contrariwise; we shall then have prov'd, "That i<sup>s</sup> his Interest to be wholly Good and VIRTUOUS:" Since in a wholsom and sound State his Affections, such as we have describ'd, he cannot possibly be other than found, good and virtuous, his Action and Behaviour.

Our Business, therefore, will be, to prove;

L. " THAT to have the NATURAL, KIND  
" or GENEROUS AFFECTIONS strong and po-  
" ful towards the Good of the Publick, is so  
" the chief Means and Power of Self-enjoyment  
And, " That to want them, is certain Misery  
" ILL."

" THAT to have THE PRIVATE or SELF-Partz.  
AFFECTIONS too strong, or beyond their degree of ~~over-~~  
ubordinacy to the kindly and natural, is also mu- §. I.  
rable."

I, AND, " That to have THE UNNATURAL  
AFFECTIONS (viz. such as are neither founded  
in the Interest of the Kind, or Publick; nor of  
the private Person, or Creature himself) is to be  
desirable in the highest degree."

## PART II.

### SECT. I.

¶ O begin therefore with this Proof, " THAT FIRST  
" TO HAVE THE NATURAL AFFEC-<sup>Proof,</sup>  
" TIONS (such as are founded in Love,<sup>from the</sup> natural  
Placancy, Good-will, and in a Sympathy <sup>Affec.</sup>  
with the Kind or Species) IS TO HAVE THE <sup>tions.</sup>  
SELF MEANS AND POWER OF SELF-ENJOY-  
MENT. And THAT TO WANT THEM IS CERTAINLY  
MISERY AND ILL."

¶ We may inquire, first, what those are, which  
are *Pleasures* or *Satisfactions*; from whence Hap-<sup>Plea-</sup>  
py is generally computed. They are (according <sup>sures of</sup> the common distinction) *Satisfactions* and *Pleasures* <sup>the BO-</sup>  
<sup>DY and</sup> *MIND.*

¶ THAT the latter of these *Satisfactions* are <sup>The lat-</sup>  
ter, is allow'd by most People, and may be <sup>ter pre-</sup>  
ferable, by this: That whenever the Mind, having  
eiv'd a high Opinion of the Worth of any Ac-  
tion or Behaviour, has receiv'd the strongest Impres-  
sion of this sort, and is wrought up to the highest  
or degree of Passion towards the Subject; at  
time it sets it-self above all bodily Pain as well  
as pleasure, and can be no-way diverted from its

Book 2. purpose by Flattery or Terror of any kind. Thus we see Indians, Barbarians, Malefactors, and even the most execrable Villains, for the sake of a particular Gang or Society, or thro' some cherish'd Notion or Principle of Honour or Gallantry, Revenge, or Gratitude, embrace any manner of Hardship, and defy Torments and Death. Whereas, on the other hand, a Person being plac'd in all the happy Circumstances of outward Enjoyment, surrounded with every thing which can allure or charm the Sense, and being then actually in the very moment of such a pleasing Indulgence; yet no sooner is there any thing amiss *within*, no sooner has he conceiv'd any *internal Ail or Disorder*, any thing *inwardly vexatious* or *distemper'd*, than instantly his Enjoyment ceases, the pleasure of Sense is at an end; and every means of that sort becomes ineffectual, and is rejected as uneasy, and subject to give Distaste.

*Inference.* True Pleasures of the Mind being allow'd, therefore, superior to those of the Body; it follows, "That whatever can create in any intelligent Being a constant flowing Series or Train of mental Enjoyments, or Pleasures of the Mind, is more considerable to his Happiness, than that which can create to him a like constant Course or Train of sensual Enjoyments, or Pleasures of the Body."

*Mental Enjoyments, whence.* Now the mental Enjoyments are either actuall the very natural Affections themselves in their immediate Operation: Or they wholly in a manner proceed from them, and are no other than their Effects.

If so; it follows, that the natural Affection duly establish'd in a rational Creature, being the only means which can procure him a constant Series or Succession of the mental Enjoyments, they are the only means which can procure him a certain and solid Happiness.

*Energy of natural Affections,* NOW, in the first place, to explain, "How much the natural Affections are in themselves the highest Pleasures and Enjoyments?" Therefrom

methinks be little need of proving this of human Kind, who has ever known tion of the Mind under a lively Affection Gratitude, Bounty, Generosity, Pity, Saccour, or whatever else is of a social or friendly who has ever so little Knowldg of hum is sensible what pleasure the Mind perce it is touch'd in this generous way. The we find between Solitude and Company, common Company and that of Friends reference of almost all our Pleasures to m verse, and the dependence they have either present or imagin'd; all these are Proofs in our behalf.

How much the social Pleasures are superior to any other, may be known by visible Tokens and Effects. The very outward Features, the Marks and Signs which attend this sort of Joy, are expressive of a more intense, clear, and undisturb'd Pleasure, than those which attend the Satisfaction of Thirst, Hunger, and other ardent Appetites. But more particularly still may this Superiority be known, from the actual Prevalence and Ascendency of this sort of Affection over all besides. Wherever it presents it-self with any advantage, it silences and appeases every other Motion of Pleasure. No Joy, merely of Senfe, can be a Match for it. Whoever is Judg of both the Pleasures, will ever give the preference to the former. But to be able to judg of both, 'tis necessary to have a Sense of each. The honest Man indeed can judg of sensual Pleasure, and knows its utmost Force. For neither is his Taste, or Sense, the duller; but, on the contrary, the more intense and clear, on the account of his Temperance, and a moderate Use of Appetite. But the immoral and profligate Man can by no means be allow'd a good Judg of social Pleasure, to which he is so mere a stranger by his Nature.

*Noz is it any Objection here: that in many Na-  
tures the good Affection, tho' really present, is found*

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Book 2. We may observe, withal, in favour of the natural Affections, that it is not only when Joy and Sprightliness are mix'd with them, that they carry a real Enjoyment above that of the sensual kind. The very Disturbances which belong to natural Affection, tho' they may be thought wholly contrary to Pleasure, yield still a Contentment and Satisfaction greater than the Pleasures of indulg'd Sense. And where a Series or continu'd Succession of the tender and kind Affections can be carry'd on, even thro' Fears, Horrors, Sorrows, Griefs; the Emotion of the Soul is still agreeable. We continue pleas'd even with this melancholy Aspect or Sense of Virtue. Her Beauty supports It-self under a Cloud, and in the midst of surrounding Calamitys. For thus, when by mere Illusion, as in a *Tragedy*, the Passions of this kind are skilfully excited in us; we prefer the Entertainment to any other of equal duration. We find by our-selves, that the moving our Passions in this mournful way, the engaging them in behalf of Merit and Worth, and the exerting whatever we have of social Affection, and human Sympathy, is of the highest Delight; and affords a greater Enjoyment in the way of Thought and Sentiment, than any thing besides can do in a way of Sense and common Appetite. And after this manner it appears, "How much the mental Enjoyments are actually the very natural Affections themselves."

*Effects* *natur-* NOW, in the next place, to explain, "How *affec-*  
*tion,* " they proceed from them, as their natural Effects?" we may consider first, That the EFFECTS of Love or kind Affection, in a way of mental Pleasure, are, "An Enjoyment of Good by Communication. A receiving it, as it were, by Reflection, or by way of Participation in the Good of others." And "A pleasing Consciousness of the actual Love, merited Esteem or Approbation of others."

How considerable a part of Happiness arises from the former of these Effects, will be easily ap-

part of the private System ; it must either be Part 2. &d superfluous and *unnatural* (as having no ~~concern~~<sup>connex</sup> towards the Advantage or Good of any §. i. in Nature) or it must be judg'd to be, what ly is, \* " A natural Joy in the Contemplation of those Numbers, that *Harmony*, *Proportion*, & *Concord*, which supports the universal Na-  
e, and is essential in the Constitution and Form every particular Species, or Order of Beings."

To this speculative Pleasure, however conside-  
rable and valuable it may be, or however superior  
the Motion of mere Sense ; must yet be far sur-  
passed by *virtuous Motion*, and the Exercise of Benig-  
nity and Goodness ; where, together with the most  
tiful Affection of the Soul, there is join'd a  
strong Assent and Approbation of the Mind to  
is acted in this good Disposition and honest

For where is there on Earth a fairer Matter  
of contemplation, a goodlier View or Contemplation,  
than that of a *beautiful*, *proportion'd*, and *becoming*  
n ? Or what is there relating to us, of which  
consciousness and Memory is more solidly and  
gladly entertaining ?

It may observe that in the Passion of Love be-  
tween the Sexes, where, together with the Affec-  
tion of a *vulgar* sort, there is a mixture of the kind  
*friendly*, the Sense or Feeling of this *Latter* is in every  
superior to the former ; since often thro this affection,  
and for the sake of the Person belov'd, <sup>religion</sup>  
greatest Hardships in the World have been sub-  
ject to, and even Death it-self voluntarily im-  
piled, without any expected Compensation. For  
shou'd the Ground of such an Expectation be  
true, in this *World* surely ; for Death puts an end

Nor yet *b-reather*, in any other : for who has  
thought of providing a Heaven or future Re-  
compence for the suffering Virtue of Lovers ?

*An* 1  
ship, that almost all our Actions, and mixt even with most of our Vices, this, *Vanity*, *Ambition*, and *Luxury*, have a share; and many other Disorders of our Life partake. Even the unchaste Love borrows largely from this Source. So that were Pleasure to be computed in the same way as other things commonly are; it might properly be said, that out of these two Branches (viz. Community or Participation in the Pleasures of others, and Belief or Meriting well from others) would arise more than nine Tenth parts of whatever is enjoy'd in Life. And thus in the main Sum of Happiness there is scarce a single Article, but what derives itself from social Love, and depends immediately on the natural and kind Affections.

Now such as *CAUSES* are, such must be the *social Love*. And therefore as *natural Affection* Content and Happiness depending on it.

*Partial* BUT left any shou'd imagine with them but an *inferior Degree* of natural Affection, *most impartial* Regard of this sort, can *entire, sincere, and true* social Inclination. End

its Continuance or Force. As it has no Establishment *in Reason*; so it must be  
ble, and subject to alteration, without  
the Variableness of such sort of Passion,  
is solely on Capriciousness and Hu-  
ndergoes the frequent Successions of  
red and Love, Aversion and Inclina-  
necessity create continual Disturbance  
give an alloy to what is immediately  
e way of Friendship and Society, and  
tinguish, in a manner, the very Incli-  
is Friendship and human Commerce.

the other hand, INTIRE AFFEC-  
whence *Integrity* has its name) as it is  
it-self, proportionable, and rational;  
agable, solid, and durable, And as  
*Partiality*, or vicious Friendship, which  
r order, every Reflection of the Mind  
akes to its disadvantage, and lessens  
t; so in the case of *Integrity*, the Con-*Partial*  
just Behaviour towards Mankind in *Affec-*  
a good reflection on each friendly Af-*tion.*  
ticular, and raises the Enjoyment of  
the higher, in the way of *Community*  
above-mention'd.

ie next place, as PARTIAL AFFEC-  
i only to a short and slender Enjoy-  
: Pleasures of *Sympathy* or *Participa-*  
; so neither is it able to derive any  
Enjoyment from that other principal  
*an Happiness, viz. Consciousness of the*  
*actual*

## An INQUIRY

Book 2. *actual or merited Esteem of others.* From whence shou'd this Esteem arise? The Merit, surely, must it-self be mean, whilst the Affection is so precious and uncertain. What Trust can there be to a casual Inclination or capricious Likings? Who depend on such a Friendship as is founded on no moral Rule, but fantastically assign'd to some Person, or small Part of Mankind, exclusive of society, and the Whole?

IT may be consider'd, withal, as a thing possible; that they who esteem or love by any Rule than that of Virtue, shou'd place their Action on such Subjects as they can long esteem. 'Twill be hard for them, in the number of their so belov'd Friends, to find any, in whom they can heartily rejoice; or whose reciprocal Love & Esteem they can sincerely prize, and enjoy. Can those Pleasures be found or lasting, which gather'd from a Self-flattery, and false Persuasion, the Esteem and Love of others, who are incapable of any sound Esteem or Love. It appears then how much the Men of narrow or partial Affection must be Losers in this sense, and of necessity short in this second principal part of mental Enjoyment.

*Intire  
Affection.*

M E A N while *intire Affection* has all the opposite advantages. It is equal, constant, oeconomical to it-self, ever satisfactory, and pleasing. It derives Applause and Love from the best; and in all interested cases, from the very worst of Men. We say of it, with justice, that it carries with it a consciousness of merited Love and Approbation from Society, from all intelligent Creatures, and is the original of all other Intelligence. And if there be in Nature any such Original; we may add, the Satisfaction which attends *intire Affection*, is great, and noble, in proportion to its final Object, which contains all Perfection; according to the Sense of the above-noted. For this, as has been shewn, is the *Intrinsic Value of Virtue.* And to have this INTIRE AFFECTION

TEGRITY of Mind, is to live according to Part: and the Dictates and Rules of supreme Wif- ~~Wif~~  
his is Morality, Justice, Piety, and natural §. I.

I left this Argument shou'd appear perhaps *laſtically* stated, and in Terms and Phrases, re not of familiar use; we may try whether we can set it yet in a plainer light.

any-one, then, consider well those Plea-  
chich he receives either in private Retirement,  
plation, Study, and Converse *with himself*; Mirth, Jollity, and Entertainment, with  
and he will find, That they are wholly  
in *An easy Temper, free of Harfshness, Bit-Mind*  
*or Distaste*; and in *A Mind or Reason well and*  
*quiet, easy within it-self, and such as can* <sup>Tempo</sup>  
*ear its own Inspection and Review.* Now  
MIND, and such a TEMPER, which fit and  
for the Enjoyment of the Pleasures men-  
must of necessity be owing to the natural and  
actions.

to what relates to TEMPER, it may be con- TEM-  
thus. There is no State of outward Prospe- PER.  
r flowing Fortune, where Inclination and  
re always satisfy'd, Fancy and Humour pleas'd.  
are almost hourly some Impediments or  
to the Appetite; some Accidents or other  
about; or something from within, to check  
ntious Course of the indulg'd Affections.  
re not always to be satisfy'd by mete Indul-  
And when a Life is guided by Fancy only,  
sufficient Ground of Contrariety and Dis-  
e. The very ordinary Lassitudes, Uneasi-  
and Defects of Disposition in the soundest  
the interrupted Course of the Humours, or  
in the healthiest People; and the accidental  
rs common to every Constitution, are suffi-  
we know, on many occasions, to breed Un-  
and Distaste. And this, in time, must prove  
II.

Book I. into a Habit; where there is nothing to oppose progres, and hinder its prevailing on the Now the only found Opposite to ILL HUM natural and kind Affection. For we may that when the Mind, upon reflection, resolve time to suppress this Disturbance already the Temper, and sets about this reforming with heartiness, and in good earnest; it otherwise accomplish the Undertaking, than introducing into the affectionate Part some genning of the social and friendly kind; some en Motion of Kindness, Fellowship, Complac Love, to allay and convert that contrary Mi Impatience and Discontent.

*Temper.* If it be said perhaps, that in the case be Religious Affection or Devotion is a sufficient a per Remedy; we answer, That 'tis accor the Kind may happily prove. For if it be pleasant and chearful sort, 'tis of the very natural Affection it-self: if it be of the di fearful sort; if it brings along with it an tion opposite to Manhood, Generosity, Cou Free-thought; there will be nothing gain'd Application: and the Remedy will, in the undoubtedly found worse than the Disease. vereft Reflections on our Duty, and the Co tion merely of what is by Authority and m nalty: enjoin'd, will not by any means serve us on this occasion. The more dismal our T are on such a Subject, the worse our Tem be, and the readier to discover it-self in H and Austerity. If, perhaps, by Compulsion any Necessity or Fear incumbent, a differe riage be at any time affected, or different own'd; the Practice at the bottom will be same. If the Countenance be compos'd; it however, will not be chang'd. The ill Paff for the time be with-held from breaking u

it will not be subdu'd, or in the least debi-Part 2.  
gainst the next occasion. So that in such a ~~way~~  
is this, whatever *Devotion* there may be; §. I.,  
y there wil in time be little of *an easy Spir-  
ited Temper* remaining; and consequently few  
der Enjoyments of *a mental kind*.

: be objected, on the other hand, that tho  
ncholy Circumstances ill Humour may pre-  
t in a Courie of outward Prosperity, and in  
ght of Fortune, there can nothing probably  
which shou'd thus sour *the Temper*, and give it  
relish as is suggested; we may consider, that  
t humour'd and indulg'd State is apt to re-  
ne most disturbance from every Disappoint-  
smallest Ail. And if Provocations are easiest  
and the Passions of Anger, Offence, and En-  
ure found the highest in the most indulg'd  
f Will and Humour; there is still the greater  
f a Supply from *social Affection*, to preserve  
*Temper* from running into Savageness and Inhu-  
. And this, the Case of Tyrants, and most  
ed Potentates, may sufficiently verify and de-  
ate.

W as to the other part of our Consideration, *MIND*,  
relates to a *MIND or Reason well compos'd and*  
*it bin it-self*; upon what account this Happi-  
ay be thought owing to *natural Affection*, we *Rea-  
ctively resolve our-selves, after this manner.*  
I be acknowledg'd that a Creature such as

Book 2. this way of Criticism. We have all of us Rembrancers enow to help us in this Work. No the greatest Favourites of Fortune exempted this Task of Self-inspection. Even Flattery it by making the View agreeable, renders us more tentive this way, and insnares us in the Habit. vainer any Person is, the more he has his Eye inwfix'd upon himself; and is, after a certain manner employ'd in this home-Survey. And when a Regard to our-selves cannot oblige us to this Intention, a false Regard to others, and a Fondness Reputation raises a watchful Jealousy, and furnishes us sufficiently with Acts of Reflection on our Character and Conduct.

In whatever manner we consider of this, shall find still, that every reasoning or reflecting Creature is, by his Nature, forc'd to endure the Representations of his own Mind, and Actions; and to have Representations of himself, and his inward Affairs, stantly passing before him, obvious to him, and revolving in his Mind. Now as nothing can be more grievous than this is, to one who has thrown away natural Affection; so nothing can be more delightful to one who has preserv'd it with sincerity.

*Con-*  
*scien-*  
*ce.* THERE are two Things, which to a rational Creature must be horridly offensive and grievous. " To have the Reflection in his Mind of " unjust Action or Behaviour, which he knows " to be naturally odious and ill-deserving: Or, of " foolish Action or Behaviour, which he knows " to be prejudicial to his own Interest or Happiness."

*Moral*  
*Con-*  
*science.* THE former of these is alone properly CONSCIENCE; whether in a moral, or religious Sense. For to have Awe and Terror of the Devil does not, of it-self, imply Conscience. No one esteem'd the more conscientious for the fear of Spirits, Conjurations, Enchantments, or what may proceed from any unjust, capricious, or diabolical Nature. Now to fear God any otherwise than in consequence of some justly blamable and

is to fear a devilish Nature, not a di-Part 2.  
Nor does the Fear of Hell, or a thou-

§. 1.  
s. of the DEITY imply Conscience; un-  
where there is an Apprehension of what is  
*odious, morally deform'd, and ill-deserving.*  
where this is the Case, there Conscience must  
affect, and Punishment of necessity be appre-  
l; even tho' it be not expressly threaten'd.

so thus religious Conscience supposes moral or  
Conscience. And tho' the former be under-  
o carry with it the Fear of divine Punishment;  
ts force however from the apprehended mo-  
rality and Odiouiness of any Act, with re-  
surely to the Divine Presence, and the natural  
ation due to such a suppos'd Being. For in  
Presence, the Shame of Villany or Vice must  
s force, independently on that further Appre-  
i of the magisterial Capacity of such a Being,  
s Dispensation of particular Rewards or Pu-  
nits in a future State.

has been already said, that no Creature can  
only and intentionally *do ill*, without being  
, at the same time, that he *deserves ill*. And  
respect, every sensible Creature may be said  
e Conscience. For with all Mankind, and all  
ent Creatures, this must ever hold, "That  
they know they deserve from every-one, that  
necessarily must fear and expect from all." Thus  
Suspicions and ill Apprehensions must  
with Terror both of Men and of the DEITY.  
Besides this, there must in every rational Creature  
yet farther Conscience; viz. from Sense of  
*what is thus ill-deserving and unnatural:*  
*from a consequent Shame or Regret of incurring*  
*what is odious, and moves Aversion.*

**E**R E scarcely is, or can be any Creature,  
Consciousness of Villany, *as such merely*, does  
t all offend; nor any thing opprobrious or  
*by imputable*, move, or affect. If there be  
one; 'tis evident he must be absolutely indis-

*Moral Conscience.*

Book 2. ferent towards moral Good or Ill. If this inde-  
~ be his Case; 'twill be allow'd he can be no-  
capable of natural Affection: If not of that, th  
neither of any social Pleasure, or mental Enjoyme  
as shewn above; but on the contrary, he must  
subject to all manner of horrid, unnatural, and  
Affection. So that to want CONSCIENCE, or *natural Sense of the Odiousness of Crime and Injustice*, is  
be most of all miserable in Life: but where C  
science, or *Sense of this sort*, remains; there, co  
sequently, whatever is committed against it, must  
necessity, by means of Reflection, as we have shew  
be continually shameful, grievous and offensive.

*False Conscience.*

A MAN who in a Passion happens to kill  
Companion, relents immediately on the sight  
what he has done. His Revenge is chang'd in  
Pity, and his Hatred turn'd against himself. A  
this merely by the Power of the Object. On t  
account he suffers Agony; the Subject of this co  
tinually occurs to him; and of this he has a co  
stant ill Remembrance and displeasing Consciousne  
If on the other side, we suppose him *not* to relent  
suffer any real Concern or Shame; then, either  
has no Sense of the Deformity of the Crime and I  
justice, no natural Affection, and consequently  
Happiness or Peace within: or if he has any Se  
of moral Worth or Goodness, it must be of a pe  
plex'd and contradictory kind. He must pursue  
inconsistent Notion, idolize some *false Species* of V  
tue, and affect as noble, gallant, or worthy, th  
which is irrational and absurd. And how torin  
ing this must be to him, is ea'y to conceive. F  
never can such a *Phantom* as this be reduc'd to a  
certain Form. Never can this *PROTEUS of Hon*  
*be held steady, to one Shape.* The Pursuit of  
can only be vexatious and distracting. There is n  
thing besides real Virtue (as has been shewn)  
can possibly hold any proportion to Esteem,  
bation, or good Conscience. And he who, b  
by *false Religion* or prevailing Custom, ha

esteem or admire any thing as Virtue which is not Part & really such ; must either thro the Inconsistency of such an Esteem, and the perpetual Immoralitys occasion'd by it, come at last to lose all Conscience, and so be miserable in the worst way : or, if he retains any Conscience at all, it must be of a kind never satisfactory, or able to bestow Content. For 'tis impossible that a cruel Enthusiast, or *Bigot*, a Persecutor, or Murderer, a *Bravo*, a Pirate, or any Villain of less degree, who is false to the Society of Mankind in general, and contradicts natural Affection ; shou'd have any fix'd Principle at all, any real Standard or Measure by which he can regulate his Esteem, or any solid Reason by which to form his Approbation of *any one* moral Act. And thus the more he sets up Honour, or advances Zeal ; the worse he renders his Nature, and the more detestable his Character. The more he engages in the love or Admiration of any Action or Practice, as great and glorious, which is in it-self morally ill and vicious ; the more Contradiction and Self-disapprobation he must incur. For there being nothing more certain than this, " That no natural Affection can be contradicted, nor no unnatural one advanc'd, without a prejudice in some degree to all natural *False Affection in general* :" it must follow, " That inward Deformity growing greater, by the encouragement of unnatural Affection ; there must be so much the more Subject for unsatisfactory Reflection, the more any false Principle of Honour, any false Religion, or Superstition prevails."

So that whatever Notions of this kind are cherished ; or whatever Character affected, which is contrary to moral Equity, and leads to Inhumanity, *no a false Conscience, or wrong Sens: of Honour,* *but only to bring a Man the more under the lash* Causer *real and just Conscience, Shame, and Self-reproach.* R. P. 1. from *He can any-one, who, by any pretended Author-ty* *commits one single Immorality, be able to satisfy himself with any Reason, why he shou'd not*

Book 2. L.  
or  
of  
ne  
na  
for

it time be carry'd further, into all mannerly; such perhaps as he even abhors to think; this is a Reproach which a Mind must make to it-self upon the least Violation of Conscience; in doing what is *morally* and *ill-deserving*; tho warranted by some or Precedent amongst Men, or pos'd Injunction or Command of his Powers.

*Con-*  
*science*  
*from In-*  
*terest.*

Now as for that other part of Conscience, the remembrance of *what was at any time unreasonably and foolishly done, in prejudice of one's Interest or Happiness:* This dissatisfactory Reflection must follow still and have effect, wheresoever there is a Sense of moral Deformity, contracted by Carelessness and Injustice. For even where there is no Sense of moral Deformity, as such merely; there must be a Sense of the ill Merit of it with respect to God and Man. Or tho' there were a possibility of excluding for ever all Thoughts or Suspicions of superior Powers, yet considering that this Inability towards moral Good or Ill implies a total want of natural Affection, and that this Defect can by no Dissimulation be conceal'd; 'tis evident, that a Man of this unhappy Character must suffer a sensible Loss in the Friendship, Trust, and Confidence of other Men; and consequently must lose in his Interest and outward Happiness. Now the Sense of this Disadvantage fail to occur to him when he sees, with Regret, and Envy, the more favorable and more grateful Terms of Friendship, and Employment on which better People live with the rest of the world. Even therefore where natural Affection is wanting; 'tis certain still, that by Immorality necessarily happening thro' want of such Affection, there must be disturbance from Conscience of some sort, viz. from Sense of *what is committed imprudently and contrary to real Interest and Advantage.*

From all this we may easily conclude, our Happiness depends on *natural affec-*  
*tion*. For if the chief Happiness be from  
ALL PLEASURES; and the chief *mental*  
are such as we have describ'd, and are from  
*natural Affection*; it follows, "That the  
*natural Affections, is to have the chief*,  
*Power of Self-enjoyment, the highest Power*,  
*Happiness of Life."*

With respect to the *Pleasures of THE BODY*,  
satisfactions belonging to mere SENSE; 'tis  
they cannot possibly have their Effect, or  
any valuable Enjoyment, otherwise than  
ans of *social and natural Affection*.

live well, has no other meaning with  
than to eat and drink well. And methinks

unwary Concession we make in favour of  
retended good Livers, when we join with them in honouring their way of Life with the Title of *vulgar Epicurism*,  
fast. As if they liv'd the fastest who took  
atest Pains to enjoy least of Life: For if our  
it of Happiness be right; the greatest Enjoyments in Life are such as these Men pass over in  
aste, and have scarce ever allow'd themselves  
erty of tasting.

as considerable a Part of Voluptuousness  
ounded in the *Palat*; and as notable as the  
is, which depends on it; one may justly <sup>Imagine</sup> that the Ostentation of Elegance, and a <sup>nation</sup> <sup>Fancy</sup>  
Emulation and Study how to excel in this  
ous Art of Living, goes very far in the raising  
high Idea of it, as is observ'd among the  
Pleasure. For were the Circumstances of a  
and Company, Equipages, Services, and the  
the Management withdrawn; there wou'd be  
left any Pleasure worth acceptance, even in  
nion of the most debauch'd themselves.

the very Notion of a Debauch (which is a Sally A Debauch,  
atever can be imagin'd of Pleasure and Voluptuousness)

*Book 2.* luptuousness) carrys with it a plain reference to  
 Societie, or Fellowship. It may be call'd a *Surfeit*,  
*Excess of Eating and Drinking*, but hardly a *D.* of that kind, when the Excess is committed  
 rarely, out of all Society, or Fellowship. An  
 who abuses himself in this way, is often call'd  
 but never a *Debauchee*. The Courtizans, and  
<sup>Pleas-</sup>  
<sup>Jurors of</sup>  
<sup>the Sense.</sup>  
<sup>Women.</sup> the commonest of Women, who live by Pro-  
 vation, know very well how necessary it is, that  
 one whom they entertain with their Beauty,  
 believe there are Satisfactions reciprocal; an-  
 Pleasures are no less given than receiv'd.  
 were this Imagination to be wholly taken  
 there wou'd be hardly any of the grosser  
 Mankind, who wou'd not perceive their rem-  
 Pleasure to be of slender Estimation.

Who is there can well or long enjoy any  
 when *alone*, and abstracted perfectly, even  
 very Mind and Thought, from every thing bel-  
 ing to Society? Who wou'd not, on such  
 as these, be presently cloy'd by any sensual-  
 gence? Who wou'd not soon grow uneasy  
 his Pleasure, however exquisite, till he had  
 means to impart it, and make it *truly plea-*  
 him, by communicating, and sharing it at lea-  
 some *one* single Person? Let Men imagin  
 they please; let 'em suppose themselves  
 selfish; or desire ever so much to follow the  
 tates of that narrow Principle, by which they  
 bring Nature under restraint: Nature wil-  
 out; and in Agonys, Disquiets, and a di-  
 State, demonstrate evidently the ill Consequ-  
 such Violence, the Absurdity of such a Dev-  
 the Punishment which belongs to such a me-  
 and horrid Endeavour.

<sup>Pleas-</sup> Thus, therefore, not only the *Pleasure*  
<sup>Jurors of</sup>  
<sup>the Sense.</sup> *Mind*, but even those of *the Body*, depend on  
 ral Affection: insomuch that where this is  
 ing, they not only lose their Force, but  
 a manner converted into Uneasiness and

*concerning VIRTUE.*

The Sensations which shou'd naturally afford Contentment and Delight, produce rather Discontent and Sourness, and breed a Weariness and Restlessness in the Disposition. This we may perceive by the perpetual Inconstancy, and Love of Change, so remarkable in those who have nothing communicative or friendly in their Pleasures. *Good Fellowship*, in its abus'd Sense, seems indeed to have something more constant and determining. The Company supports the Humour. 'Tis the same in Love. A certain Tenderness and Generosity of Affection supports the Passion, which otherwise wou'd instantly be chang'd. The perfectest Beauty cannot, of it-self, retain, or fix it. And that Love which has no other Foundation, but relies on this latter kind, is soon turn'd into Aversion. Satiety, perpetual Disgust, and Feverishness of Desire, attend those who passionately study Pleasure. They *please*, who study to regulate their Passions, *selves* & enjoy, who study to know how absolute *incapacity* there is in any thing sensual to please, i.e. contentment, where it depends not on something friendly or social, something conjoin'd, and affinity with *kind* or *natural Affection*.

IT E'ER we conclude this Article of *social Balance*, we may take a general View of the *Affections*, and bring it, once for all, into the Scale; ove what kind of *BALANCE* it helps to within; and what the Consequence may be, *Deficiency*, or *light Weight*.  
E'RE is no-one of ever so little Understanding, who belongs to a human Constitution, who not that without Action, Motion, and Employment, the Body languishes, and is oppress'd; idleness turns to Disease; the Spirits, un-

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\* *Supra*, p. 60, 61,

Book 2. employ'd abroad, help to consume the Parts with Nature, as it were, preys upon her-self. *Balance* the same manner, the sensible and living Part of the *Af-Soul or Mind*, wanting its proper and natural exercise, is burden'd and diseas'd. Its Thoughts and Passions being unnaturally withheld from their Objects, turn against it-self, and create the highest Impatience and Ill-humour.

*In \* Brutes, and other Creatures, who have the Use of Reason or Reflection (at least not the manner of Mankind) 'tis so order'd in Nature, that by their daily Search after Food, and Application either towards the Business of their livelihood, or the Affairs of their Species or Kind, most their whole time is taken up, and they fail to find full Employment for their Passions, according to that degree of Agitation to which they are subject, and which their Constitution requires. If any of these Creatures be taken out of his natural vigorous State, and plac'd amidst such a Plenty as profusely administer to all his Appetites and Wants, it may be observ'd, that as his Circumstances are thus luxuriant, his Temper and Passions have a greater growth. When he comes, at any time, to have the Accommodations of Life at a cheaper rate than was at first intended him by Nature, he is made to pay dear for 'em in another way; by losing his natural good Disposition, and the Orderliness of his Kind or Species.*

This needs not to be demonstrated by particular Instances. Whoever has the least knowledge of natural History, or has been an Observer of several Breeds of Creatures, and their ways of Increase and Propagation, will easily understand this difference of Orderliness between the *wild* and the *tame* of the same Species. The latter acquire new Habits,

\* *Supra*, p. 60, 61. And *Infra*, p. 200, 201, &c.  
VOL. III. p. 148, 149, &c.

state from their original Nature. They lose Part 2, the common Instinct and ordinary Ingenuity ~~of~~  
Kind; nor can they ever regain it, whilst ~~they~~ <sup>§. 1.</sup> continue in this pamper'd State: but being ~~Animal~~  
to shift abroad, they resume the natural Af- <sup>animal</sup> ~~Kind~~.  
and Sagacity of their Species. They learn to  
a stricter Fellowship; and grow more con-  
for their Offspring. They provide against  
sons, and make the most of every Advan-  
tage by Nature for the Support and Mainte-  
of their particular Species, against such as are  
and hostile. And thus as they grow busy  
ploy'd, they grow regular and good. Their  
Icy and Vice forsakes them with their Idle-  
d Ease.

happens with *Mankind*, that whilst some are ~~Man-~~  
~~kind~~ confin'd to Labour, others are provided ~~kind~~,  
undance of all things, by the Pains and La-  
f Inferiors. Now, if among the superior and  
it, there be not something of fit and proper  
ment rais'd in the room of what is wanting  
mon Labour and Toil; if instead of an Ap-  
on to any sort of Work, such as has a good  
onest End in Society, (as Letters, Sciences,  
Husbandry, publick Affairs, OEcconomy, or  
e) there be a thorow Neglect of all Duty or  
ment; a settled Idleness, Supineness, and  
ity; this of necessity must occasion a most  
l and dissolute State; It must produce a total  
er of the Passions, and break out in the  
est Irregularitys imaginable.

see the enormous Growth of Luxury in capi-  
ys, such as have been long the Seat of Empire,  
e what Improvements are made in Vice of  
kind, where numbers of Men are maintain'd  
Opulence, and wanton Plenty. 'Tis other-  
with those who are taken up in honest and due  
yment, and have been well inur'd to it from  
Youth. *This we may observe in the hasty*  
*remote*

Book 2. remote Provincials, the Inhabitants of smaller Towns  
 and the industrious sort of common People; w<sup>tis</sup> rare to meet with any Instances of those singularitys, which are known in Courts and Palaces, and in the rich Foundations of easy and pamper'd Priests.

Treas.  
ony. Now if what we have advanc'd concerning *inward Constitution* be real and just; if it be that Nature works by a just Order and Regula as well in the Passions and Affections, as in Limbs and Organs which she forms; if it appertaineth, that she has so constituted this *inward Part*, that nothing is so essential to it as *Exercise*; no Exercise so essential as that of *social or natural Affection*: it follows, that where this is remov'd or weaken'd, the *inward Part* must necessarily stand and be impair'd. Let Indolence, Indifference, Insensibility, be study'd as an Art, or cultivated with the utmost Care; the Passions thus restrained will force their Prison, and in one way or another procure their Liberty, and find full Employments. They will be sure to create to themselves *unusual unnatural Exercise*, where they are cut off from that which is *natural and good*. And thus in the room of orderly and natural Affection, new and unnatural must be rais'd, and all *inward Order and Economy* destroy'd.

ONE must have a very imperfect Idea of Order of Nature in the Formation and Structure of Animals, to imagine that so great a Principle, fundamental a Part as that of *natural Affection* might possibly be lost or impair'd, without any inward Ruin or Subversion of the Temper and Frame of the Mind.

WHOEVER is the least vers'd in this kind of Architecture, will find the inward Fabrick adjusted, and the whole so nicely built, that barely extending of a single Passion a little too far, or the continuance of it too long, is able to bring about irrecoverable Ruin and Misery. He will find

explan.

senc'd in the ordinary Case of Phrenz  
ition; when the Mind, dwelling to  
one Subject (whether prosperous or c  
sinks under the weight of it, and proves what  
necessity is, of a due Ballance, and Counter-  
in the Affections. He will find, that in  
different Creature, and distinct Sex, there is  
ferent and distinct Order, Set, or Suit of Pas-  
; proportionable to the different Order of Life,  
fferent Functions and Capacitys assign'd to each.  
ie Operations and Effects are different, so are  
prings and Causes in each System. The inside  
is fitted to the out-  
g'd, misplac'd, or cha-  
ng to one Species are in-  
ng to another, there m  
and Disturbance with  
.1. this we may obser  
he more perfect with  
as are imperfect from  
d Violence *within*, in ~~which~~ earliest Form, and  
t Matrix. We know how it is with Monsters,  
s are compounded of different Kinds, or diffe-  
xes. Nor are they less Monsters, who are  
pen or distorted in an inward Part. The or-  
Animals appear unnatural and monstrous,  
they lose their proper Instincts, forsake their  
neglect their Offspring, and pervert those  
ons or Capacitys bestow'd by Nature. How  
ied must it be, therefore, for MAN, of all  
Creatures, to lose that Sense, and Feeling,  
is proper to him *as a MAN*, and suitable to  
aracter, and Genius? How unfortunate must  
for a Creature, whose dependance on Society  
ter than any others, to lose that *natural Affec-*  
*tion* by which he is prompted to the Good and  
t of his Species, and Community? Such in-  
: *Man's natural Share of this Affection, that*

Part 2.  
~~~~~  
§. 1.

nd Per-
tions are
those be-
Ballance
those be-
of the Af-
fections.
be Con-

y, by compar-
perfect Natures, *Monsters,*

arth, by having

earliest Form, and

Matrix. We know how it is with Monsters,

s are compounded of different Kinds, or diffe-

xes. Nor are they less Monsters, who are

pen or distorted in an inward Part. The or-

Animals appear unnatural and monstrous,

they lose their proper Instincts, forsake their

neglect their Offspring, and pervert those

ons or Capacitys bestow'd by Nature. How

ied must it be, therefore, for MAN, of all

Creatures, to lose that Sense, and Feeling,

degree of familiarity and friend-shire that he lets loose his Paines to a Desire which can hardly by any outward violence be with-held; or if it be, is too create a Sadness, Dejection, and Melancholy in the Mind. For whever is unsociable, and voluntarly shuns Society, or Commerce with the World, of necessity be morose and ill-natur'd. He, on the other side, who is with-held by force or accident, finds in his Temper the ill Effects of this Rest. The Inclination, when the contrary affords a healthfull scope; as we may see particularly, when time of Solitude and long Absence, when open'd, the Mind disburden'd, and the Breast unfolded to a Bosom-Friend.

This we see yet more remarkably in Persons of the most elevated Stations. Princes, Monarchs, and those who see Condition to be above ordinary human and who affect a sort of distant Strain towards all Men. But their Carris, it's true, are often held at a distance, pensate this, there are others sub-^{of the affections} room, who, perhaps the most vile and the least sufficient, however, to serve its form. These are the Subjects of the Great. For These are the Sufferers and pain: in These we see These they can with Plea-

, and Mistrust, which besets the solitary and gloomy State of un-companied and un-friendly Greatness. Nor needs particular Proof from History, or present fact, to second this Remark.

it may appear, how much NATURAL DESIRE is predominant; how it is inwardly implanted in us, and implanted in our Natures; how it is with our other Passions; and how essential that regular Motion and Course of our Desires on which our Happiness and Self-enjoyment immediately depend.

as we have demonstrated, That as, on HAVING THE NATURAL AND GOOD DESIRES, IS TO HAVE THE CHIEF MEANS OF SELF-ENJOYMENT: So, on the WANT THEM, IS CERTAIN MISERY.

S E C T. II.

Book 2. *Desire of those Conveniences, by which we are well provided for, and maintain'd ; —— Emulation, or Love Selfish of Praise and Honour ; —— Indolence, or Love of Ease and Rest.* —— These are the Affections which relate to the private System, and constitute whatever we call Interest'dness or Self-love.

Now these Affections, if they are moderate, and within certain bounds, are neither injurious to Social Life, nor a hindrance to Virtue : but being in an extreme degree, they become Cowardice, — Revengefulness, — Luxury, — Avarice, — Vanity and Ambition, — Sloth ; — and, as such, are own'd vicious and ill, with respect to human Society. How they are ill with respect to the private Person, and are to his own disadvantage as well as that of the Publick, we may consider, as we severally examine them.

Line of Life 5 IF THERE were any of these Self-passions which for the Good and Happiness of the Creature might be oppos'd to Natural Affection, and allow'd to over-ballance it ; THE DESIRE AND LOVE OF LIFE wou'd have the best Pretence. But it will be found perhaps, that there is no Passion which, by having much allow'd to it, is the occasion of more Disorder and Misery.

THERE is nothing more certain, or more universally agreed than this ; " That Life may sometimes be even a Misfortune and Misery." To enforce the continuance of it in Creatures reduc'd to such Extremity, is esteem'd the greatest Cruelty. And tho' Religion forbids that any-one shou'd be his own Reliever, yet if by some fortunate accident, Death offers of it-self, it is embrac'd as highly welcome. And on this account the nearest Friends and Relations often rejoice at the Release of one entirely belov'd ; even tho' he himself may have been so weak as earnestly to decline Death, and endeavour the utmost Prolongment of his own un-eligible State.

and Abhorrence or Dread
“ beyond a certain degree, and over-
ing in the Temper of any Creature, must
n directly against his own Interest ; make
on occasion, become the greatest Enemy to *Love of*
; and necessitate him to act as such.

tho it were allow'd the Interest and Good
nature, by all Courses and Means whatso-
any circumstances, or at any rate, to pre-
%; yet wou'd it be against his Interest still
this Passion in a high degree. For it wou'd
means prove ineffectual, and no-way con-
its End. Various Instances need not be
or what is there better known, than that
is an excessive *Fear* betrays to danger, in-
ving from it ? 'Tis impossible for any-one
sibly, and with Presence of Mind, even
Preservation and Defence, when he is
ess'd by such a Passion. On all emer-
'mergencies. 'tis C

which it is least observed by others, and
ters at all times into the pleasantest parts of L-
so as to corrupt and poison all Enjoyment, and C-
tent. One may safely aver, that by reason of
Passion alone, many a Life, if inwardly and clo-
view'd, wou'd be found to be thorowly misera-
tho attended with all other Circumstances which
appearance render it happy. But when we ad-
this, the Meannesses, and base Condescensions, o-
fisn'd by such a passionate Concern for living; w-
we consider how by means of it we are driven
Actions we can never view without Dislike,
forc'd by degrees from our natural Conduct,
still greater Crookednesses and Perplexity; ther-
no-one, surely, so disingenuous as not to allow,
Life, in this case, becomes a forry Purchase, an-
pass'd with little Freedom or Satisfaction. For I
can this be otherwise, whilst every thing which
generous and worthy, even the chief *Relish*, *P-*
Love of pinc's, and Good of Life, is for Life's sake al-
Life. don'd and renounc'd?

AND thus it seems evident, " That to h-
" this Affection of DESIRE and LOVE OF LI-
" too intense, or beyond a moderate degree,
" against the Interest of a Creature, and contri-
" to his *Happiness and Good.*"

Refute. THERE is another Passion very different (

At a just Regulation of the Affections in a Particular virtuous Man, such Efforts towards Action not to what is justly stil'd *Paffion* or *Anger*. §. 2.

A Man of Courage may be cautious of real *Fear*. And a Man of Temper may reward or punish without *Anger*. But in ordinary Actions there must necessarily be some Mixture of real Passions themselves; which however, in the main, are able to allay and temper one another. And thus ANGER in a manner becomes necessary. 'Tis by this Passion that one Creature offering Violence to another, is deter'd from the Execution; whilst he observes how the Attempt affects his Fellow; and knows by the very Signs which accompany this rising Motion, that if the Injury be carry'd further, it will not pass easily, or with impunity. 'Tis this Passion withal, which after Violence and Hostility executed, rouzes a Creature in opposition, and assists him in returning like Hostility and Harm on the Invader. For thus, as *Rage* and *Despair* increase, a Creature grows still more terrible; and being urg'd to the greatest extremity, finds a degree of Strength and Boldness unexperienc'd till then, and which had never risen except thro' the height of Provocation. As to this Affection therefore, notwithstanding its immediate Aim be indeed *the Ill* or Punishment of another, yet it is plainly of the sort of those which tend to the Advantage and Interest of the Self-system, *the Animal himself*; and is withal in other respects contributing to the Good and Interest of the Species. But there is hardly need we should explain how mischievous and self-destructive ANGER is, if it be what we commonly understand by that word: if it be such a Passion as is rash, and violent in the Instant of Provocation; or such as imprints it-self deeply, and causes a settled *Revenge*, and an eager vindictive Pursuit. No wonder indeed that so much is done in mere *Revenge*, and under the Weight of a deep Resentment, when men

fort being
accomplishment or
leaves indeed behind it the p
Ease, and an overflowing of soft and p
tion. Yet is this, in truth, no better than th
it-self. For whoever has experienc'd racking
spite is us'd to affect him. From hence a
untoward Delights of Perverseness, Fro
and an envenom'd of Perverseness, Fro
its liberty. For this is only a perpetual
of ANGER perpetually renew'd. In othe
ters, the Passion arises not so suddenly,
Causes; but being once mov'd, is ne
quieted. The dormant Fury, REVE
rais'd once, and wrought up to her h
tain'd, is easy, and attains her End; a
ing Relief and Ease so much; making
our preceding Anguish and incumben
long duration, and in the bitter sense. Cer
tains of ardent Love is call'd the
Pain; this other Succes may be
term'd so. However soft or flatt
Pain may be esteem'd, this latter
pleasing one; Nor can it be possi
than sound and thorow Wretched
disgustful Feeling, without the l
thing soft, gentle, or agreeable.
"Tis not very necessary to i
of this Passion, in respect of o
our private Condition, or Circ
these Particulars we may gro
are of the moral sort of Su

and treated so rhetorically, and with Part 2.
repetition in publick, as to be apt to ~~the~~
y of Mankind. What has been said, §. 2.
ugh perhaps to make this evident,
e subject to such a Passion as we have
ctioning, is, in reality, to be very un-

And, " That the Habit it-self is a *Dif-*
he worst sort ; from which *Misery* is
le."

AS to *Luxury*, and what the World calls *PLEA-*
: Were it true (as has been prov'd the *SURE*.
hat the most considerable Enjoyments *Luxury*.
merely of *the Sense* ; and were it true,
t those Enjoyments of the Senie lay in
ward things capable of yielding always a
rtain Portion of Pleasure, according to
and quality ; it wou'd then follow, that
way to obtain Happiness, wou'd be to
ely of these Subjects, to which Happiness
e were thus infallibly annex'd. But
shionably we may apply the Notion of
, 'twill hardly be found that our inward
e able to keep pace with these outward
a luxuriant Fortune. And if the natural
and Aptnes *from within* be not concur-
l be in vain that these Subjects are thus
from abroad, and acquir'd with ever so
y.
be observ'd in those who by Excess have
instant Nauseating and Distaste, that they
theles as constant a Craving or Eager-
nach. But the *Appetite* of this kind is
natural ; as is that of Thirst arising from
contracted by habitual Debauch. Now
tions of the *natural Appetite*, in a plain
initely beyond those Indulgences of the
and elegant *Luxury*. This is often per-
e Luxurious themselves. It has been
People bred after the sumptuous way.
and

An INQUIRY,

and us'd never to wait, but to prevent Appetites; that when by any never Turn of Life they came to fall into a more natural Course, or for a while, as on a Journey, or a day of Sport, came accidentally to experience the Sweet of a plain Diet, recommended by due Abstinence and Exercise; they have with freedom own'd, that it was then they receiv'd the highest Satisfaction and Delight which a Table cou'd possibly afford.

ON the other side, it has been as often remark'd in Persons accustom'd to an active Life, and healthful Exercise; that having once thorowly experienc'd this plainer and more natural Diet, they have upon a following Change of Life regretted their Loss, and undervalu'd the Pleasures receiv'd from all the Declinacys of Luxury, in comparison with those rememb'red Satisfactions of a preceding State. 'Tis plain, that by urging Nature, forcing the Appetite, and inciting Sense, the Keeness of the Appetite, and it is lost. And tho' thro' Vice or ill Habit the same Subjects of Appetite may, every day, be sought with greater Ardour; they are enjoy'd with less Satisfaction. Tho' the Impatience of abstaining be greater, or Nauseatings which continually intervene, are o' the worst and most hateful kind of Sensation. Hard LUXUR. APPETITE. Sure is there any thing tasted which is wholly free from this ill relish of a surfeited Sense and ruin'ing Delight. So that instead of a constant and flowing every State it-self is in reality a State of Life, t' mity, a Corruption of Pleasure, and destructive every natural and agreeable Sensation. So far is from being true; "That in this licentious Co-
" we enjoy LIFE best, or are likely to make
"most of it."

As to the Consequences of such an Intemperance, how fatal to the Body, by Diseases of many and to the Mind, by Selfishness and Stupidity, needs not any explanation.

ences as to Interest are plain enough. Part potent and unrestrain'd Desire, as Wants, so it must subject us to a Dependence on others. Our private Circumstances, plentiful or easy they may be, cannot us. Ways and Means must be sure what may administer to such an end, as forces us to sacrifice Honour runs us out into all irregularity and bad Conduct. The Injuries we do our-selves and Unforgiveness, are then surely thro an Impotence of this sort, and if Restraint, we do what we ourselves, ^{PL} destructive to us. But these are Matters ^{SUR} themselves. And from less than what is easy to conclude, " That Luxury, such, are contrary to real Interest, & Enjoyment of Life."

another *Luxury* superior to the kind ^{Am} mentioning, and which in strictness will'd a *Self-passion*, since the sole End inantage and Promotion of the Species, other social Affections are join'd with *Natural Pleasure*, and founded in mere selfe ; this has more added to it, and a *Pleasure of Sense*. Such Concern Nature shewn for the Support and the several Species, that by a certain kind of Necessity of their Natures, to regard the Propagation of their Species, whether it be the Interest or Good of feel this *Indigence* beyond a natural gree ; is what we may consider. Already said so much concerning *natural Appetite*, there needs less to be said. If it be allow'd, that to all ^{PL} there is a Measure of Appetite, ^{SC} which cannot possibly be exceeded with the Creature, even in his very Capa-

An INQUIRY

Book 2. city of enjoying Pleasure ; it will hardly be thought
that there is no certain Limit or just Boundary of
this other Appetite of the AMOROUS kind. There
are other sorts of ardent Sensations accidentally ex-
perienc'd, which we find pleasant and acceptable
whilst they are held within a certain degree ; but
which, as they increase, grow oppressive and intol-
erable. *Laughter* provok'd by Titillation, grows an
excessive Pain ; tho it retains still the same Features
of Delight and Pleasure. And tho in the case of that
particular kind of *Itch* which belongs to a Distemper
nam'd from that defect, there are some who, far
from disliking the Sensation, find it highly accept-
able and delightful ; yet it will hardly be reputed
such among the more refin'd sort, even of those
who make Pleasure their chief Study, and highest
Good.

NOW if there be in every Sensation of mere
Pleasure, a certain Pitch or Degree of Ardour, which
by being further advanc'd, comes the nearer to mere
Rage and Fury ; if there be indeed a necessity of
stopping somewhere, and determining on some Boundary
for the Passion ; where can we fix our Standard,
or how regulate our-selves but *with regard to Nature*,
beyond which there is no Measure or Rule of
things ? Now *Nature* may be known from what
we see of the natural State of Creatures, and of Man
himself, when unprejudic'd by vicious Education.

WHERE happily any-one is bred to a natural
Life, inur'd to honest Industry and Sobriety, and
un-accustom'd to any thing immoderate or intem-
perate ; he is found to have his Appetites and In-
clinations of this sort at command. Nor are they
on this account less able to afford him the Pleasure
or Enjoyment of each kind. On the contrary
they are more sound, healthy, and un-
Excess and Abuse, they must afford him
Inevitable Satisfaction. So that were both
Inclinations to be experimentally compar'd ;
the one which belong'd to one who

eed to mention any thing. The injury it
the Mind, tho less notic'd, is yet greater. The
nce of all Improvement, the wretched Waste
the Effeminacy, Sloth, Supineness, the
and Looseness of a thousand Passions, thro
relaxation and enervating of the Mind;
f them Effects sufficiently apparent, when
on.

The Disadvantages are of this Intempe-
respect of Interest, Society, and the World;
it the Advantages are of a contrary So-
and Self-command, wou'd be to little pur-
nition. 'Tis well known there can be no
greater than what is consequent to the Do-
und Rule of such a Passion. Of all other,
least manageable by Favour or Conces-
assumes the most from Privilege and In-
What it costs us in the Modesty and Inge-
our Natures, and in the Faith and Honesty
haracters, is as easily apprehended by any-
will reflect. And it will from hence ap-
That there is no Passion, which in its Ex-
ence and Excess more necessarily occasions
er and Unhappiness."

AS to that Passion which is esteem'd pe-
INTERESTING, as having for its Aim the Posse-
Health, and what we call a *Settlement* or
n the World: If the Regard towards this
oderate, and in a reasonable degree; if it
no passionate Pursuit, nor raises any ardent
Appetite, there is nothing in this Case

~~Book 2.~~ which is not compatible with Virtue, and even fable and beneficial to Society. The publick as well as private System is advanc'd by the Industry, which this Affection excites. But if it grows at length into a real *Passion*; the Injury and Mischief it does the Publick, is not greater than that which it creates to the Person himself. Such a one is in reality a Self-oppressor, and lies heavier on himself than can ever do on Mankind.

How far a COVETING or Avaritious Temper is miserable, needs not, surely, be explained. Who knows not how small a Portion of world's Matters is sufficient for a Man's single Use and Convenience; and how much his Occasions and Wants might be contracted and reduc'd, if a just Frustrer were study'd, and Temperance and a natural Life came once to be pursued with half that application, Industry and Art, which is bestow'd on Sumptuousness and Luxury? Now if Temperance be in reality so advantageous, and the Practice as well as the Consequences of it so pleasing and happy as has been before express'd; there is little need, on the other side, to mention any thing of the Miseries attending those covetous and eager Desires about things which have no Bounds or Rule; as being out of Nature, beyond which there can be no Limit to Desire. For where shall we once stop, when we are beyond this Boundary? How shall we fix on certain a thing wholly unnatural and unreasonable? Or what Method, what Regulation shall we set by mere Imagination, or the Exorbitancy of Fancy adding Expence to Expence, of Possession to Possession?

Hence that known Restlessness of covetous and eager Minds, in whatever State or Degree of tune they are plac'd; there being no thorough or Satisfaction, but a kind of Insatiableness belonging to this Condition. For 'tis impossible there can be any real Enjoyment, except in consequence

real and just Appetite. Nor do we readily call that Part 2
1 *Enjoyment* of Wealth or of Honour, when thro ~
ovetousness or Ambition, the Desire is still for- §. 2.
ard, and can never rest satisfy'd with its Gains.
it against this Vice of COVETOUSNESS, there is
ough said continually in the World; and in our
mon way of speaking, “ *A covetous, and a mi-*
serable Temper, has, in reality, one and the same
signification.”

NOR IS there less said, abroad, as to the Ills of *Emula-*
it other aspiring Temper, which exceeds an honest
tion, or *Love of Praise,* and passes the Bounds
en of *Vanity* and *Conceit.* Such is that Passion
which breaks into an enormous PRIDE and AMBI-
ON. Now if we consider once the Ease, Happi-
es, and Security which attend a *modest Disposition*
quiet Mind, such as is of easy Self-command;
ed to every Station in Society, and able to suit
elf with any reasonable Circumstances whatever;
ill, on the first view, present us with the most
eable and winning Character. Nor will it be
nd necessary after this to call to mind the Excel-
ce and Good of *Moderation*, or the Mischief and
-injury of immoderate Desires, and conceited
d Imaginations of personal Advantage, in such
ngs as Titles, Honours, Precedencys, Fame,
ry, or *vulgar Astonishment, Admiration and Ap-*
ife.

This too is obvious, that as the Desires of this
d are rais'd, and become impetuous, and out
our command; so the Aversions and Fears of
contrary part, grow proportionably strong and
nt, and the Temper accordingly suspicious,
is, captious, subject to Apprehensions from all
is, and uncapable of bearing the least Repulse
inary Disappointment. And hence it may be
ded, “ *That all Rest and Security as to what is*
“ *now, and all Peace, Contentednes and Ease as to*
“ *what is present, is forsaken by the aspiring Pa-*
“ *sions*

Indolence.

THERE is opposition to those eager
which we have been speaking. Not
excludes either the Passion of Covetousness or
them from breaking into open Action. 'Tis this
Passion, which by soothng the Mind, and softning
it into an EXCESSIVE LOVE of REST and INDO-
LENCE, renders high Attempts impracticable, and
represents as insuperable the Difficultys of a pain-
and laborious Course towards Wealth and Honor.
Now tho' an Inclination to Ease, and a Love of
and useful to us as the Inclination we have to
Sleep; yet an excessive Love of Rest, and a
tracted Aversion to Action and Employment
be a Disease in the Mind equal to that of a Le-
in the Body.

How necessary Action and Exercise are
Body, may be judg'd by the difference be-
tween those Constitutions which are acc-
and those which are wholly Strangers to
by the different Health and Complexion re-
hour and due Exercise create, in compa-
that Habit of Body we see consequent to
State of Indolence and Rest. Nor is t
bit ruinous to the Body only. The lang-
ease corrupts all the Enjoyments of a
healthy Sense, and carrys its Infect-
Mind; where it spreads a worse Co-
however the Body may for a while Co-
is leated, can escape without an im-
tion and Disorder. The Habit be-
and Anxiety, which influences

...^{ility}; ill Humour, and Spleen : P.
on there has been enough said above, where c
onsider'd the want of a due *Ballance* in the s.
ions.

It is certain that as in *the Body*, when no La-^{lence}
or natural Exercise is us'd, the Spirits which
their due Imployment; turn against the Con-
son, and find work for themselves in a de-
live way ; so in *a Soul, or Mind*, unexercis'd,
which languishes for want of proper Action
mployment, the Thoughts and Affections be-
bstructed in their due Course, and depriv'd of
natural Energy, raise Disquiet, and foment a
rous Eagerneſs and tormenting Irritation. The
er from hence becomes more impotent in Pa-
noe incapable of real Moderation, and, like
'd Fuel, readily takes fire by the least

to *Interest*, how far it is here concern'd ;
retched that State is, in which by this Ha-
an is plac'd, towards all the Circumstances
irs of Life, when at any time he is call'd
; how subjected he must be to all Incon-
, wanting to himself, and depriv'd of the
of others ; whilst being unfit for all Offi-
utys of Society, he yet of any other Per-
needs the help of it, as being least able
nd support himself ; all this is obvious.
tis evident, " That to have this over-bias-
ification towards *Rest*, this *lothful, soft,*
ate Temper, averse to Labour —
is to have an un-

Book 2. a profligate and abject Character. As they g
 perious and high, they are the occasion that
 ture in proportion becomes mean and low,
 are original to that which we call *Selfishness*,
 rise to that sordid Disposition of which we
 ready spoken. It appears there can be no
 miserable in it-self, or so wretched in its Conse
 as to be thus impotent in Temper, thus mas
 Passion, and, by means of it, brought under t
 fervile Subjection to the World.

Self-passion in general. 'Tis evident withal, that as this *Selfish*
 creases in us, so must a *Subtlety*, and *feigne*
Carriage, which naturally accompanys it. A
 the Candour and Ingenuity of our Natures, t
 and Freedom of our Minds must be forfeite
Trust and *Confidence* in a manner lost ; and
 cions, *Jealousies*, and *Envys* multiply'd. A
 End and *Interest* must be every day more i
 form'd in us ; *generous Views* and *Motives* laid
 And the more we are thus sensibly disjoin'd
 day from Society and our Fellows ; the wor
 nion we shall have of those uniting Passions
 bind us in strict Alliance and Amity with
 Upon these Terms we must of course endeav
 silence and suppress our natural and good
 tions : since they are such as wou'd carry
 the good of Society, against what we fondly
 ceive to be our private Good and Interest ;
 been shewn.

Now if these **SELFISH PASSIONS**, beside
 other Ill they are the occasion of, are with
 certain means of losing us our *natural Affe*
 then (by what has been prov'd before) 'tis ev
 " That they must be the certain means of los
 " the chief Enjoyment of Life, and raisin
 " those horrid and *unnatural Passions*,
 " vagueness of Temper, which makes
 " *HAT OF MISERY*, and *the most v*
 " *of Life* ;" as remains for us to expl

S E C T. III.

§. 3.

THE Passions therefore, which, in the last place, ^{THIRD} we are to examine, are those which lead neither to a publick nor a private Good ; and are neither of any advantage to the Species in general, or to the Creature in particular. These, in opposition to ^{from the} ^{unnatu-} ^{ral Affec-} ^{tions.} the *social and natural*, we call the **UNNATURAL AFFECTIONS.**

Of this kind is that **UNNATURAL and INHUMANITY**. *Inhumanity.* DELIGHT in beholding Torments, and in viewing Distress, Calamity, Blood, Massacre and Destruction, with a peculiar Joy and Pleasure. This has been the reigning Passion of many Tyrants, and barbarous Nations ; and belongs, in some degree, to such Tempers as have thrown off that Courteousness of Behaviour which retains in us a just Reverence of Mankind, and prevents the Growth of Harshness and Brutality. This Passion enters not where Civility or affable Manners have the least place. Such is the Nature of what we call *good Breeding*, that in the midst of many other Corruptions, it admits not of **INHUMANITY**, or *savage Pleasure*. To see the Sufferance of an Enemy with truel Delight, may proceed from the height of Anger, Revenge, Fear, and other extended Self-passions : But to delight in the Torture and Pain of other Creatures indifferently, Natives or Foreigners, of our own, or of another Species, Kindred or no Kindred, known or unknown ; to feed, as it were, on Death, and be entertain'd with dying Agonys ; this has nothing in it accountable in the way of Self-interest or private Good above-mention'd, but is wholly and absolutely unnatural, as it is horrid and miserable.

There is another Affection nearly related to ^{Petur} ^{lano} *this*, which is a gay and frolicksome Delight in what is injurious to others ; a sort of **WANTON MISCHIEVOSNESS**, and Pleasure in what is destructive.

Book 2. tive; a Passion which, instead of being restrain'd
 is usually encourag'd in Children: so that 'tis indeed no wonder if the Effects of it are very unfor-
 tunately felt in the World. For 'twill be ~~but~~
 perhaps, for any-one to give a reason why ~~the~~
 Temper which was us'd to delight in Disorder ~~and~~
 Ravage, when in a Nursery; shou'd not afterward
 find delight in other Disturbances, and be the occ-
 tion of equal Mischief in Familys, amongst Friends,
 and in the Publick it-self. But of this Passion there
 is not any foundation in Nature; as has been ex-
 plain'd.

Malignity. MALICE, MALIGNITY, or ILL-WILL, such as
 is grounded on no Self-consideration, and where
 there is no Subject of Anger or Jealousy, nor any
 thing to provoke or cause such a Desire of doing ill
 to another; this also is of that kind of Passion.

Env. y. ENVY too, when it is such as arises from the
 Prosperity or Happiness of another Creature no ways
 interfering with ours, is of the same kind of Passion.

*Moros-
e-ness.* THERE is also among these, a sort of HATRED
 OF MANKIND AND SOCIETY; a Passion which
 has been known perfectly reigning in some Men,
 and has had a peculiar Name given to it. A large
 share of this belongs to those who have long indulg'd
 themselves in a habitual *Moroseness*, or who
 by force of ill Nature, and ill Breeding, have con-
 tracted such a Reverse of Affability, and civil Man-
 ners, that to see or meet a Stranger is offensive.

*MISAN-
THRO-
PT.*

ions of the amorous Desire within our own, to these Depravities of Appetite, we need add here; after what has been already said, on object of the more natural Passion.

As these are the only Affections or Passions we can strictly call *unnatural*, ill, and of no use so much as to any separate or private

Others indeed there are which have this use, but are so exorbitant and out of measure, and the common Bent of any ordinary Self-love, and so utterly contrary and abhorrent to all good and natural Affection, that they are generally odious and may be justly esteem'd *unnatural* and ill.

Besides these may be reckon'd such an ENORMOUS PRIDE or AMBITION, such an ARROGANCE,

RANCOUR, as wou'd willingly leave nothing but, nothing free, nothing prosperous in the world; such an ANGER as wou'd sacrifice every thing to it-self: such a REVENGE as is never to be quench'd, nor ever satisfy'd without the Cruelty: such an INVERTRACY and RANCOUR,

IT MAY be objected here, that the
unnatural as they are, carry still a sort of Pleasure
with them ; and that however barbarous a Pleasure
it be, yet still it is a Pleasure and Satisfaction which
is found in Pride, or Tyranny, Revenge, Malice, or
Cruelty exerted. Now if it be possible in Nature,
that any-one can feel a barbarous or malicious
Joy, other wise than in consequence of mere An-
guish and Torment, then may we perhaps allow this
kind of Satisfaction, then to be call'd Pleasure or Delight.
But the Case is evidently contrary. To love, an-
to be kind ; to have social or natural love, an-
Complacency and Good-will, is to feel immedi-
ate Satisfaction and genuine Content. 'Tis in its
original Joy, depending on no preceding Pain or
easiness ; and producing nothing beside Satisfaction
merely. On the other side, Animosity, Hatred
Bitterness, is original Misery and Torment, produc-
ing no other Pleasure or Satisfaction, than as the
natural Desire is for the instant satisfy'd by some
which appeases it. How strong soever this P-
may appear ; it only the more
which produces it.

concerning VIRTUE.

dently acquainted with those Disturbances, which, ~~at~~ at ill hours, even small occasions are apt to raise. From these slender Experiences of Harshness and Ill-humour, they fully know and will confess the ill Moments which are pass'd, when the Temper is ever so little gall'd or fretted. How must it fare, therefore, with those who hardly know any better hours in Life; and who, for the greatest part of it, are agitated by a thorow active Spleen, a close and settled Malignity, and Rancour? How lively must be the Sense of every thwarting and controuling Accident? How great must be the Shocks of Disappointment, the Stings of Affront, and the Agonys of a working Antipathy, against the multiply'd Objects of Offence? Nor can it be wonder'd at, if to Persons thus agitated and oppress'd, it seems a high Delight to appease and allay for the while those furious and rough Motions, by an Indulgence of their Passion in Mischief and Revenge.

No ~~ways~~ as to the Consequences of this *unnatural State*, in respect of Interest, and the common Circumstances of Life; upon what Terms a Person who has in this manner lost all which we call *Nature*, can be suppos'd to stand, in respect of the Society of Mankind; how he fee's himself in it; what Sense he has of his own Disposition towards others, and of the mutual Disposition of others towards himself: this is easily conceiv'd.

WHAT Injoyment or Rest is there for one who is not conscious of the merited Affection or Love, ~~but~~, on the contrary, of the Ill-will and Hatred of every human Soul? What ground must this afford ~~to~~ Horror and Despair? What foundation of Fear, ~~and~~ continual Apprehension from Mankind, and ~~from~~ Superior Powers? How thorow and deep must ~~be that Melancholy~~, which being once mov'd, has ~~no lasting solace~~ or pleasing from the side of Friendship, ~~to carry~~ or divert it? Where-ever such a Creature ~~wants himself~~; which-ever way he casts his Eye ~~every thing around must appear ghastly and horri~~

'T is thus, at last, in
Wilderness ; where all is laid waste, every
and godly remov'd, and nothing extant be-
is savage and deform'd. Now if Banish-
one's Country, Removal to a foreign Place
thing which looks like Solitude or Deser-
heavy to endure ; what must it be to feel
Banishment, this real Estrangement from hu-
mane ; and to be after this manner i-
midst of Society ? What must it be to
Disagreement with every thing, this Irr-
and Opposition to the Order and Govern-
Universe ?

HENCE it appears, That the g-
ferys accompanys that State which is
the Loss of natural Affection ; and T
THOSE HORRID, MONSTROUS, AND
AFFECTIONS, IS TO BE MISER
HIGHEST DEGREE.

CONCLUSI

THUS have we endeavour'd to
propose'd in the beginning.
common and known Sense of Vice
one can be vicious or ill, except ei-
1. By the Deficiency or Want
Affections ;

Or, 2. by the Violence of the
Or, 3. by such as are plainly
IT must follow, that if each
cious and destructive to the Crea-
his compleatet State of Miser-

EVERY VITIOUS, IS TO BE MISERABLE, Part 2,
and every virtuous Action must be proportionable
to the Mischief, help towards this Mischief, and
must follow That EVERY VITIOUS AC-

TION, BE SELF-INJURIOUS AND ILL.
the other side; the Happiness and Good of

it has been prov'd from the contrary Effect
or Affections, such as are according to Nature,
is Oeconomy of the Species or Kind. We
set up all those Particulars, from whence (al-
y. of Addition and Subtraction) the main Sec-
ond Account of Happiness, is either augmented
minish'd. And if there be no Article excepted
in this Scheme of Moral Arithmetick; the
t treated may be said to have an evidence as
is that which is found in Numbers, or Mathe-
ma. For let us carry Scepticism ever so far, let
it, if we can, of every thing about us; we
doubt of what passes *within our-selves*. Our
and Affections are known to us. They are
, whatever the Objects may be, on which they
ploy'd. Nor is it of any concern to our Ar-
it, how these exterior Objects stand; whether
realitys, or mere Illusions; whether we
or dream. For ill Dreams will be equally dif-
g: And a good Dream (if Life be nothing else)
e easily and happily pass'd. In this Dream
, therefore, our Demonstrations have the same
our Ballance and Oeconomy hold good, and our
tion to VIRTUE is in every respect the same.
on the whole: There is not, I presume, the
degree of Certainty wanting, in what has been
cerning the Preferableness of the mental Plea- Conclu-
the sensual; and even of the sensual, accom-
with good Affection, and under a temperate and
e, to those which are no ways restrain'd, nor
by anything social or affectionate.

is there less Evidence in what has been
be suited Structure and Fabrick of the Mind,

instantly tends to Whole it-self, and of the Affection, very Passions thro' which Men are vicious, themselves a Torment and Disease; and that whatsoever is done which is knowingly ill, must be of ill Consciousness; and in proportion, as the Act is ill, must impair and corrupt Social Enjoyment, and destroy both the Capacity of kind Affection, and the Consciousness of meriting any such. So that neither we participate thus in Joy or Happiness with other imagin'd Love of other: on which mutual Kindness greatest of all our Pleasures are founded.


If this be the Case of moral Delinquency from Nature, which is consequent to this Disease, and miserable; 'twill appear, "That 'or consent to any thing ill or immoral, is a Interest, and leads to the greatest Ills: " and "on the other side, Every thing which is an ment of Virtues, or an Establishment of ration and Integrity, is an Advancement of " and leads to the greatest and most solid Enjoyment."

Thus the Wisdom of what rules, and chief in Nature, has made it to work towards the general Good; which ceases to promote, he is actually so himself, and ceases to promote his own Welfare. He is, on this account, useful to himself, than as he any other society, and to that Whole of which Part. So that VIRTUE, which

To ruin; that jingle Quality, thus denoted
to Society, and to Mankind in general, is ^{from} surely a Happiness and Good to each Creature; and is that by which alone Man happy, and without which he must be miserable; thus, VIRTUE is the Good, and VICE every-one.

K 3

TREATISE



R E A T I S E V.

VIZ.

T H E

R A L I S T S,

A

Philosophical Rhapsody.


B E I N G

C I T A L of certain Conversations
Natural and Moral Subjects.

iter Silvas Academi quærere Verum.

Hor. Ep. 2. Lib. 2.

lish'd in the Year M.DCC.IX.





THE
MORALISTS, &c.

PART I.

PRINCLES to PALEMON.

WHAT Mortal, if he had never chanc'd to hear your Character, PALEMON, cou'd imagine that a Genius fitted for the greatest Affairs, and form'd amidst Courts and Camps, shou'd have so violent a Turn towards Philosophy and the Schools? Who is there cou'd possibly believe that one of your Rank and Credit in the *fashionable* World, shou'd be so thorowly convertant in the *learned* one, and deeply interested in the Affairs of a People so disagreeable to the Generality of Mankind and Humour of the Age?

I BELIEVE truly, You are the only well-bred Man who wou'd have taken the Fancy to talk Philosophy in such a Circle of good Company as we had round us yesterday, when we were in your Coach together, in the Park. How you cou'd reconcile the Objects there, to such Subjects as that was unaccountable. I cou'd only conclude, either you had an extravagant Passion for Philoso-

Part i. to quit so many Charms for it ; or that some of those tender Charms had an extravagant Effect, which sent you to Philosophy for Relief.

In either case I pity'd you ; thinking it a milder Fate, to be, as I truly was, for my own part, *a more indifferent Lover*. 'Twas better, I told you, to admire Beauty and Wisdom a little more moderately. 'Twas better, I maintain'd, to ingage so cautiously as to be sure of coming off with a whole Heart, and a Fancy as strong as ever towards all the pretty Entertainments and Diversions of the World. For these, methought, were things one wou'd not willingly part with, for a fine romantick Passion of one of those Gentlemen whom they call'd *Virtuoso's*.

The Name I took to belong in common to your *Lover* and *Philosopher*. No matter what the Object was ; whether Poetry, Musick, Philosophy, or *the Fair*. All who were enamour'd any-way, were in the same Condition. You might perceive it (I told you) by their Looks, their Admiration, their profound Thoughtfulness, their waking ever and anon as out of a Dream, their talking still of one thing, and scarce minding what they said on any other Subject.—Sad Indications !

But all this Warning serv'd not to deter you. For you, PALEMON, are one of the Adventurous, whom Danger rather animates than discourages. And now nothing less will satisfy you than to have our Philosophical Adventures recorded. All must be laid before you, and sum'd in one compleat Account ; to remain, it seems, as a Monument of that unseasonable Conversation, so opposite to the reigning Genius of Gallantry and Pleasure.

I MUST own, indeed, 'tis become fashionable in our Nation to talk Politicks in every Company, and mix the Discourses of State-affairs with those of *Pleasure* and *Entertainment*. However, 'tis certain we approve of no such Freedom in *Philosophy*.
No

Nor do we look upon *Politicks* to be of her Pro-Sect. i. vince, or in the least related to her. So much have ~~we~~ we Moderns degraded her, and stripp'd her of her chief Rights.

You must allow me, PALEMON, thus to bemoan *Philosophy*; since you have forc'd me to ingage with her at a time when her Credit runs so low. She is no longer *active* in the World; nor can hardly, with any advantage, be brought upon the publick Stage. We have immur'd her (poor Lady!) in Colleges and Cells; and have set her servilely to such Works as those in the Mines. Empiricks, and pedantick Sophists are her chief Pupils. The *School-syllogism*, and the *Elixir*, are the choicest of her Products. So far is she from producing Statesmen, as of old, that hardly any Man of Note in the publick cares to own the least Obligation to her. If some few maintain their Acquaintance, and come now and then to her Recesses, 'tis as the Disciple of Quality came to his Lord and Master; "secretly, and "by night."

But as low as *PHILOSOPHY* is reduc'd; if *Morals* be allow'd belonging to her, *Politicks* must undeniably be hers. For to understand the Manners and Constitutions of Men *in common*, 'tis necessary to study *MAN in particular*, and know the Creature, as he is in himself, before we consider him in Company, as he is interested in the State, or join'd to any City or Community. Nothing is more familiar than to reason concerning *Man* in his *confederate State* and *national Relation*; as he stands engag'd to this or that Society, by Birth or Naturalization: Yet, to consider him as a *Citizen or Commoner of the World*, to trace his Pedigree a step higher, and view his End and Constitution in *Nature* it-self, must pass, it seems, for some intricate or over-refin'd Speculation.

It may be properly alledg'd perhaps, as a Reason for this general Shyness in *moral Inquiry*; that the People to whom it has principally belong'd to handle these Subjects, have done it in such a manner as v

Part 1. put the better Sort out of countenance with the
 undertaking. The appropriating this Concern to n
 Scholasticks, has brought their Fashion and Air
 the very Subject. There are formal Set-pla
 where, we reckon, there is enough said and tau
 on the Head of these graver Subjects. We can
 no quarter to any thing like it in good Comp.
 The least mention of such matters gives us a disf
 and puts us out of humour. If Learning co
 a-crois us, we count it *Pedantry*; if Morality,
Preaching.

*Lang.
guage.* ONE must own this, however, as a real Di
 vantage of our modern Conversations; that by
 a scrupulous Nicety they lose those masculine H
 of Learning and sound Reason. Even the Fair
 in whose favour we pretend to make this Con
 fession, may with reason despise us for it, and la
 at us for aiming at their peculiar Softness. 'Tis
 Compliment to them, to affect their Manners,
 be effeminate. Our Sense, Language, and Style
 well as our Voice, and Person, shou'd have so
 thing of that Male-Feature, and natural Roughi
 by which our Sex is distinguish'd. And what
 Politeness we may pretend to, 'tis more a Disfig
 ment than any real Refinement of Discourse, to
 der it thus delicate.

Cly's. No Work of Wit can be esteem'd perfect w
 out that Strength and Boldness of Hand, which g
 it Body and Proportions. A good Piece, the Pi
 ers say, must have good *Museling* as well as *Co
 ing* and *Drapery*. And surely no Writing or
 course, of any great moment, can seem other
 enervated, when neither strong Reason, nor A
 quity, nor the Records of Things, nor the na
 History of Man, nor any-thing which can be c
Knowledge, dares accompany it; except perhaps
 some ridiculous Habit, which may give it an A
 Play and Dalliance.

THIS brings to my mind a Reason I have often Sect. I.
t for; why we Moderns, who abound so much ~~writ-~~
~~ates~~ and *Essays*, are so sparing in the way
DIALOGUE; which heretofore was found the DIA-
lt and best way of managing even the graver LOGUE.
It is. The truth is; 'twou'd be an abomina-
lshood and belying of the Age, to put so much
Sense together in any one Conversation, as
to make it hold out steddyly, and with plain co-
se, for an hour's time, till any one Subject had
rationally examin'd.

lay Colours, to draw, or describe, against the
uance of Nature and Truth, is a Liberty nei-
permitted the Painter nor the Poet. Much
n *the Philosopher* have such a Privilege; espe-
in his own Case. If he represents his Philo-
as making any figure in Conversation; if he
shs in the Debate, and gives his own Wisdom
vantage over the World's; he may be liable to
Raillery, and possibly be made a *Fable* of.
is said of *the Lion*, that being in civil Confe- *A Fable*,
with *the Man*, he wisely refus'd to yield the
ority of Strength to him; when, instead of
the Man produc'd only certain Figures and
sentations of human Victorys over the Lion-

These Master-pieces of Art the Beast disco-
to be wholly of human Forgery: and from
he had good right to appeal. Indeed had he
1 his life been witness to any such Combats as
an represented to him in the way of Art; pos-
he Example might have mov'd him. But old
s of a HERCULES, a THESEUS, or ether
subduers, cou'd have little power over him,
he neither saw nor felt any such living Anta-
capable to dispute the Field with him.

t need not wonder, therefore, that the sort of
Painting, by way of Dialogue, is so much out-
en; and that we see no more of these philo-

Part I. Sophsical Portraiture now-a-days. For who
 know the Originals? Or what tho' you (PARSON) by chance, have lighted on such a one; and our-selves with the Life? Can you imagine it make a good Picture?

Academists.

YOU know too, that in this Academick Philosophy I am to present you with, there is a certain of Questioning and Doubting, which no-way the Genius of our Ago. Men love to take partantly. They can't bear being kept in fuf The Examination torments 'm. They want rid of it, upon the easiest terms. 'Tis as if fancy'd themselves drowning, whenever they trust to the Current of Reason. They seem ing away, they know not whither; and are to catch at the first Twig. There they chuse wards to hang, tho ever so insecurely, rathe trust their Strength to bear them above Water who has got hold of an Hypothesis, how slight is satisfy'd. He can presently answer every question, and, with a few Terms of Art, give an ac of every thing without trouble.

Alchymists.

'Tis no wonder if in this Age the Philoso the Alchymist prevails so much: since it pr such Wonders, and requires more the Labo Hands than Brains. We have a strange Fa be Creators, a violent Desire at least to kno Knack or Secret by which Nature does all. To of our Philosophers only aim at that in Specu which our Alchymists aspire to in Practice. with some of these it has been actually unde beration how to make Man, by other Medium Nature has hitherto provided. Every Sect has elpe. When you know it, you are Master ture: you solve all her * Phænomena: you see Deigns, and can account for all her Operatio need were, you might, perchance too, be of h

ny, and work for her. At least one wou'd Sect. I.
ne the Partizans of each modern Sect had this ~~—~~
it. They are all ARCHIMEDES's in their way,
an make a World upon easier terms than he of-
to more one.

short; there are good Reasons for our being *Dogma-*
superficial, and consequently thus *dogmatical*
philosophy. We are too lazy and effeminate, and
I a little too cowardly, to dare *doubt*. The *de-*
way best becomes our Manners. It suits as
with our Vices as with our Superstition. Which-
we are fond of, is secur'd by it. If in favour
eligion we have espous'd an Hypothesis, on
our Faith, we think, depends; we are super-
ficially careful not to be loosen'd in it. If, by
s of our ill Morals, we are broken with Reli-
; 'tis the same Case still: We are as much afraid
ubtin. We must be sure to say, "It cannot be;"
"Tis *Demonstrable*: For otherwise *Who knows?*
id not to *know*, is to *yield!*" —

+ us we will needs *know* every thing, and be
e pains of examining nothing. Of all Phileso-
therefore, how absolutely the most disagreeable
tha: appear, which goes upon no establish'd
ithesis, nor presents us with any flattering
ne, talks only of Probabilitys, Suspence of
ment, Inquiry, Search, and Caution not to be
s'd on, or deceiv'd? This is tha: *academick*
pline in which formerly * the youth were *Antients*.
d: when not only Horsemanshi; and Military
had their publick Places of Exercise; but Phi-
hy too had its Wrestlers in repute. Reason and
had their *Auditors*, and underwent this Trial;
in a formal way, apart from the World; but
lv, among the better sort, and as an Exercise of
enterior kind. This the great st Men were not
nid to practise, in the Interval, of publick Af-
in the highest Stations and Employments, and

The MORAL
at the latest hour of their Lives. Hence the
of DIALOGUE, and Patience of Debate and Reasoning,
any of which we have scarce a Remembrance; but
any of our Conversations, at this season of the World.

CONSIDER then, PALEMON, what our Picture
is like to prove: and how it will appear; especially
in the Light you have unluckily chosen to set
it. For who wou'd thus have confronted Philosophy
with the Gaiety, Wit, and Humour of the Age?—
If this, however, can be for your Credit, I am con-
tent. The Project is your own. 'Tis you who
have match'd Philosophy thus unequally. Therefore
leaving you to answer for the Success, I begin this
inauspicious Work, which my ill Stars and you have
assign'd me; and in which I hardly dare ask Succour
of the Muses, as poetical as I am oblig'd to shew
my-self in this Enterprize.

S E C T. II.

"O WRETCHED State of Mankind!
" Hapless Nature, thus to have err'd in
" chief Workmanship! — Whence sprang
" fatal Weakness? What Chance or Destiny
" we accuse? Or shall we mind the Poets,
" they sing thy Tragedy (PROMETHEUS)
" with thy stolen celestial Fire, mix'd with vile
" didst mock Heaven's Countenance, and in
" Likeness of the Immortals mad'st the com-
" MAN; that wretched Mortal, ill to himse
" Cause of Ill to all."

WHAT say you, PALEMON, to this R.
Just in such a romantick Strain that you forge
against human Kind, upon a Day when ev
look'd pleasing, and the Kind when ev
never appear'd fairer, or made it-self (I
rel'd with: Nor were you so out of cou

The Verdure of the Field, the distant Pro-
Sect.s.
Gold, the gilded Horizon, and purple Sky, form'd
By a Setting Sun, had Charms in abundance, and
were able to make impression on you. Here, PA-
LESTON, you allow'd me to admire as much as I
could; when, at the same instant, you wou'd not
let me talk to you of those nearer Beautys of
your own Kind, which I thought more natural for
Men at our Age to admire. Your Severity however
would not silence me upon this Subject. I continu'd
to plead the Cause of *the Fair*, and advance their
Charms above all those other Beautys of Nature.
When you took advantage from this Opposition,
to shew how little there was of *Nature*, and how
much of *Art* in what I admir'd, I made the best Apo-
logy I cou'd; and fighting for Beauty, kept the Field
as long as there was one *Fair-one* present.

CONSIDERING how your Genius stood in-
differently to Poetry, I wonder'd most to find you on a
golden grown so out of conceit with our modern
Poets, and *Galante* Writers; whom I quoted to you,
as better Authoritys than any Antient in behalf of
the Fair Sex, and their Prerogative. But this you
treated lightly. You acknowledg'd it to be true indeed,
what had been observ'd by some late Wits,
"That GALLANTRY was of a modern Growth."
And well it might be so, you thought, without dis-
honour to the Ancients; who understood *Truth* and
Nature too well, to admit so ridiculous an Invention.

Twas in vain, therefore, that I held up this
Shield in my defence. I did my Cause no service,
when in behalf of *the Fair* I pleaded all the fine
things which are usually said, in this romantick way,
to their advantage. You attack'd the very Fortress
of *Gallantry*, ridicul'd the *Point of Honour*, with all
those nice Sentiments and Ceremonials belonging
to it. You damn'd even our Favourite *Novels*;
those dear sweet natural Pieces, writ most of 'em by
the Fair Sex themselves. In short, this whole Order
and Scheme of Wit you condemn'd absolutely, as
false.

Part 1. *fasse, monstrous, and GOTNICK*; quite out of way of Nature, and sprung from the mere Dregg *Chivalry or Knight-Errantry*; a thing which in self you prefer'd, as of a better Taste than t which reigns at present in its stead. For at a time when this Mystery of Gallantry carry'd along with it the Notion of doughty Knighthood; when Fair were made Witnesses, and, in a manner, Part to Feats of Arms, enter'd into all the Points of War and Combat, and were won by dint of Launce & manly Prowess; 'twas not altogether absurd (I thought) on such a foundation as this, to pay Homage and Adoration, make 'em the Stand of Wit and Manners, and bring Mankind under their Laws. But in a Country where no *Saints* were worship'd by any Authority from Region, 'twas as impertinent and sensileis, as it was profane, to deify the Sex, raise 'em to a Capacity above what Nature had allow'd, and treat 'em with a Respect which in the natural way of Love themselves were the aptest to complain of.

INDEED as for the Moral Part, 'twas woderful (you said) to observe the Licentiousness whi this foppish courtly Humour had establish'd in the World. What such a flattering way of Addressing all the Sex in common cou'd mean, you know not; unless it were to render 'em wholly common indeed, and make each Fair-one apprehend that the Publick had a right to her; and that the Beauty was too communicative and divine a Thing to be made a Property, and confin'd to One at once.

MEAN while our Company began to leave The Beau-monde, whom you had been thus severally censuring, drew off apace: for it grew late. I took notice that the approaching Objects of Night were the more agreeable to you, for the Latitude they introduc'd; and that the Moon & Planets which began now to appear, were in reality the only proper Company for a Man in

Humour. For now you began to talk with much Satisfaction of natural Things, and of all Orders of Beautys, ~~and~~ **M A N** only excepted. Never did I hear a finer Description than you made of the Order of the heavenly Luminars, the Circles of the Planets, and their attendant Satellites. And you who wou'd allow nothing to those fair earthly Luminars in the Circles which just now we mov'd in ; you, PALEMON, who seem'd to overlook the Pride of that Theatre, began now to look out with Ravishment on this other, and triumph in the new philosophical Scene of Worlds unknown. Here, when you had pretty well spent the first Fire of your Imagination, I wou'd have got you to reason more calmly with me upon that other Part of the Creation, your own Kind ; to which (I told you) you discover'd so much Aversion, as wou'd make one believe you a compleat *Timon*, or *Man-bater*. *Misan-*
tropy.

" CAN you then, O PHILOCLES, (said you in a high strain, and with a moving air of Passion) " Can you believe me of that Character ? Or can you think it of me in earnest, that being **M A N**, and conscious of my Nature, I shou'd have yet so little of Humanity, as not to feel the Affections of a *Man* ? " Or feeling what is natural towards my Kind, that I shou'd hold their Interest light, and be indifferently affected with what affects or seriously concerns them ? Am I so ill a Lover of my Country ? " Or is it that you find me indeed so ill a Friend ? " For what are all Relations else ? What are the Ties of private Friendship, if that to *Mankind* be not obliging ? Can there be yet a Bond in Nature, if That be none ? O PHILOCLES ! Believe me when I say I feel it one, and fully prove its Power within me. Think not that I wou'd willingly break my Chain : Nor count me so degenerate or unnatural, as whilst I hold this Form, and wear a human Heart, I shou'd throw off Love, Compassion, Kindness, and not ~~be~~ *wield* *Mankind.*

Part I. " *Mankind.* —— But O what Treachery ! what Disorders ! And how corrupt is all ! —— Did you not observe e'en now, when all this Space was fill'd with goodly Rows of Company, how peaceful all appear'd. —— What Charms there are in publick Company's ! What Harmony in Courts and Courtly Places ! How pleas'd is every Face ! How courteous and humane the general Carriage and Behaviour ! —— What Creature capable of Reflection, if he thus saw us Mankind, and saw no more, wou'd not believe our Earth a *very Heaven* ? What Foreigner (the Inhabitant, suppose, of some near Planet) when he had travel'd hither, and survey'd this outward Face of things, wou'd think of what lay hid beneath the Mask ? —— But let him stay a-while. Allow him leisure ; till he has gain'd a nearer View, and following our disolv'd Assemblys to their particular Receptions, he has the power of seeing 'em in this new Aspect. —— Here he may behold those great Men of the Ministry, who not at an hour ago in publick appear'd such Friends, now plotting craftily each other's Ruin, with the Ruin of the State it-self, a Sacrifice to their Ambition. Here he may see too those of a softer kind, who knowing not Ambition, follow only *Love*. Yet (PRIVATE LOCLES) who wou'd think it ?" —

At these words, you may remember, I discover'd the Lightness of my Temper, and laugh'd aloud ; which I cou'd hardly hope you wou'd have pardon'd, had I not freely told you the true reason. "Twas not for want of being affected with what you spoke. I only imagin'd a more particular Cause had provok'd you, when having pass'd over the Ambitious, you were coming full-charg'd against the People of a softer Passion. At first, I look'd on you as deeply in the Spleen : But now I concluded you in love, and so unhappily engag'd as to have reason to complain of Infidelity. " This, thought I,

as has mov'd these men thus. Hence the sad Sot. "World! Here was that Corruption, and those Dis-~~ways~~
orders he lamented!"

AFTER I had begg'd pardon for my rude Mirth, cause which had the good fortune however to make some ill. change in your Honour; we fell naturally into cool Reasoning about the Nature and Cause of ILL in general: " Thro' what Contingency, what Chances; by what fatal Negligy, what Will, or what Per-~~sever~~ it came upon the World; or being come once, shou'd still subsist." This * Inquiry, which with slight Reasoners is easily got over, stuck hard, I found, with one of your close Judgment and Penetration. And this insensibly led us into a nice Criticism of NATURE; whom you sharply arraign'd for many Absurdities you thought her guilty of, in relation to Mankind, and his peculiar State.

FAIN wou'd I have persuaded you to think with more Equality of NATURE, and to proportion her Defects a little better. My Notion was, that the Grievance lay not altogether in *one* part, as you plac'd it; but that *every thing* had its share of Inconvenience. Pleasure and Pain, Beauty and Deformity, Good and Ill, seem'd to me every-where interwoven; and one with another made, I thought, a pretty Mixture, agreeable enough, in the main. 'Twas the same, I fancy'd, as in some of those rich Stuffs, where the Flowers and Ground were oddly put together, with such irregular Work, and contrary Colours, as look'd ill *in the Pattern*, but mighty natural and well *in the Piece*.

BUT you were still upon Extremes. Nothing wou'd serve to excuse the Faults or Blemishes of this Part of the Creation, MANKIND; even tho all besides were fair, without a Blemish. The very Storms and Tempests had their Beauty in your

Part 1. account, those alone excepted which arose in
 man Breasts. 'Twas only for this turbulent
Cause of Mortals you offer'd to accuse Nature. A
 Ill.

now found why you had been so transported
 the Story of PROMETHEUS. You wanted su
 Operator as this for Mankind: And you
 tempted to wish the Story cou'd have been
 firm'd in modern Divinity; that clearing the
 preme Powers of any Concern or Hand in the
 Workmanship, you might have the liberty
 weighing against it, without Profaneness.

This however, I told you, was but a flight
 fion of the religious Poets among the Ants.
 'Twas easy to answer every Objection by a
 MYTHUS: as, "Why had Mankind *originally*
 " much Folly and Perverseness? Why so
 " Pride, such Ambition, and strange Appre
 " Why so many Plagues, and Curses, entail
 " him and his Posterity?" — PROMETHEUS
 was the Cause. The plastick Artist, with his
 lucky Hand, solv'd all. " 'Twas His Contriv
 " (they say) and He was to answer for it."
 reckon'd it a fair Game, if they cou'd gain a
Remove, and put the evil *Cause* farther off.
 People ask'd a Question, they told 'em a
 and sent 'em away satisfy'd. None besides
 Philosophers wou'd be such Busy-bodys (they thought)
 as to look beyond, or ask a second Question.

AND in reality, continu'd I, 'tis not
 imagin'd how serviceable a *Tale* is, to amuse
 besides mere Children; and how much easier
 Generality of Men are paid in this Paper-coin
 in Sterling Reason. We ought not to lau
 readily at the Indian Philosophers, who tell
 their People how this huge Frame of the
 is supported, tell 'em 'tis by an Elephant.
 And the Elephant how? — A shread
 tion! but which by no means shou'd be ani
 'Tis here only that our Indian Philosophers
 blame. They shou'd be contented with

plant, and go no further. But they have a Tortoise Soft., in revice; whose Back, they think, is broad enough. So the Tortoise must bear the new Load: And thus the matter stands worse than before.

The Heathen Story of PROMETHEUS was, I told you, much the same with this Indian one: only the Heathen Mythologists were so wise as not to go beyond the first Removal. A single PROMETHEUS was enough to take the Weight from Jove. They fairly made Jov^e a Stander-by. He rejoy'd, it seems, to be Neuter; and see what wou'd come of this notable Experiment; how the dangerous Man-moulder wou'd proceed; and what wou'd be the Event of his Tampering. — Excellent Account, to satisfy the Heathen Vulgar! But how, think you, wou'd a Philosopher digest this? "For the Gods (he wou'd say presently) either cou'd have hinder'd PROMETHEUS's Creation, or they cou'd not. If they cou'd, they were answerable for the Consequences; if they cou'd not, they were no longer Gods, being thus limited and controul'd. And whether PROMETHEUS were a Name for Chance, Destiny, a plaffick Nature, or an evil Daemon; whatever was design'd by it, 'twas still the same Breach of OMNIPOTENCE."

THAT such a hazardous Affair as this of Creation shou'd have been undertaken by those who had not perfect Fore-sight as well as Command, you own'd was neither wise nor just. But you stood to Fore-sight. You allow'd the *Consequence* to have been undertaken by the creating Powers, when they undertook their Work: and you deny'd that it wou'd have been better for them to have omitted it; tho' they knew what wou'd be the Event. "I was ~~Care~~ ^{careful} better still that the Project shou'd be executed, ill. whatever might become of Mankind, or how hard forever such a Creation was like to fall on the generosity of this miserable Race. For 'twas impossible, you thought, that Heaven shou'd have ^{"acted}

Part I. "acted otherwise than for the best. So that
— from this Misery and Ill of Man, there
"undoubtedly some Good arising; something w
"over-ballanc'd all, and made full amends."

THIS was a Confession I wonder'd indeed
I came to draw from you: And soon afterwar
found you somewhat uneasy under it. For he
took up your own part against you; and settin
those Villanys and Corruptions of human Kin
the same light you had done just before, I p
upon you to tell, where possibly cou'd be the
vantage or Good arising hence; or what Excell
or Beauty cou'd redound from those tragical
tures you your-self had drawn so well after the
Whether it must not be a very strong philosop
Faith, which shou'd persuade one that those di
Parts you set to view were only the necessary Sh
of a fine Piece, to be reckon'd among the Bea
of the Creation: Or whether possibly you m
look upon that Maxim as very fit for Hea
which I was sure you did not approve at all in M
kind; "*To do Ill, that Good might follow.*"

THIS, I said, made me think of the ma
of our modern PROMETHEUS's, the Mounteb
who perform'd such Wonders of many kinds, i
on our earthly Stages. They cou'd create Disease
and make Mischief, in order to heal, and re
store. But shou'd we assign such a Practice as
to Heaven? Shou'd we dare to make such
piricks of the Gods, and such a Patient of
Nature? "Was this a reason for Nature's Si
"ness? Or how else came she (poor Innoce
"to fall sick, or run astray? Had she been
"ginaly healthy, or created sound at firſt; she
"ſtill continu'd ſo. "Twas no Credit to the C
"to leave her defitute, or with a Flaw which w
"cost dear the mending, and make them Suffic
"for their own Work." —

was going to bring HOMER to witness for Sect. 2.
many Troubles of Jove, the Death of SARPE-
t, and the frequent Crosses Heaven met with,
n the fatal Sisters. But this Discourse, I saw,
pleas'd you. I had by this time plainly disco-
'd my Inclination to SCEPTICISM. And here

only Religion was objected to me, but I was
roach'd too on the account of that Gallantry
ich I had some time before defended. Both were
l'd together in the Charge you made against me,
en you saw I adher'd to nothing : but was now
ready to declaim against the Fair, as I had been
ore to plead their Cause, and defend the Moral
Lovers. This, you said, was my constant way
all Debates : I was as well pleas'd with the Rea-
on one side, as on the other : I never troubled
-self about the Success of the Argument, but
gh'd still, whatever way it went ; and even when
convinc'd others, never seem'd as if I was con-
c'd my-self.

I own'd to you, PALEMON, there was Truth
ough in your Charge. For above all things I
'd Ease ; and of all Philosophers those who rea-
l'd most at their ease, and were never angry or
turb'd ; as those call'd SCEPTICKS, you own'd,
ver were. I look'd upon this kind of Philosophy
the prettiest, agreeablest, roving Exercise of the
nd, possible to be imagin'd. The other kind, I
ought, was painful and laborious ; " To keep al-
ways in the Limits of one Path ; to drive always
at a Point ; and hold precisely to what Men, at a
venture, call'd THE TRUTH : A Point, in all
appearance, very unfix'd, and hard to ascertain."
ides, my way lutt no body. I was always the
it to comply on any occasion ; and for Matters of
igion, was further from Profaneness and erro-
ous Doctrine than any-one. I cou'd never have
sufficiency to check my spiritual and learned
prior. I was the furthest from leaning to any

Part i. own Understanding : nor was I one who exalted Reason above Faith, or insisted much upon what the dogmatical Men call Demonstration, and dare oppose to the sacred Mysterys of Religion. And to shew you (continu'd I) how impossible it is for the Men of our sort ever to err from the Catholick and Establish'd Faith, pray consider ; That whereas Others pretend to see with their own Eyes, what is properst and best for 'em in Religion ; We, for our parts, pretend not to see with any other than those of our spiritual Guides. Neither do we presume to judg those Guides our-selves ; but submit to them, as they are appointed us by our just Superiors. In short, you who are Rationalists, and walk by Reason in every thing, pretend to know all things, whilst you believe little or nothing : We for our parts know nothing, and believe all.

HERE I ended ; and, in return, you only ask'd me coldly, " Whether with that fine SCEPTICISM
" of mine, I made no more distinction between
" Sincerity and Insincerity in Actions, than I did
" between Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong,
" in Arguments ? "

I durst not ask what your Question drove at. I was afraid I saw it too plainly ; and that by this loose way of talking, which I had learnt in some fashionable Conversations of the World, I had given you occasion to suspect me of the worst sort of Scepticism, such as spar'd nothing ; but overthrew all Principles, Moral and Divine.

FORGIVE me (said I) good PALEMON : you are offended, I fee, and not without cause. But what if I shou'd endeavour to compensate my Scopical Misbehaviour, by using a known Sceptick Privilege, and asserting strenuously the Cause I have hitherto oppos'd ? Do not imagine that I dare aspire so high as to defend reveal'd Religion, or the holy Mysterys of the Christian Faith. I am unworthy of such a Task, and shou'd profane the Subject.

of mere *Philosophy* I speak : And my Fancy is only Sect. to try what I can muster up thence, to make head against the chief Arguments of *Atheism*, and re-establish what I have offer'd to loosen in the System of *Theism*.

Y O U R Project, said you, bids fair to reconcile *Theism* me to your Character, which I was beginning to mistrust. For as averse as I am to the Cause of *Theism*, or Name of *Deist*, when taken in a sense exclusive of Revelation ; I consider still that, in strictness, the Root of all is *THEISM* ; and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary to be first of all a good *Theist*. For *Theism* can only be oppos'd to * *Polytheism*, or *Atheism*. Nor have I patience to hear the Name of *Deist* (the highest of all Names) decry'd, and set in opposition to *Christianity*. " As if our Religion was a kind of *Magick*, which depended not on the Belief of a single supreme Being. Or as if the firm and rational Belief of such a Being, on philosophical Grounds, was an improper Qualification for believing any thing further." Excellent Presumption, for those who naturally incline to the Disbelief of Revelation, or who thro Vanity affect a Freedom of this kind ! —

B U T let me hear (continu'd you) whether in good Earnest, and thorow Sincerity, you intend to advance any thing in favour of that Opinion which is fundamental to all Religion ; or whether you design only to divert your-self with the Subject, as you have done hitherto ? " Whatever your Thoughts are, *PHILOCLES*, I am resolv'd to force 'em from you. You can no longer plead the Unsuitableness of the Time or Place to such grave Subjects. The gaudy Scene is over with the Day. Our Company have long since quitted the Field. And the solemn Majesty of such a Night as this, may

* " To *Polytheism* (*Daemonism*) or *Atheism* :" as above,
pag. 10.

The MORALISTS,

" justly sute with the profoundest Meditation,
 " most serious Discourse."
 Thus, PALEMON, you continu'd to urge me
 till by necessity I was drawn into the following
 Vein of Philosophical Enthusiasm.

S E C T. III.

YOU shall find then, said I (taking a grave Air)
 that 'tis probable for me to be serious ; and
 all. Your Over-seriousnes a-while since, for good and
 unseasonable time, may have driven me perha
 into a contrary Extreme, by opposition to your
 melancholy Humour. But I have now a better
 Idea of that Melancholy you discover'd, and ne
 withstanding the humorous Turn you were
 to give it, I am persuaded it has a different Fou
 dation from any of those fantastical Causes I th
 LOVE, assign'd to it. " Love, doubtless, is at the bot
 " tom : but a nobler Love than such as commo
 " Beautys inspire." —————

HERE, in my turn, I began to raise my Voice
 and imitate the solemn way you had been teach
 me. " Knowing as you are, continu'd I, " u
 " knowing and experienc'd in all the Degrees
 " Orders of Beauty, in all the mysterious Charm
 " the particular Forms ; you rise to what is
 " general ; and with a larger Heart, and Mind
 " comprehensive, you generously seek that wh
 " highest in the kind. Not captivated by the
 " aments of a fair Face, or the well-drawn
 " portions of a human Body, you view the I
 " self, and embrace rather the Mind which
 " the Lustre, and renders chiefly amiable.
 " No^r is the Enjoyment of such a single
 " sufficient to satisfy such an aspiring Soul.
 " how to combine more Beautys, and by v
 " alition of these, to form a beautiful Soc
 " views Communitys, Friendships, Relatio

" and considers by what Harmony of particular Sect.
 " Minds the general Harmony is compos'd, and
 " Commonwealth establish'd.

" Nor satisfy'd even with publick Good in one
 " Community of Men, it frames it-self a nobler
 " Object, and with enlarg'd Affection seeks *the Good of Mankind*. It dwells with Pleasure amidst *Virtue*
 " that Reason, and those Orders on which this fair
 " Correspondence and goodly Interest is establish'd,
 " Laws, Constitutions, civil and religious Rites ;
 " whatever文明izes or polishes rude Mankind ; the
 " Sciences and Arts, Philosophy, Morals, Virtue ;
 " the flourishing State of human Affairs, and the
 " Perfection of human Nature ; these are its de-
 " lightful Prospects, and this the Charm of Beauty
 " which attracts it.

" STILL ardent in this Pursuit (such is its *Univer-*
 " *Love of Order and Perfection*) it rests not here ;
 " nor satisfies it-self with the Beauty of a Part,
 " but extending further its communicative Bounty,
 " seeks the Good of All, and affects the Interest and
 " Prosperity of *the Whole*. True to its native World
 " and higher Country, 'tis here it seeks Order and
 " Perfection ; wishing the best, and hoping still to
 " find a just and wise Administration.

" AND since all Hope of this were vain and *GOD*
 " idle, if no *universal Mind* presided ; since with-
 " out such a supreme Intelligence and providen-
 " tial Care, the distracted Universe must be con-
 " demn'd to suffer infinite Calamitys ; 'tis here the
 " generous Mind labours to discover that *healing*
 " Cause by which the Interest of *the Whole* is se-
 " curely establish'd, the Beauty of Things, and the
 " universal Order happily sustain'd.

" THIS, PALEMON, is the Labour of your Soul : Ill not
 " and This its *Melancholy* ; when unsuccessfully pur-
 " suing the supreme Beauty, it meets with darkning
 " Clouds which intercept its Sight. Monsters arise,
 " not those from *Lybian Desarts*, but from the

Part I. " Heart of Man more fertile ; and with their horrid
 ~~~ " Aspect cast an unseemly Reflection upon NATURE.  
 Ill natu- " She, helpless (as she is thought) and  
 ral and " working thus absurdly, is contemn'd, the Go-  
 moral. " vernment of the World arraign'd, and DEITY  
 " made void.

" Much is alledg'd in answer, to shew why  
 " Nature errs, and how she came thus impotent  
 " and erring from an unerring Hand. But I deny  
 " she errs; and when she seems most ignorant or  
 " perverse in her Productions, I assert her even then  
 " as wise and provident, as in her goodliest Works.  
 " For 'tis not then that Men complain of the World's  
 " Order, or abhor the Face of things, when they see  
 " various Interests mix'd and interfering; Natures  
 " subordinate, of different kinds, oppos'd one to  
 " another, and in their different Operations sub-  
 " mitted, the higher to the lower. 'Tis on the  
 " contrary, from this Order of inferior and supe-  
 " rior Things, that we admire the \* World's  
 " Beauty, founded thus on Contrarietys : whilst from  
 " such various and disagreeing Principles, a univer-  
 " sal Concord is establish'd.

" Thus in the several Orders of terrestrial  
 " Forms, a Resignation is requir'd, a Sacrifice and  
 " mutual yielding of Natures one to another. The  
 " Vegetables by their Death sustain the Animals :  
 " and Animal Bodys dissolv'd, enrich the Earth, and  
 " raise again the vegetable World. The numerous  
 " Insects are reduc'd by the superior Kinds of Birds  
 " and Beasts : and these again are check'd by Man ;  
 " who in his turn submits to other Natures, and  
 " resigns his Form a Sacrifice in common to the rest  
 " of Things. And if in Natures so little exalted or  
 " pre-eminent above each other, the Sacrifice of In-  
 " terest can appear so just ; how much more rea-

\* See VOL. III. p. 179, 180. what is cited in the Note  
 from the ancient Author on the World.

" sonably may all inferior Natures be subjcted to Sect. :  
 " the superior Nature of the World ! That World, ~~which~~  
 " PALEMON, which even now transported you,  
 " when the Sun's fainting Light gave way to these  
 " bright Constellations, and left you this wide Sy-  
 " tem to contemplate.

" H E R E are those *Laws* which ought not, nor  
 " can submit to any thing below. The central  
 " Powers, which hold the lasting Orbs in their just  
 " Poize and Movement, must not be controul'd to  
 " save a fleeting Form, and rescue from the Pre-  
 " cipice a puny Animal, whose brittle Frame, how-  
 " e'er protected, must of it-self so soon dissolve.  
 " The ambient Air, the inward Vapours, the im-  
 " pending Meteors, or whatever else is nutrimental  
 " or preservative of this Earth, must operate in a  
 " natural Course : and other Constitutions must sub-  
 " mit to the good Habit and Constitution of the all-  
 " sustaining Globe.

" L E T us not therefore wonder, if by Earth-  
 " quakes, Storms, pestilential Blasts, nether or up-  
 " per Fires, or Floods, the animal Kinds are oft  
 " afflicted, and whole Species perhaps involv'd at  
 " once in common Ruin : But much less let us ac- ill nat  
 " count it strange, if either by outward Shock, or ral an  
 " some interior Wound from hostile Matter, parti- moral.  
 " cular Animals are deform'd even in their first  
 " Conception, when the Disease invades the Seats of  
 " Generation, and seminal Parts are injur'd and  
 " obstructed in their accurate Labours. 'Tis then  
 " alone that monstrous Shapes are seen : Nature still  
 " working as before, and not perversly or errone-  
 " ously ; not faintly, or with feeble Endeavours ;  
 " but o'erpower'd by a *superior Rival*, and by an-  
 " other Nature's *justly* conquering Force.

" N O R need we wonder, if the interior Form,  
 " the Soul and Temper, partakes of this occasional  
 " Deformity, and sympathizes often with its close  
 " Partner, Who is there can wonder either at the  
 " Sicknesses

Part I.<sup>st</sup> Sickneses of Sense, or the Depravity of Minds in  
 such clos'd in such frail Bodys, and dependent on such  
 "pervertible Organs?

*Glad.* "Here then is that Solution you require: and  
 hence those seeming Blemishes cast upon Nature.  
 "Nor is there ought in this beside what is natural  
 "and good. 'Tis good which is predominant; and  
 "every corruptible and mortal Nature by its Morta-  
 "lity and Corruption yields only to some better, and  
 "all in common to that best and highest Nature,  
 "which is incorruptible and immortal."

I SCARCE had ended these Words, e'er you  
 broke out in admiration; asking what had befall'n  
 me, that of a sudden I had thus chang'd my Char-  
 acter, and enter'd into Thoughts which must cer-  
 tainly, you suppos'd, have some Foundation in me,  
 since I cou'd express them with such seeming Affec-  
 tion as I had done.

O, said I, PALEMON! that it had been my  
 fortune to have met you the other day, just at my  
 Return out of the Country, from a Friend whose  
 Conversation had in one day or two made such an  
 Impression on me, that I shou'd have futed you to a  
 Miracle. You wou'd have thought indeed that I  
 had been cur'd of my Scepticism and Levity, so as  
 never to have rally'd more, at that wild rate, on any  
 Subject, much less on these which are so serious.

TRUELY, said you, I cou'd wish I had met you  
 rather at that time, or that those good and serious  
 Impressions of your Friend had without interruption  
 lafted with you till this moment.

WHATEVER they were, I told you, PALE-  
 MON, I had not so lost 'em neither, as not easily, you  
 saw, to revive 'em on occasion; were I not afraid

Afraid! said you. For whose sake, good P-  
 EOCLES, I intreat you? For mine or your own?  
 For both, reply'd I. For tho' I was like to be  
 perfectly cur'd of my Scepticism; 'twas by will-

downright works, downright *Enthusiasm*. You never ~~Sect.~~  
knew a more agreeable ENTHUSIAST!

Would he my Friend (said you) I shou'd hardly ~~enthu-~~  
treat him in so free a manner. Nor shou'd I, per-~~fas.~~  
haps, judg that to be *Enthusiasm* which you so freely  
term so. I have a strong suspicion that you injure  
him. Nor can I be satisfy'd till I hear further of  
that serious Conversation for which you tax him as  
*Enthusiastick*.

I must confess (said I) he had nothing of that  
savage Air of the vulgar enthuiaſtick Kind. All  
was serene, soft, and harmonious. The manner of  
it was more after the pleasing Transports of those  
antient *Pets*; you are often charm'd with, than after  
the fierce unfociable way of modern *Zealots*; those  
starch'd gruff Gentlemen, who guard Religion as  
Bullys do a Mistress, and give us the while a very  
indifferent Opinion of their Lady's Merit, and their  
own Wit, by adoring what they neither allow to  
be inspected by others, nor care themselves to exa-  
mine in a fair light. But here I'll anſwer for it; there  
was nothing of Disguise or Paint. All was fair,  
open, and genuine, as Nature her-self. 'Twas *Na-*  
*ture* he was in love with: 'Twas *Nature* he sung:  
And if any-one might be said to have a *natural*  
Mistress, my Friend certainly might, whose Heart  
was thus ingag'd. But *Love*, I found, was every-  
where the same. And tho the Object here was very  
fine, and the Passion it created very noble; yet *Li-*  
*berty*, I thought, was finer than all: And I who never  
car'd to engag'd in other Loves of the least conti-  
nuance, was the more afraid, I told you, of this  
which had such a power with my poor *Friend*, as to  
make him appear the perfectest ENTHUSIAST in the  
world, *Ill-bumour* only excepted. For this was singu-  
lar in him, " That tho he had all of the *Enthusiast*, he  
had nothing of the *Bigot*. He heard every thing with  
Mildness and Delight; and bore with me when I  
treated all his Thoughts as visionary; and when,  
Sceptick-like, I unravel'd all his Systems."

Haze

Part 2. HERE was that Character and Description which so highly pleas'd you, that you wou'd hardly suffice me to come to a conclusion. 'Twas impossible, <sup>Enthu-</sup>  
<sub>last.</sub> found, to give you satisfaction, without reciting the main of what pass'd in those two days between my Friend and me, in our Country-Retirement. Again and again I bid you beware: " You knew not the danger of this philosophical Passion; nor consider'd what you might possibly draw upon your-self, and make me the Author of. I was far enough engag'd already: and you were pushing me further, at your own hazard."

A L. I cou'd say made not the least impression on you. But rather than proceed any further this night, I engag'd, for your sake, to turn Writer, and draw up the Memoirs of those two philosophical Days; beginning with what had pass'd this last Day between our-selves; as I have accordingly done (you see) by way of Introduction to my Story.

BY this time, being got late to Town, some hours after the latest of our Company, you set me down at my own Lodging; and thus we bad Good-night.

## P A R T II.

### PHILOCLES TO PALEMON.

AFTER such a Day as Yesterday, I might well have thought it hard, when I awak'd the next Morning, to find my-self under positive Engagements of proceeding in the same philosophical way, without intermission, and upon harder term, than ever. For 'twas no longer the agreeable Part of a Companion which I had now to best. Your Conversation, PALEMON, which had hitherto supported me, was

at an end. I was now alone ; confin'd to my Clo-Sectt. ;  
oblig'd to meditate by my-self ; and reduc'd to ~~the~~  
the hard Circumstances of an Author, and Historian,  
in the most difficult Subject.

BUT here, methought, propitious Heaven, in  
some manner, afflict'd me. For if *Dreams* were, as  
HOMER teaches, sent from the 'Throne of Jove' ;  
I might conclude I had a favourable one, of the *true*  
sort, towards the *Morning-light* ; which, as I recollect'd  
my-self, gave me a clear and perfect Idea of  
what I desir'd so earnestly to bring back to my Memory.

I FOULD my-self transported to a distant Coun-  
try, which presented a pompous rural Scene. It was  
a Mountain not far from the Sea, its Brow adorn'd  
with antient Wood, and at its foot a River and  
well-inhabited Plain : beyond which the Sea appear-  
ing, clos'd the Prospect.

No sooner had I consider'd the Place, than I dis-  
cern'd it to be the very same where I had talk'd with  
THEOCLES the second Day I was with him in the  
Country. I look'd about to see if I cou'd find my  
Friend ; and calling THEOCLES ! I awak'd. But so  
powerful was the Impression of my Dream, and so  
perfect the Idea rais'd in me, of the Person, Words,  
and Manner of my Friend, that I cou'd now fancy  
my-self philosophically inspir'd, as that ROMAN Sage  
by his AEGERIA, and invited, on this occasion, to  
try my *Historical Muse*. For justly might I hope  
for such Assistance in behalf of THEOCLES, who is  
lov'd the *Muse*, and was, I thought, no less  
lov'd by them.

TO RETURN therefore to that *original* rural  
Scene, and that Herwick GENIUS, the Companion  
and Guide of my first Thoughts in these profounder  
Subjects : I found him the first Morning with his be-  
lov'd *Mantuan Muse*, roving in the Fields ; what-  
as I had been inform'd at his House, he was gone  
out, after his usual way, to read. The moment he  
saw me, his Book vanish'd, and he came with friendly  
haste

Part 2, haste to meet me. After we had embrac'd  
 ver'd my Curiosity to know what he wa  
 and ask'd, " if it were of a secret kind,  
 " cou'd not be admitted." On this  
 me his Poet ; and looking pleasantly, No  
 truly, said he, PHILOCLES, did you not ex  
 more mysterious Book than this ?  
 did, considering his Character, which I too  
 so contemplative a kind. And do y  
 said he, that without being comtemplati  
 truly relish these diviner Poets ? Inde  
 I never thought there was any need of gro  
 templative, or retiring from the World, to  
 GIL OR HORACE.

*Retire-  
ment.*

You have nam'd two, said he, who  
 be thought so very like ; tho they were Fri  
 equally good Poets. Yet joining 'em, as y  
 to do, I wou'd willingly learn from you, v  
 your opinion there be any Disposition so  
 reading 'em, as that in which they writ t  
 In this, I am sure, they both join'd heartil  
*Retirement* : when for the sake of such a Li  
 bit as you call *contemplative*, they were wil  
 crifice the highest Advantages, Pleasures, a  
 of a Court. But I will venture to say more  
 of *Retirement* : " That not only the best At  
 " the best Company, require this seaso  
 ciety it-self cannot be rightly enjoy'd wit  
 Abstinence and separate Thought. All gro  
 dull, and tirefom, without the help of se  
 vals of Retirement. Say, PHILOCLES, w  
 your-self have not often found it so ? Do  
 those Lovers understand the Interests of th  
 who by their good-will wou'd never be pa  
 moment ? Or wou'd they be discreet Fri  
 you, who wou'd chuse to live together on su  
 What Relish then must the World have (i  
 mon World of mix'd and undistinguish'd  
 without a little Solitude ; without steppin  
 then aside, out of the Road and beaten T

that tedious Circle of Noise and Show, which forces Sect. I.  
weary'd Mankind to seek relief from every poor ~~poor~~  
Diversion ?

By your Rule, said I, THEOCLES, there shou'd be no such thing as *Happiness* or *Good* in Life, since every Enjoyment wears out so soon ; and growing painful, is diverted by some *other* thing ; and that again by some *other* ; and so on. I am sure, if Solitude serves as a Remedy or Diversion to any thing in the World, there is nothing which may not serve as Diversion to Solitude ; which wants it more than any thing besides. And thus there can be no *Good* which is regular or constant. Happiness is a thing out of the way, and only to be found in wandring.

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, I rejoice to find <sup>Happi-</sup>  
you in the pursuit of *Happiness* and *Good* ; however <sup>ness,</sup>  
<sup>Good.</sup> you may wander. Nay, tho' you doubt whether there be *that Thing* ; yet if you reason, 'tis sufficient ; there is hope still. But see how you have unawares engag'd your-self ! For if you have destroy'd all *Good*, because in all you can think of, there is nothing will constantly hold so ; then you have set it as a Maxim (and very justly in my Opinion) "That *Nothing can be good but what is con-*  
*"stant."*

I own, said I, that all I know of worldly Satisfaction is inconstant. The Things which give it, are never at a stay ; and the *Good* it-self, whatever it be, depends no less on Humour than on Fortune. For that which Chance may often spare, Time will not. Age, Change of Temper, other Thoughts, a different Passion, new Engagements, a new Turn of Life, or Conversation, the least of these are fatal, and alone sufficient to destroy Enjoyment. Tho' *the Object* be the same, *the Relish* changes, and the shortliv'd *Good* expires. But I shou'd wonder much if you cou'd tell me any thing in Life which was not of as changeable a Nature, and subject to the same common Fate of Satiety and Disgust.

**Partz.** I FIND then, reply'l he, that the current Notion of *Good* is not sufficient to satisfy you. You can afford to scepticize, where no-one else will so much as hesitate. For almost every-one philosophizes dramatically on this Head. All are positive in  
 "That our real *Good* is PLEASURE."

If they wou'd inform us "Which (said I) or what sort," and ascertain once the very Species and distinct Kind; such as must constantly remain the same, and equally eligible at all times; I shou'd then perhaps be better satisfy'd. But when Will and Pleasure are synonymous; when every thing which pleases us is call'd PLEASURE, and we never chuse or prefer but as we please, 'tis trifling to say "Pleasure is our Good." For this has as little meaning as to say, "We chuse what we think eligible;" and "We are pleas'd with what delights or please us." The Question is, "Whether we are right, pleas'd, and chuse as we shou'd do?" For a highly pleas'd as Children are with Baubles, or with whatever affects their tender Senses; we cannot indeed sincerely admire their Enjoyment, or imagine 'em Possessors of any extraordinary Good. Yet are their Senses, we know, as keen and susceptible of Pleasure as our own. The same Reflection is of force as to mere Animals, who in respect of the Liveliness and Delicacy of Sensation, have many o' em the advantage of us. And as for some low and sordid Pleasures of human Kind; shou'd they be even lastingly enjoy'd, and in the highest credit with their Enjoyers; I shou'd never afford 'em the name of Happiness or Good.

W o u ' d you then appeal, said he, from the immediate Feeling and Experience of one who is pleas'd, and satisfy'd with what he enjoys?

M o s t certainly I shou'd appeal, said I (continuing the same Zeal which THREOCLES had stirr'd in me)

er, against those Dogmatizers on *Pleasure*.) For is *Sext. 1.*  
 ere that sordid Creature on earth, who does not  
 ize his own *Enjoyment*? Does not the frowardeſt,  
 e moſt rancorous diſtemper'd Creature do as muſh?  
 not Malice and Cruelty of the highest reliſh with  
 me Natures? Is not a hoggiſh Life the height of  
 me Mens Wiſhes? You wou'd not ask me ſurely  
 enumerate the feveal Species of Sensations, which  
 en of certain Taſtes have adopted, and own'd for  
 eir chief *Pleasure* and Delight. For with ſome  
 en even Diseases have been thought valuable and  
 orth the cheriſhing, merely for the Pleaſure found  
 allaying the Ardor of an iгitating Sensation. And  
 theſe abſurd Epicures thoſe other are near a-kin,  
 ho by ſtudy'd Provocatiues raife unnatural Thirſt  
 id Appetite; and to make way for fresh Repletion,  
 epare Emſticks, as the laſt Deſert; the ſooner to  
 new the Feaſt. 'Tis ſaid, I know, proverbially,  
 That *Taſtes are diſferent, and muſt not be diſputed.*"  
 nd I remember ſome ſuch Motto as this plac'd once  
 i a Deviſe, which was found ſutable to the No-  
 on. A Fly was repreſented feeding on a certain  
 umpt. The Food, however vile, was natural to the  
 nimal. There was no Abſurdity in the caſe. But  
 ou'd you ſhew me a brutiſh or a barbarous Man  
 ius taken up, and ſolac'd in his Pleaſure; ſhou'd  
 ou ſhew me a Sot in his ſolitary Debauch, or a Ty-  
 int in the exerſice of his Cruelty, with this *Motto*  
 ver him, to forbide my Appeal; I ſhou'd hardly be  
 ought to think the better of his *Enjoyment*: Nor can  
 poſſibly ſuppoſe that a mere ſordid Wretch, with a  
 iſe abject Soul, and the beſt Fortune in the World,  
 as ever caſpable of any real *Enjoyment*.

By this Zeal, reply'd THEOCLES, which you  
 ave ſhewn in the refuting a wrong Hypothesis, one  
 ou'd imagine you had in reality ſome Notion of a  
 gbt; and began to think that there might poſſibly  
 e ſuch a thing at laſt as *Good*.

THAT there is ſomething nearer to Good, and  
 ore like it than another, I am free, ſaid I, to  
 own.

THE MORTALITY,

Part 2. own. But what *real Good* is, I am still to  
and must therefore wait till you can better inform  
me. This I only know ; " That either All  
sure is Good, or only Some." If all, then every  
kind of Sensuality must be precious and desirable.  
If some only, then we are to seek, what Kind ;  
discover, if we can, what it is which distinguishes  
between one Pleasure and another : and makes  
indifferent, sorry, mean ; another valuable, and  
thy. And by this Stamp, this Character, if there  
any such, we must define Good ; and not by I  
sure it-self ; which may be very great, and yet  
contemptible. Nor can any-one truly judg the Value  
of any immediate Sensation, otherwise than by  
ing first of the Situation of his own Mind,  
that which we esteem a Happiness in one Situation  
of Mind, is otherwise thought of in another. W  
Situation therefore is the justest, must be consider'd  
How to gain that Point of Sight, whence proba  
bly we may best discern ; and How to place  
selves in that unbias'd State, in which we  
fittest to pronounce."

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, if this be unfe  
edly your Sentiment ; if it be possible you sh  
have the Fortitude to with-hold your \* Assent  
this Affair, and go in search of what the meane  
Mankind think they already know so certainly ;  
from a nobler Turn of Thought than what you have  
observ'd in any of the modern Scepticks you have  
vers'd with. For if I mistake not, there are ha  
any-where at this day a sort of People more per  
tory, or who deliberate less on the choice of C  
They who pretend to such a Scrutiny of other  
dences, are the readiest to take the Evidence of  
greatest Deceivers in the World, their own Pa  
Having gain'd, as they think, a Liberty from  
seeming Constraints of Religion, they suppose  
employ this Liberty to perfection, by following

first Motion of their Will, and assenting to the first Sect. Dictate or Report of any prepossessing \* Fancy, any foremost Opinion or Conceit of Good. So that their Privilege is only that of being perpetually amus'd; and their Liberty that of being impos'd on in their most important Choice. I think one may say with assurance, " That the greatest of Fools is he who imposes on himself, and in his greatest Concern thinks certainly he knows that which he has least study'd, and of which he is most profoundly ignorant." He who is ignorant, but knows his Ignorance, is far wiser. And to do justice to these fashionable Men of Wit; they are not all of 'em, indeed, so insensible as not to perceive something of their own Blindness and Absurdity. For often when they seriously reflect on their past Pursuits and Engagements, they freely own, " That for what remains of Life, they know not whether they shall be of a-piece with themselves; or whether their Fancy, Pleas-<sup>ure</sup>, Humour, or Passion will not hereafter lead 'em to ~~sure~~ a quite different Choice in PLEASURE, and to a Disapprobation of all they ever enjoy'd before."

—Comfortable Reflection !

To bring the Satisfactions of the Mind, continu'd he, and the Enjoyments of Reason and Judgment under the Denomination of PLEASURE, is only a Collusion, and a plain receding from the common Notion of the word. They deal not fairly with us, who in their philosophical Hour, admit that for Pleasure, which at an ordinary time, and in the common Practice of Life, is so little taken for such. The Mathematician who labours at this Problem, the bookish Man who toils, the Artist who endures voluntarily the greatest Hardships and Fatigues; none of these are said " To follow Pleasure." Nor will the Men of Pleasure by any means admit 'em to be of their number. The Satisfactions which are purely mental, and depend only on the Motion of a

\* VOL. I. pag. 216, &c.

Part 2. Thought ; must in all likelihood be too refin'd for Apprehensions of our modern *Epicurus*, who are taken up with Pleasure of a more substantial kind. They who are full of the Idea of such a sensible Good, can have but a slender Fancy for the spiritual and intellectual sort. But 'tis this latter they set up and magnify upon occasion ; to save Ignominy which may redound to 'em from the former. This done, the latter may take its chance. Its Use is presently at an end. For 'tis observable that when the Men of this sort have recommended the Enjoyments of the Mind under the title of *Pleasure* ; when they have thus dignify'd the Word, included in it whatever is mentally good or excell'd they can afterwards suffer it contentedly to slide down again into its own genuine and vulgar Sense ; where they rais'd it only to serve a turn. When *Pleasure* is call'd in question, and attack'd, then *Reason* and *Virtue* are call'd in to her Aid, and made principal parts of her Constitution. A complicated Form appears, and comprehends straight all which is generous, honest, and beautiful in human Life. When the Attack is over, and the Objection is prov'd, the Specter vanishes : *Pleasure* returns again to her former Shape ; She may e'en be *Pleasure* ! and have as little concern with dry sober *Reason* in the nature of the thing, and according to common Understanding, she really has. For if this rational sort of Enjoyment be admitted into the Notion of Good, how is it possible to admit withal that kind of Sensation which in effect is rather opposite to Enjoyment ? 'Tis certain that in respect of the Mind and its Enjoyments, the Eagerness and Irritation mere *Pleasure*, is as disturbing as the Importunity and Vexation of *Pain*. If either throws the Mind off its bias, and deprives it of the Satisfaction it takes in natural Exercise and Employment ; the Mind in case must be sufferer as well by one as by the other. If neither does this, there is no harm on either side. —

By the way, said I, interrupting him; As Gn. Sect. 1.  
cere as I am in questioning, "Whether PLEASURE ~~and~~  
" be really *Good*;" I am not such a Soeptick as to  
doubt "Whether PAIN be really *Ill*."

WHATEVER is grievous, reply'd he, can be no other than *Ill*. But that what is grievous to *one*, is not so much as troublesome to *another*; let Sportsmen, Soldiers, and others of the hardy Kinds be witness. Nay, that what is *Pain* to *one*, is *Pleasure* to another, and so alternately, we very well know: since Men vary in their Apprehension of these Sensations, and on many occasions confound one with the other. Has not even Nature her-self, in some respect, as it were blended 'em together, and (as a wise Man said once) "join'd the Extremity of one  
" so nicely to the other, that it absolutely runs into  
" it, and is undistinguishable?"

IN FINE then, said I, if *Pleasure* and *Pain* be thus convertible and mix'd; if, according to your Account, "That which is now *Pleasure*, by being  
" strain'd a little too far, runs into *Pain*, and *Pain*,  
" when carry'd far, creates again the highest *Pleasure*, by mere Cessation, and a kind of natural  
" Succession; If some *Pleasures* to *some* are *Pains*,  
" and some *Pains* to *others* are *Pleasures*;" All this,  
if I mistake not, makes still for my Opinion, and shows That there is nothing you can assign which can really stand as *Good*. For if *Pleasure* be not *Good*. *Good*, nothing is. And if *Pain* be *Ill*. (as I must necessarily take for granted) we have a shread Chance on the *ill* side indeed, but none at all on the *better*. So that we may fairly doubt, "Whether Life it-  
" self be not mere Misery;" since *Gainers* by it we can never be; *Losers* we may sufficiently, and are like to be, every hour of our Lives. Accordingly, what our English Poets says of *Good*, shou'd be just and proper: "Tis good not to be born;" — And thus for any thing of *Good* which can be expect-  
ed in Life, we may even "Beg pardon of Nature,"

Part 2. " and return her Present on her hands, without  
~~ ing for her Call." For what shou'd hinder  
God. or What are we the better for living ?

True Query, said he, is pertinent. But such Dispatch, if the Case be doubtful? This, (my good PHILOCLES!) is a plain Transferreſſ your ſceptical Bounds. We must be ſufficiently matical, to come to this Determination. 'Tis ſciding as well concerning Death as Life; " possibly may be hereafter, and What not?" to be affir'd that we can never be concern'd i thing hereafter, we must understand perfectly w is which concerns or engages us in any thinſent. We must truly know ourſelves, and in this SELF of ours conſists. We must determine againſt Pre-exiſtence, and give a better reaſon for having never been concern'd in ought befor Birth, than merely, " Because we remember no " are conſcious." For in many things we have concern'd to purpose, of which we have no Memory or Conſciousneſſ remaining. And th may happen to be again and again, to perpe for any reaſon we can show to the contrary. Revolution in us. We are no more the ſelf Matter, or System of Matter, from one day to other. What Succession there may be hereafter know not; ſince even now, we live by Succ and only perish and are renew'd. 'Tis in va flatter ourſelves with the auſſurance of our Intending with a certain Shape or Form. What ſetted us at firſt in it, we know not; any than how we have ſince held on, and contin concern'd in ſuch an Aſſemblage of fleeting cies. Wher'e besides, or in What elſe we may to do, perchance, in time to come, we kn little; nor can tell how Chance or Providence, after, may diſpoſe of us. And if Providence the caſe, we have ſtill more reaſon to confide we undertake to be our own Diſpoſers. 1

needs become a SCHEPICK above all Men to hestate in Matters of Exchange. And tho he acknowledges no present Good or Enjoyment in Life, he must be sure, however, of bettering his Condition, before he attempts to alter it. But as yet, PHILOCLES, even this Point remains undetermin'd between us : " Whether in this present Life there be not such a thing as *real Goon.*"

B E you therefore (said I) my Instructor, sagacious THEOCLES ! and inform me " What that Good is, or Where, which can afford Contentment and Satisfaction always alike, without variation or diminution." For tho on some Occasions, and in some Subjects, the Mind may possibly be so bent, and the Passion so wrought up, that for the time no bodily Sufferance or Pain can alter it ; yet this is what can seldom happen, and is unlikely to last long : since without any Pain or Inconvenience, the Passion in a little time does its own work, the Mind relaxes with its Bent, and the Temper weary'd with Repetition finds no more Enjoyment, but runs to something new.

HEAR then ! said THEOCLES. For tho I pretend not to tell you at once the Nature of this which I call Goon ; yet I am content to shew you something of it, in *your-self*, which you will acknowledg to be naturally more fix'd and constant, than any thing you have hitherto thought on. Tell me, my Friend ! if ever you were weary of doing good to those you lov'd ? Say when you ever found it unpleasing to serve a Friend ? Or whether when you first prov'd this generous Pleasure, you did not feel it less than at this present ; after so long Experience ? Believe me, PHILOCLES, this Pleasure is more debauching than any other. Never did any Soul do good, but it came readier to do the same again, with more Enjoyment. Never was Love, or Gratitude, or Bounty practis'd but with increasing Joy, which made the Practiser still more in love with

Part 2. with the fair AG. Answer me, PHILOCLES,  
who are such a Judge of Beauty, and have so good  
Friendship ~~private~~<sup>Taste</sup> of Pleasure; is there any thing you admitt  
fair as Friendship? or any thing so charming  
generous Action? What wou'd it be therefore,  
Life were in reality but one continu'd Friend  
and cou'd be made one such intire Act? Here I  
wou'd be that fix'd and constant Good you so  
Or wou'd you look for any thing beyond?

P R E H A P S not, said I. But I can never,  
ly, go beyond this, to seek for a Chimera, if  
Good of yours be not thorowly chimerical,  
tho a Poet may possibly work up such a singu-  
larity, so as to hold a Play out; I can conceiv  
very faintly how this high Strain of Friendship  
be so manag'd, as to fill a Life. Nor can I  
gine where the Object lies of such a sublime he-  
Passion.

C A N any Friendship, said he, be so heroick, as  
towards Mankind? Do you think the Love of F  
in general, and of one's Country, to be not  
or that particular Friendship can well subsist  
out such an enlarr'd Affection, and Sense of O  
tion to Society? Say (if possible) you are a J  
but hate your Country. Say, you are true to t  
terest of a Companion, but false to that of S  
Can you believe your-self? Or will you la  
Name aside, and refuse to be call'd the Friend,  
you renounce the MAN?

T H A T there is something, said I, due to  
Friend, is what I think will not be disputed by  
who claims the Name of Friend. Hardly  
cou'd I allow the Name of Man to one who  
cou'd call or be call'd Friend. But he who  
proves himself a Friend, is MAN enough; no  
wanting to Society. A single Friendship may  
him. He has deserv'd a Friend, and is  
Friend; tho not in strictness, or according to  
high moral Sense, the Friend of Mankind. For  
truth, as to this sort of Friendship, it may

leads be esteem'd perhaps more than ordinarily Sect. I.  
ianly, and even heroick, as you assert it: But for  
my part, I see so very little Worth in *Mankind*, and  
have so indifferent an Opinion of the *Publick*, that I  
can propose little Satisfaction to my-self in loving  
them.

Do you, then, take *Bounty* and *Gratitude* to be *Grati-*  
*tude*, among the Acts of Friendship and Good-nature ?

Undoubtedly: For they are the chief.

Suppose then, that the oblig'd Person discovers  
in the Obliger several Failings; does this exclude the  
*Gratitude* of the former? Not in the least.

Or does it make the *Exercise* of Gratitude  
less pleasing? I think rather the contrary.  
For when depriv'd of other means of making a Re-  
turn, I might rejoice still in that sure way of shew-  
ing my Gratitude to my Benefactor, by bearing his  
Failings as a Friend. And as to *Bounty*: Tell *Bounty*,  
me, I beseech you, is it to those only who are *des-*  
*serving* that we shou'd do good? Is it only to a  
good Neighbour, or Relation, a good Father, Child,  
or Brother? Or does Nature, Reason, and Hu-  
manity better teach us, to do good still to a Father,  
because a Father; and to a Child, because a Child;  
and so to every Relation in human Life? I  
think, said I, this last is rightest.

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, consider then what  
it was you said, when you objected against the  
Love of *Mankind* because of human Frailty; and  
seem'd to scorn the *Publick*, because of its Misfor-  
tunes. See if this Sentiment be consistent with that  
Humanity which elsewhere you own and practise.  
For where can Generosity exist, if not here? Where  
can we ever exert Friendship, if not in this chief  
Subject? To what shou'd we be true or grateful in *Love of*  
the World, if not to *Mankind*, and that Society to *Man-*  
*kind*, which we are so deeply indebted? What are the  
Faults or Blemishes which can excuse such an Omission,  
*or in a grateful Mind can ever lessen the Satisfaction*  
*of making a grateful kind return?* Can you then  
out

## The MORALISTS,

*Part 1.* out of *Good-breeding* merely, and from a Temper natural to you, rejoice to shew Civility, Courteousnes, Obligingnes, seek Objects of Compaffion, and be pleas'd with every Occurrence where you have power to do some service even to People unknown? Can you delight in such Adventures abroad in foreign Countrys, or in the case of Strangers here at home; to help, assist, relieve all who require it, in the most hospitable, kind, and friendly manner? And can your Country, or what is more, your KIND, require less Kindness from you, or deserve less to be consider'd, than even one of these Chance-Creatures?

*Good-nature.* — O PHILOCLES! how little do you know the Extent and Power of *Good-nature*, and to what an heroick pitch a Soul may rise, which knows the thorow Force of it; and distributing it rightly, frames in it-self an equal, just, and universal Friendship!

*Mystical Love.* JUST as he had ended these Words, a Servant came to us in the Field, to give notice of some Company, who were come to dine with us, and waited our coming in. So we walk'd home-wards. I told THEOCLES, going along, that I fear'd I shou'd never make a good Friend or Lover after his way. As for a plain natural Love of one single Person in either Sex, I cou'd compass it, I thought, well enough; but this complex universal sort was beyond my reach. I cou'd love the Individual, but not the Species. This was too mysterious; too metaphysical an Objeft for me. In short, I cou'd love nothing of which I had not some sensible material Image.

How! reply'd THEOCLES, can you never love except in this manner? when yet I know that you admir'd and lov'd a Friend long e'er you knew his Person. Or was PALEMON's Character of no force, when it engag'd you in that long Correspondence which preceded your late Acquaintance?

*The Fact* (said I) I must, of necessity, own to you. And now, methinks, I understand your Mystery

screave how I must prepare for it : For in the Sect. 1. manner as when I first began to love PALE-<sup>the</sup>, I was forc'd to form a kind of material Obj- and had always such a certain Image of him, -drawn, in my Mind, whatever I thought of so I must endeavour to order it in the Case before if possibly by your help I can raise any such e, or Specter, as may represent this odd Being wou'd have me love.

ETHINKS, said he, you might have the same ligence for NATURE or MANKIND, as for *the le of old ROME*; whom, notwithstanding their nishes, I have known you in love with, many s; particularly under the Representation of a tiful Youth call'd *the GENIUS of the People*. *Genius* I remember, that viewing some Pieces of Anti- of a r, where the People were thus represented, allow'd 'em to be no disagreeable Object.

SURELY, reply'd I, were it possible for me to upon my Mind such a Figure as you speak whether it stood for *Mankind* or *Nature*, it might *Nature* stily have its effect ; and I might become per- a Lover after your way : But more especially, ou cou'd so order it, as to make things recipro- between us, and bring me to fancy of this Ge- s, that it cou'd be " sensible of my Love, od capable of a Return." For without this, I d make but an ill Lover, tho of the perfectest ity in the World.

IS enough, said THEOCLES, I accept the ns : And if you promise to love, I will endea- to shew you *that BEAUTY* which I count *the best*, and *most deserving of Love* ; and which not fail of a Return. — To-morrow, when eastern Sun (as Poets describe) with his first adorns the Front of yonder Hill ; there, if are content to wander with me in the Woods see, we will pursue those Lovers of ours, by of the Silvan Nymphs : and invoking <sup>the</sup> II.

*Genius  
of the  
World.*

Part 2, the Genius of the Place, we'll try to obtain at some faint and distant View of the sovereign Genius and first Beauty. This if you can come once to contemplate, I will answer for it, that all those bidding Features and Deformitys, whether of Nature or Mankind, will vanish in an instant, and you that Lover I cou'd wish.—But now, eno—Let us to our Company; and change this Conversation for some other more suitable to our Fire and Table.

## S E C T. II.

**Y**OU see here, PALEMON, what a Foundation is laid for the Enthusiasms I told you of; which, in my Opinion (I told you too) were more dangerous, because so very odd, and out of the way. But Curiosity had seiz'd you, I seeiv'd, as it had done me before. For after first Conversation, I must own, I long'd for not so much as the next day, and the appointed Morning-walk in the Woods.

W<sup>e</sup> had only a Friend or two at dinner with us; and for a good while we discours'd of indifferent things, till I, who had my head running upon those other Subjects, gladly laid off something dropt by chance concerning Friendship, and said, That for my own part, truly, tho' I thought I had known Friendship, and really count'd myself a good Friend during my whole Life; I was now persuaded to believe myself no better than a Learner: since THEOCLES had almost convinc'd me, "That to be a Friend to any one in particular, 'twas necessary to be first a Friend to Mankind." But how to qualify myself for a Friendship, was, methought, no little difficulty.

INDEED, said THEOCLES, you have given a very indifferent Character of your-self, in fact. If you had spoken thus of the Friendship of great Men at Court, or perhaps of a Courtier,

complain'd " How hard it was for you to suc- Sect. 2.  
eed, or make Interest with such as govern'd ~~the~~  
here ; " we shou'd have concluded in your be-  
, that there were such Terms to be comply'd  
h, as were unworthy of you. But " To de- *Virtue.*  
serve well of the Publick," and " To be justly  
til'd *the Friend of Mankind,*" requires no more  
n to be good and *virtuous* ; Terms which for one's  
n sake one wou'd naturally covet.

Now comes it then, said I, that even these *good Motives.*  
ms themselves are so ill accepted, and hardly ever  
en (if I may so express it) except on *further Terms?*  
*VIRTUE*, by it-self, is thought but an ill Bar-  
n : and I know few, even of the Religious and  
out, who take up with it any otherwise than as  
ldren do with Phyfick ; where the Rod and Sweet-  
it are the potent Motives.

THEY are Children indeed, reply'd THEOCLES,  
I shou'd be treated so, who need any Force or  
suasion to do what conduces to their Health and  
od. But where, I beseech you, are those for-  
ding Circumstances which shou'd make *Virtue* go  
vn so hardly ? Is it not, among other things,  
t you think your-self by this means precluded the  
Tables and costly Eating of our modern *Epi-*  
; and that perhaps you fear the being reduc'd  
eat always as ill as now, upon a plain Dish or  
, and no more ?

THIS, I protested, was injuriously suppos'd of  
. For I wish'd never to eat otherwise than I  
v did, at his Table ; which, by the way, had  
re resemblance (I thought) of EPICURUS's, than  
se which now-a-days preposterously pass'd under  
name. For if his Opinion might be taken, the  
hest Pleasures in the World were owing to *Tem-*  
*perance*, and *moderate Use*.

If then the merest Studier of *Pleasure*, (answer'd  
EOCLES) even EPICURUS himself, made that fa-  
irable Report of *Temperance*, so different from his <sup>Temp</sup>  
*tern Disciples* ; if he cou'd boldly say, " That ran  
with

Part 2. " with such Fare as a mean Garden affords  
" cou'd vie even with the Gods for Happiness,  
~~Temperance.~~ how shall we say of this part of Virtue, that  
be taken upon Terms? If the immediate Practice of  
Temperance be thus harmless; are its Consequences injurious? Does it take from the Vigour of the Mind, consume the Body, and render both the other less apt to their proper Exercises, " joys of Reason or Sense, or the Employments and Offices of civil Life?" Or is it that Circumstances are the worse for it, as he stands towards his Friends, or Mankind? Is a Gentleman in this sense to be pity'd, " As One burdens himself, and others; One whom all Men naturally shun, as an ill Friend, and a Corrupter of Society and Good Manners?" — Shall we consider our Gentleman in a publick Trust, and see what he is like to succeed best with this restraint; or whether he may be more rely'd upon more incorrupt, if his Appetites are and his Relish strong towards that which Pleasure? Shall we consider him as a Soldier in a Campaign, or Siege; and advise with ourselves what we might be best defended, if we had occasion to such a one's Service? " Which Officer would be the best for the Soldiers; Which Soldier for Officers; or Which Army for their Country? — What think you of our Gentleman, fellow-traveller? Wou'd he, as a temperate man, be an ill Choice? Wou'd it indeed be more and delightful " To have a Companion, in any shift or necessity, wou'd prove the most venous, and eager to provide in the first instance, for himself, and his own exquisite Sensation? — I know not what to say where Beauty concern'd. Perhaps the amorous Galants, and Refiners on this sort of Pleasure, may have fin'd their Minds and Tempers, that notwithstanding their accustom'd Indulgence, they can, in a sudden resolution, renounce their Enjoyment, rather than

late Honour, Faith, or Justice.—And thus, at Sect. 2.  
last, there will be little Virtue or Worth ascrib'd to  
this patient sober Character. “The dull temperate  
“ Man is no fitter to be trusted than the elegant  
“ luxurious one. Innocence, Youth, and Fortune  
“ may be as well committed to the Care of this  
“ latter Gentleman. He wou'd prove as good an  
“ Executor, as good a Trustee, as good a Guardian,  
“ as he wou'd a Friend. The Family which en-  
“ trusted him wou'd be secure; and no Dishonour,  
“ in any likelihood, wou'd happen from the honest  
“ Man of Pleasure.”

THE Seriousness with which THEOCLES spoke  
this, made it the more pleasant; and set our other  
Company upon saying a great many good things on  
the same Subject, in commendation of a temperate  
Life. So that our Dinner by this time being ended,  
and the Wine, according to Custom, plac'd before  
us; I found still we were in no likelihood of pro-  
ceeding to a Debauch. Every-one drank only as he  
fancy'd, in no Order or Proportion, and with no  
regard to circular Healths or Pledges: A Manner  
which the sociable Men of another Scheme of Morals  
wou'd have censur'd no doubt, as a heinous Irregu-  
larity, and Corruption of Good Fellowship.

I own (said I) I am far from thinking TEM-  
PERANCE so disagreeable a Character. As for this  
part of Virtue, I think there is no need of taking  
it on any other Terms to recommend it, than the  
mere Advantage of being sav'd from Intemperance,  
and from the desire of things unnecessary.

How! said THEOCLES, are you thus far ad-  
vanc'd? And can you carry this Temperance so far  
as to Estates and Honours, by opposing it to Avar-  
ice and Ambition? — Nay, then truly, you may be  
said to have fairly embark'd your-self in this Cause.  
You have pass'd the Channel, and are more than  
half-seas over. There remains no further Scruple.

Part 2. in the case of Virtue, unless you will declare yourself a Coward, or conclude it a happiness to be born one. For if you can be temperate withal towards LIFE, and think it not so great a busines, whether it be of fewer or more Years; but satisfy'd with what you have liv'd, can rise a thankful Guest from a full liberal Entertainment; Is not this the Sum of all? the finishing Stroke and very Accomplishment of *Virtue*? In this Temper of Mind, what is there can hinder us from forming for our-selves as heroick a Character as we please? What is there either good, generous, or great, which does not naturally flow from such a modest TEMPERANCE? Let us once gain this simple plain-look'd *Virtue*, and see whether the more shining *Virtues* will not follow. See what that Country of the Mind will produce, when by the wholesome Laws of this Legislatress it has obtain'd its Liberty! You, PHILOCLES, who are such an Admirer of Civil Liberty, and can represent it to your-self with a thousand several Graces and Advantages; can you imagine no Grace or Beauty in that original native Liberty, which set us free from so many in-born Tyrannys, gives us the Privilege of our-selves, and makes us our own, and independent? A sort of Property, which, methinks, is as material to us to the full, as that which secures us our Lands, or Revenues.

I shov'd think, said he (carrying on his Humour) that one might draw the Picture of this moral Dame to as much advantage as that of her political Sister; whom you admire, as describ'd to us "in her AMAZON-Dress, with a free manly Air becoming her; her Guards the *Lares*, with their written Tables, like Bucklers, surrounding her Riches, Traffick, and Plenty, with the Cornucopia serving as her Attendents; and in her Train of Arts and Sciences, like Children, playing." — The rest of the Piece is easy to imagine: "Her Triumph over Tyranny, and lawless Rule of

" and Passion." — But what a Triumph wou'd her Sister's be ! What Monsters of savage Passions wou'd there appear subdu'd ! " There fierce Ambition, Lust, Uproar, Misrule, with all the Fiends which rage in human Breasts, wou'd be securely chain'd. And when Fortune her-self, the Queen of Flattery, with that Prince of Terrors, Death, were at the Chariot-wheels, as Captives ; how natural wou'd it be to see Fortitude, Magnanimity, Justice, Honour, and all that generous Band attend as the Companions of our inmate Lady LIBERTY ! She, like some new-born Goddess, wou'd grace her Mother's Chariot, and own her Birth from humble Temperance, that nursing Mother of the Virtues ; who like the Parent of the Gods (old Reverend CYBELE) wou'd properly appear drawn by rein'd Lions, patient of the Bit, and on her Head a Turret-like Attire : the Image of defensive Power, and Strength of Mind."

BY THIS Picture THEOCLES, I found, had given Entertainment to the Company ; who from this rough Draught of his, fell to designing upon the same Subject, after the antient manner ; till PRODICUS and CERES, and all the Antients were exhausted.

GENTLEMEN, said I, the Descriptions you MR. have been making, are, no doubt, the finest in the world : But after all, when you have *Virtue* as glorious and triumphant as you please, I will bring you an authentick Picture of another kind, where we shall see this Triumph *in reverse* ; " VIRTUE her-self a *Captive* in her turn ; and by a proud Conqueror triumph'd over, degraded, spoil'd of all her Honours, and defac'd ; so as to retain hardly one single Feature of real Beauty." —

I OFFER'D to go on further, but cou'd not, being so violently decry'd by my two Fellow-guests ; who protested they wou'd never be brought

Part 2. to own so detestable a Picture: And one of 'em  
 (a formal sort of Gentleman, somewhat advanc'd  
 in Years) looking earnestly upon me, said, in an  
 angry Tone, " That he had hitherto, indeed,  
 " ceiv'd some hopes of me; notwithstanding he  
 " observ'd my *Freedom of Thought*, and heard me  
 " quoted for such a passionate Lover of *Liberty*:  
 " But he was sorry to find that my Principle of  
 " Liberty extended in fine to a Liberty from all  
 " Principles" (so he expres'd himself) " And none,  
 " he thought, beside a Libertine in Principle wou'd  
 " approve of such a Picture of Virtue, as only an  
 " *Atheist* cou'd have the impudence to make."

THEOCLES the while sat silent; tho he saw I minded not my Antagonist, but kept my Eye fix'd steddy on himself, expecting to hear what he wou'd say. At last, sfetching a deep Sigh, O PHILOCLES, said he, how well you are Master of that Cause you have taken on you to defend! How well you know the way to gain advantage to the worst of Causes, from the imprudent Management of those who defend the best! —— I dare not, for my own share, affirm to you, as my worthy Friends have done, " That 'tis the *Atheist* alone can lay this load on *Virtue*, and picture her thus disgracefully." —— No —— There are other over-officious and less-suspected Hands, which do her perhaps more injury, tho with a better colour.

THAT *Virtue* shou'd, with any shew of Reason, be made a *Victim* (continu'd he, turning himself to his Guests) must have appear'd strange to you, no doubt, to hear asserted with such assurance as has been done by PHILOCLES. You cou'd conceive no tolerable ground for such a Spectacle. In this *revers'd Triumph* you expected perhaps to see some foreign Conqueror exalted; as either *Vice* itself, or *Pleasure*, *Wit*, spurious Philosophy, or some false Image of Truth or Nature. Little were you aware that the cruel Enemy oppos'd to *Via-*

tue shou'd be RELIGION it-self ! But you will S  
call to mind, that even innocently, and without  
any treacherous design, *Virtue* is often treated so, &  
by those who wou'd magnify to the utmost the  
**Corruption of Man's Heart** ; and in exposing, as  
they pretend, the Falshood of *human Virtue*, think to  
**extol Religion**. How many religious Authors, how  
many sacred Orators turn all their edge this way,  
and strike at *moral Virtue* as a kind of Stepdame, or  
**Rival to RELIGION** ! — “ \* *Morality* must not be  
“ nam'd ; *Nature* has no pretence ; *Reason* is an  
“ Enemy ; *Common Justice*, Folly ; and *Virtus*, Mi-  
“ sery. Who wou'd not be vicious, had he his  
“ Choice ? Who wou'd not forbear, but because  
“ be must ? Or who wou'd value *Virtue*, but for  
“ hereafter ? ”

TRULY, said the old Gentleman (interrupting him) if this be the *Triumph* of Religion, 'tis such as her greatest Enemy, I believe, wou'd scarce deny her : and I must still be of opinion (with PHILOCLES's leave) that it is no great sign of Tenderness for *Religion*, to be so zealous in honouring her Zeal at the cost of *Virtue*.

P E R H A P S so, said I. Yet that there are many such Zealots in the World, you will acknowledg. And that there is a certain Harmony between this Zeal and what you call *Atheism*, THEOCLES, you hear, abh has allow'd.— But let us hear him out ; if perhaps he will be so free as to discover to us what he thinks of the generality of our religious Writers, and their Method of encountering their common Enemy, *the Atheist*. This is a Subject which possibly may need a better clearing. For 'tis notorious that the chief Opposers of *Atheism* write upon contrary Principles to one another, so as in a manner to confute themselves. Some of 'em hold zealously for *Virtue*, and

Part 2. are *Realists* in the Point. Others, one may say, are only *nominal Moralists*, by making Virtue nothing in *MORA*-it-self, a Creature of Will only, or a mere Name of *LISTS*, *Fashion*. "Tis the same in natural Philosophy: Some take one Hypothesis, and some another. I shou'd be glad to discover once the true Foundation; and *Natura*-*Real*. *Laws*, distinguish those who effectually refute their other Antagonists as well as the *Atheists*, and rightly assert the joint-Cause of Virtue and Religion.

HERE, PALEMON, I had my Wish. For by degrees I ingag'd THEOCLES to discover himself fully upon these Subjects; which serv'd as a Prelude to those we were to ingage in, the next Morning; for the approach of which, I so impatiently long'd. If his Speculations prov'd of a rational kind, this previous Discourse (I knew) wou'd help me to comprehend 'em; if only *pleasing Fancys*, this wou'd help me however, to please my-self the better with 'em.

HERE then began his Criticism of Authors; which grew by degrees into a continu'd Discourse. So that had this been it a University, THEOCLES might very well have pass'd for some grave Divinity-Professor, or Teacher of *Etbicks*, reading an Afternoon Lecture to his Pupils.

### S E C T . III.

*Divi-*  
*nity.* **I**T wou'd be undoubtedly, said he, a happy Cause which cou'd have the benefit of such Managers as shou'd never give their Adversarys any handle of advantage against it. I cou'd wish that in the Cause of RELIGION we had reason to boast as much. But since 'tis not impossible to write ill even in the best of Causes, I am inclin'd to think this great one of Religion may have run at least an *Divines*. equal hazard with any other; since they who write in defence of it, are apt generally to use so much the less Caution, as they are more exempt from the fear of Censure or Criticism in their own Person

Adversary is well secur'd and silenc'd to their Sect. 3.

They may safely provoke him to a Field ~~where~~ he cannot appear openly, or as a profess'd gonist. His Weapons are private, and can often strike the Cause without offence to its Maintainers; but no direct Attack robs them of their imaginary Glory. They conquer for themselves, and expect to prov'd still for their Zeal, however the Cause they may have suffer'd in their hands. —

PERHAPS then, said I, (interrupting him) it be true enough, what was said once by a Person who seem'd zealous for Religion, " That none did well against the Atheists beside the Clerk who ~~Atheist~~ drew the Warrant for their Execution."

this were the true Writing, reply'd he, there'd be an end of all Dispute or Reasoning in Case. For where Force is necessary, Reason has nothing to do. But on the other hand, if Reason is useful, Force in the mean while must be laid : For there is no Enforcement of Reason, but by Reason. And therefore if ~~Atheists~~ are to be reason'd with, at all ; they are to be reason'd with, other Men ; since there's no other way in nature to convince 'em.

THIS I own, said I, seems rational and just : I'm afraid that most of the devout People will be found ready to abandon the patient, for the more *se* Method. And tho' Force without Reason may hough somewhat hard, yet your other way of Reason without Force, I am apt to think, wou'd meet with fewer Admirers.

IT perhaps, reply'd THEOCLES, 'tis a mere word which troubles us. The Word or Name of *atheist* may possibly occasion some Disturbance, by being made to describe two Characters so very different as His who *absolutely denies*, and His who *only doubts*. Now he who *doubts*, may possibly lament his own Unhappiness, and wish to be convinc'd. He who *denies*, is daringly presumptuous, and sets up Opinion against the Interest of Mankind, and Being

Part 2. Being of Society. 'Tis easily seen that one of the Persons may bear a due respect to the Magistrate Laws, tho' not the other; who being obnoxious them, is therefore punishable. But how the for is punishable by Man, will be hard to say; unless the Magistrate had dominion over Minds, as well as over Actions and Behaviour; and had power exercise an Inquisition within the inmost Bosoms secret Thoughts of Men.

I APPREHEND you, said I. And by your count, as there are two sorts of People who call'd Atheists, so there are two ways of writing against them, which may be fitly us'd apart, but so well jointly. You wou'd set aside mere Men and separate the Philosopher's Work from the Magistrate's; taking it for granted, that the more discreet and sober part of Unbelievers, who come under the dispatching Pen of the Magistrate, can be affected only by the more deliberate and gentle one Philosophy. Now the Language of the Magistrate must confess, has little in common with that of Philosophy. Nothing can be more unbecoming magisterial Authority than a philosophical Style: nothing can be more unphilosophical than a magistrate one. A mixture of these must needs spoil both. And therefore, in the Cause before us, "If any besides the Magistrate, can be said to write w<sup>t</sup> 'tis He (according to your account) who writes as becomes Philosophy, with Freedom of Debate and Fairness towards his Adversary."

A LLOW it, reply'd he. For what can be more equitable? Nothing. But will the World of the same Opinion? And may this Method of writing be justly practis'd in it? Undoubtedly it may. And for a Proof, we have many instances in Antiquity to produce. The Freedom taken in this philosophical way was never esteem'd injurious to Religion, or prejudicial to the Vulgar; for we find it to have been a Practice both in Writing and Conversation among the great Men of antiquity.

bus People ; and that even those Magistrates who Seſt. 3.  
ated at the Altars, and were the Guardians of the ~~new~~  
eck Worship, were Sharers in these free Debates,  
FOR GIVE me, THEOCLES, (said I) if I pre-  
to ſay, that ſtill this reaches not the Caſe be-  
fore us. We are to conſider Christian Times, ſuch as  
now preſent. You know the common Fate of *Jealousy*,  
who dare to appear fair Authors. What was *of Au-*  
*pious and learned Man's Caſe*, who wrote *the* <sup>thors.</sup>  
*Actual System of the Universe?* I confeſs it was  
iant enough to conſider, that tho' the whole World  
no leſs satisfy'd with his Capacity and Learning,  
with his Sincerity in the Caufe of *Deity*; yet  
he accus'd of giving the upper hand to the  
Aſtis, for having only ſtated their Reasons, and  
e of their Adverſarys, fairly together. And among  
r Writings of this kind, you may remember how  
rtain Fair INQUIRY (as you call'd it) was re-  
d, and what offence was taken at it.

A M sorry, said THEOCLES, it prov'd so. But indeed you have found a way which may, per-  
; force me to discourse at large with you on this  
; by entering the Lists in defence of a Friend un-  
y censur'd for this philosophical Liberty.

CONFESS'D to THEOCLES and the Company, this had really been my Aim : And that for this on alone I made my-self the Accuser of this Author : " Whom I here actually charg'd, as I did all those other *moderate calm* Writers, with no less than Profaneness, for reasoning so unconcernedly and patiently, without the least shew of Zeal or Passion, upon the Subject of a Deity, and a future State."

AND I, on the other side, reply'd THEOCLES, am  
anxious for this patient way of Reasoning; and will  
endeavour to clear my Friend of this Imputation, if  
I can have patience enough to hear me out, in an  
air of such a compafs.

We all answer'd for our-selves, and he began.

OF THE many Writers  
are employ'd, either in supporting the  
Christian Faith in general, or in refuting such par-  
ticular Doctrines as are esteem'd Innovations in  
Christian Church. There are not, 'tis thought, r-  
Persons in the World who are loose in the  
Grounds and Principles of all Religion: And re-  
as these we find, indeed, there are not many W-  
ho purposely apply themselves. They may  
it a mean Labour, and scarce becoming the  
argue sedately with such as are almost uni-  
treated with Detestation and Horror. But as  
requir'd by our Religion to have Charity  
Men, so we cannot surely avoid having a re-  
cern for those whom we apprehend to be u-  
worst of Errors, and whom we find by Ex-  
ought they perhaps in prudence to be treated  
little regard, whose Number, however  
thought to be rather increasing; and this t  
the People of no despicable Rank. So th  
well deserve some Consideration, " Wheth-  
" Age and Country the same Remedys  
" which have hitherto been try'd; or wh-  
" other may not be prefer'd, as being  
" Times of less Strictnes in Matters  
" and Places less subject to Authority."

This might be enough to put an  
thinking of such a way of reasoning wi-  
luded Persons, as in his Opinion migh-  
factual for their Benefit, than the repe-  
tions and *Invectives* with which most  
ments us'd against them are commonly  
Nor was it so absurd to imagine that  
rent Method might be attempted;  
Writer might offer Reason to these  
much more Favour and Advantage, as  
prepossess'd, and willing to exami-  
with the greatest Unconcern and l-

such Persons as these, 'tis to be fear'd, 'twill Sect. 3.  
ays appear, " That what was never question'd, ~~was~~  
as never prov'd: and That whatever Subject  
ad not, at some time or other, been examin'd  
ith perfect Indifference, was never rightly ex-  
min'd, nor cou'd rightly be believ'd." And in a  
tise of this kind, offer'd as an *Essay* or *Inquiry*,  
they wou'd be far from finding that Impartial-  
and Indifference which is requisite; if instead of  
adines to comply with whatever Consequences  
an Examination as this, and the Course of Rea-  
g brought forth, the Author shou'd shew a pres-  
s Inclination to the Consequences only on one  
and an Abhorrence of any Conclusion on the  
r.

THEIRS therefore, in different Circumstances,  
perhaps have found it necessary, and becom-  
heir *Character*, to shew all manner of Detesta-  
both of the Persons and Principles of these Men.  
Author, on the contrary, whose Character ex-  
not that of a *Lay-man*, endeavours to shew  
ty and Favour, by keeping the fairest Mea-  
he possibly can with the Men of this sort;  
ing 'em all he is able, and arguing with a perfect  
ference, even on the Subject of a *Deity*. He  
s to conclude nothing positive himself, but  
s it to others to draw Conclusions from his  
iples: having this one chief Aim and Inten-  
iples: having this one chief Aim and Inten-

" How, in the first place, to reconcile these  
rsons to the *Principles of Virtue*; That, by this  
ans, a Way might be laid open to *Religion*;  
removing those greatest, if not only Obstacles  
it, which arise from the Vices and Passions of  
m."

s upon this account he endeavours chiefly *Funda-*  
*abish Virtue on Principles*, by which he is able *mental*  
*gue with those who are not as yet induc'd to* *Princ-*  
*a God, or Future State. If he cannot do thus*  
*, he reckons he does nothing. For how can*  
*the Goodness be intelligible to those who know* *not*

Part 2. not what *Goodness it-self* is? Or how can Virtue be understood to deserve Reward, when as yet its Merit and Excellence is unknown? We begin surely at the wrong end, when we wou'd prove MERIT by Favour, and ORDER by a Deity. — This our Friend seeks to redress. For being, in respect of VIRTUE, what you lately call'd a Realist; he endeavours to shew, " That it is really something in " *it-self*, and in the nature of Things: not arbitrary or factitious (if I may so speak) not constituted from without, or dependent on Custom, Fancy, or Will; not even on the Supreme Will it-self, which can no-way govern it: but being necessarily good, is govern'd by it, and ever uniform with it." And notwithstanding he has thus made VIRTUE his chief Subject, and in some measure independent on Religion, yet I fancy he may possibly appear at last as high a Divine as he is a Moralist.

Theists, Nominal, Real. I wou'd not willingly advance it as a Rule, " That those who make only a Name of VIRTUE, " make no more of DEITY, and cannot without " Affectation defend the Principles of Religion;" But this I will venture to assert; " That whoever sincerely defends VIRTUE, and is a Realist in MORALITY, must of necessity, in a manner, by the same Scheme of Reasoning, prove as very a Realist in DIVINITY."

ALL Affectation, but chiefly in Philosophy, I must own, I think unpardonable. And you, Philologists, who can give no quarter to ill Reasoning, nor endure any unsound or inconsistent Hypothesis; you will be so ingenuous, I dare say, as to reject our modern DEISM, and challenge those who assume a Name to which their Philosophy can never in the least intitle 'em.

COMMEND me to honest ERICRUS, who raises his DEITY's aloft in the imaginary Spaces; and setting 'em apart out of the Universe and Nature of Things, makes nothing of 'em beyond a Word

more ingenuous, and plain dealing : For this every soft. 3.  
is who philosophizes may easily understand.

The same Ingenuity belongs to those Philosophers whom you, PHILOCLES, seem inclin'd to favour. When A SCEPTICK questions, " Whether a real Theology can be rais'd out of Philosophy alone, without the help of Revelation ; " he does more than pay a handsom Compliment to Authority and the receiv'd Religion. He can impose no-one who reasons deeply : since whoever does will easily conceive, that at this rate Theology ist have no Foundation at all. For Revelation self, we know, is founded on the Acknowledgment of a divine Existence: And 'tis the Province Philosophy alone to prove what Revelation only posess.

I look on it, therefore, as a most unfair way, those who wou'd be Builders, and undertake this wing part, to lay such a Foundation as is insufficient to bear the Structure. Supplanting and Unmining may, in other Cases, be fair War : But philosophical Disputes, 'tis not allowable to work under-ground, or as in Sieges by the Sap. Nothing be more unbecoming than to talk magisterially in venerable Terms of " A supreme NATURE, an infinite Being, and a DEITY ; " when all the while a Providence is never meant, nor any thing the Order or the Government of a Mind admitted. when these are understood, and real Divinity acknowledg'd ; the Notion is not dry, and barren ; such Consequences are necessarily drawn from it, must set us in Action, and find Employment for strongest Affections. All the Dutys of RELIGION dently follow hence ; and no exception remains against any of those great Maxims which Revelation establish'd.

Now whether our Friend be unfeignedly and sincely of this latter sort of real Theologists, you will *rn best* from the Consequences of his Hypothesis. I will observe, whether instead of ending in mere Speculation,

Part 2. *Speculation*, it leads to *Practice*: And you will then surely be satisfy'd, when you see such a Structure rais'd, as with the Generality of the World must pass at least for *high Religion*, and with some, in all likelihood, for no less than ENTHUSIASM.

*Divine Love.* For I appeal to you, PHILOCLES, whether there be any thing in *Divinity* which you think has more the Air of *Enthusiasm* than that Notion of *Divine Love*, such as separates from every thing worldly, sensual, or meanly-interested? A *Love* which is simple, pure, and unmix'd; which has no other Object than merely the Excellency of that Being it-self, nor admits of any other Thought of Happiness, than in its single Fruition. Now I dare presume you will take it as a substantial proof of my Friend's being far enough from Irreligion, if it be shewn that he has espous'd this *Notion*, and thinks of making out this *high Point of Divinity*, from Arguments familiar even to those who oppose *Religion*.

ACCORDING, therefore, to his Hypothesis, he wou'd in the first place, by way of prevention, declare to you, That tho' the disinterested *Love of God* were the most excellent Principle; yet he knew very well, that by the indiscreet Zeal of some devout well-meaning People it had been stretch'd too far, perhaps even to Extravagance and Enthusiasm; *Mysticks*, as formerly among the *Mysticks* of the antient Church, whom these of latter days have follow'd. On the other hand, that there were those who in opposition to this devout mystick way, and as profess'd Enemies to what they call *Enthusiasm*, had so far exploded every thing of this exorbitant kind, as in a manner to have given up Devotion; and in reality had left so little of Zeal, Affection, or Warmth, in what they call their *Rational Religion*, as to make them much suspected of their Sincerity in any. For tho' it be natural enough (he wou'd tell you) for a mere political Writer to ground his great Argument for Religion on the necessity of such a Belief as that of a future Reward and Punishment; yet, if you will

take his Opinion, 'tis a very ill Token of Sincerity Sect. 3. in Religion, and in the Christian Religion more especially, to reduce it to such a Philosophy as will allow no room to that other Principle of *Love*; but treats all of that kind as *Enthusiasm*, for so much as aiming at what is call'd *Disinterestedness*, or teaching the *Love of God or Virtue for Gon or VIRTUE's sake*.

Here, then, we have two sorts of People (according to my Friend's account) who in these opposite Extremes expose *Religion* to the Insults of its Adversarys. For as, on one hand, 'twill be found difficult to defend the Notion of that high-rais'd Love, espous'd with so much warmth by those devout *Mysticks*; so, on the other hand, 'twill be found as hard a Task, upon the Principles of these cooler Men, to guard Religion from the Imputation of Mercenaries, and a slavish Spirit. For how shall one deny, that to serve God by Compulsion, or for Interest merely, is *servile* and *mercenary*? Is it not evident, that the only *true* and *liberal* Service paid either to that supreme Being, or to any other Superior, is *that*, "which proceeds from an *Esteem* or " *Love* of the Person serv'd, a *Sense* of Duty or " *Gratitude*, and a *Love* of the dutiful and grateful Part, as *good* and *amiable*, *in it-self*?" And where is the Injury to *Religion*, from such a Confession as this? Or what Detraction is it from the Belief of an After-reward or Punishment, to own " That the Service caus'd by it, is not equal to " that which is *voluntary* and *with Inclination*, but is " rather *disingenuous* and of the *slavish kind*?" Is it not still for the Good of Mankind and of the World, that Obedience to the Rule of Right shou'd some way or other be paid; if not *in the better way*, yet at least *in this imperfect one*? And is it not to be *desirous*, " That altho' this Service of *Fear* be allow'd even so low or base; yet *RELIGION* still being a *Discipline*, and *Progress* of the Soul towards *Virtue*."

*RELIGION*  
*Liberals*  
*Illiberals*

Part 2. " the Motive of Reward and Punishment is primary  
 " and of the highest moment with us ; till being  
 Re- " capable of more sublime Instruction, we are led  
 wards " from this servile State, to the generous Service of  
 and " Affection and Love ?"  
 Punish-  
 ments.

To this it is that in our Friend's Opinion we  
 ought all of us to aspire, so as to endeavour " That  
 " the Excellence of the Object, not the Reward or Pu-  
 " nishment, shou'd be our Motive : But that where  
 " thro the Corruption of our Nature, the former of  
 " these Motives is found insufficient to excite to Vir-  
 " tue, there the latter shou'd be brought in aid, and  
 Supple-  
 mental " on no account be undervalu'd or neglected."  
 Motives.

Now this being once establish'd, how can RELI-  
 GION be any longer subject to the Imputation of  
 Mercenariness ? But thus we know Religion is often  
 charg'd. " Godliness, say they, is great Gain : nor is  
 " God devoutly serv'd for nougnt." — Is this  
 therefore a Reproach ? Is it confess'd there may be  
 a better Service, a more generous Love ? — Enough,  
 there needs no more. On this Foundation our  
 Friend presumes it easy to defend RELIGION, and  
 even that devoutest Part, which is esteem'd so great  
 a Paradox of Faith. For if there be in Nature such  
 a Service as that of Affection and Love, there re-  
 mains then only to consider of the Object, whether  
 Object of Love. there be really that supreme One we suppose. For if  
 there be divine Excellence in Things ; if there be in  
 Nature a Supreme Mind or DEITY ; we have then  
 an Object consummate, and comprehensive of all  
 which is good or excellent. And this Object, of all  
 others, must of necessity be the most amiable, the most  
 ingaging, and of highest Satisfaction and Enjoyment.  
 Now that there is such a principal Object as this in the  
 World, the World alone (if I may say so) by its wise  
 and perfect Order must evince. This Order, if in-  
 deed perfect, excludes all real ILL. And that it really  
 does so, is what our Author so earnestly maintains,  
 by solving the best he can those untoward Phenomena  
 and

and ill Signs, taken from the Course of Providence, Sect. 3  
in the seemingly unequal Lot of *Virtue* in this World.

'Tis true; tho' the Appearances hold ever so strongly against *Virtue*, and in favour of *Vice*, the Objection which arises hence against a DEITY may be easily remov'd, and all set right again on the supposal of a *future State*. This to a Christian, or one <sup>*Future State.*</sup> already convinc'd of so great a Point, is sufficient to clear every dark Cloud of Providence. For he needs not be over-and-above solicitous as to the Fate of *VIRTUE in this World*, who is secure of *Hereafter*. But the case is otherwise as to the People we are here to encounter. They are at a loss for Providence, and seek to find it in the World. The Aggravation of the appearing Disorders in worldly Affairs, and the blackest Representation of Society and Human Nature, will hardly help 'em to this View. 'Twill be difficult for 'em to read Providence in such Characters. From so uncomely a Face of things *below*, they will presume to think unfavourably of all *above*. By the Effects they see, they will be inclin'd to judg the Cause, and by the Fate of *Virtue* to determine of a *Providence*. But being <sup>*Previous Prof.*</sup> once convinc'd of Order and a Providence as to things *present*, they may soon, perhaps, be satisfy'd even of a *future State*. For if Virtue be to it-self no small Reward, and Vice in a great measure its own Punishment; we have a solid ground to go upon. The plain Foundations of a distributive Justice, and due Order in this World, may lead us to conceive a further Building. We apprehend a larger <sup>*A Pro- vidence.*</sup> Scheme, and easily resolve our-selves why Things <sup>*O R.*</sup> were not compleated in this State; but their Accomplishment reserv'd rather to some further period. For had the good and virtuous of Mankind been wholly prosperous in this Life; had Goodness never met with Opposition, nor Merit ever lain under a Cloud; where had been the Trial, Victory, or Crown of *Virtue*? Where had the Virtues had their Theater, or whence their Names? Where had been Temperance

*Part 2. Temperance or Self-denial? Where Patience, Meekness, Magnanimity?* Whence have these their being? What Merit, except from Hardship? What Virtue without a Conflict, and the Encounter of such Enemys as arise both within, and from abroad?

But as many as are the Difficultys which *Virtue* has to encounter in this World, her Force is yet superior. Expos'd as she is here, she is not however abandon'd or left miserable. She has enough to raise her above Pity, tho' not above our Wishes; and as happy as we see her here, we have room for further Hopes in her behalf. Her present Portion is sufficient to shew Providence already engag'd on her side. And since there is such Provision for her *here*, such Happiness and such Advantages even in this Life; how probable must it appear, that this providential Care is extended yet further to a *succeeding Life*, and perfected *hereafter*?

This is what, in our Friend's opinion, may be said in behalf of a future State, to those who question Revelation. 'Tis this must render Revelation probable, and secure that first step to it, the Belief of a Deity and Providence. A Providence must be prov'd from what we see of Order in things present. We must contend for Order; and in this part chiefly, where Virtue is concern'd. All must not be refer'd to a *Hereafter*. For a disorder'd State, in which all present Care of Things is given up, Vice uncontroul'd, and Virtue neglected, represents a very *Chaos*, and reduces us to the belov'd Atoms, Chance, and Confusion of the Atheists.

WHAT therefore can be worse done in the Cause of a *Deity*, than to magnify Disorder, and exaggerate (as some zealous People do) the Misfortunes of Virtue, so far as to render it an unhappy Choice with respect to this World? They err widely, who propose to turn Men to the Thoughts of a *better* World, by making 'em think so ill of *this*. For to declaim in this manner against *Virtue* to those of a looser Faith, will make 'em the less believe

*a. Deity; But not the more; & future State.* Sect. 3  
Let it be thought sincerely that any Man, by giving the most elevated Opinion of Virtue, and of Happiness it creates, was ever the less inclin'd the Belief of a future State. On the contrary, *Favourers of Vice* will ever be found, that as they who are *Fathers of the Op. nion.* are always the least willing to hear a future Existence; so they who are in love with Virtue, are the readiest to embrace that Opinion which renders it so illustrious, and makes its Cause triumphant.

Thus it was, that among the Antient *A- tions.* Motive which inclin'd so many of the wisest Men, the *Founders and Preservers of Society,* *Legislators, Patriots, Deliverers, Heros,* whose virtues they were desirous shou'd live and be immortaliz'd. Nor is there at this day any thing capable of making this Belief more engaging among Good and Virtuous than *the Love of Friendship,* Friend-*ship.* which creates in 'em a Desire not to be wholly separated by Death, but that they may enjoy the same ss'd Society hereafter. How is it possible, then, it *an Author* shou'd, for exalting *Virtue* merely, deem'd an Enemy to *a future State?* How can Friend be judg'd false to *Religion*, for defending principle on which the very Notion of God and idness depends? For this he says only, and this is Sum of all: "That by building a future State *Conclusion.* on the Ruins of *Virtue, Religion* in general, *son.* and the Cause of *a Deity* is betray'd; and by making Rewards and Punishments the principal Motives to Duty, the Christian Religion in particular is overthrown, and its greatest Principle, that of *Love,* rejected and expos'd."

Upon the whole then, we may justly as well charitably conclude, that it is truly *our Author's* sign, in applying himself with so much Fairness to *Men of looser Principles,* to lead 'em into such

Part 2. such an Apprehension of the Constitution of  
kind and of human Affairs, as might form in  
*Conclu-*  
*sion.* Notion of *Order in Things*, and draw hence a  
knowledgegment of that Wisdom, Goodness  
Beauty, which is supreme; that being thus  
come Profelytes, they might be prepar'd for  
*divine Love* which our Religion wou'd teach  
when once they shou'd embrace its Precept  
form themselves to its sacred Character.

THUS, continu'd he, I have made my F  
Apology; which may have shewn him to you  
haps a good *Moralist*; and, I hope, no Enemy  
Religion. But if you find still that the *Divine*  
not appear'd so much in his Character as I pre-  
I can never think of satisfying you in any other  
way of Conversation. Shou'd I offer to go f  
I might be engag'd deeply in Spiritual Affairs  
be forc'd to make some new Model of a Sermon  
his System of Divinity. However, I am in  
now that in good earnest Matters are com-  
nigh to *Preaching*, you will acquit me for  
have already perform'd.

#### S E C T. IV.

JUST as he had made an end of speaking  
in some Visitants, who took us up the  
ing part of the Afternoon in other Discourses;  
these being over, and our Strangers gone (all  
*the old Gentleman*, and *his Friend*, who ha-  
wth us) we began a-new with THEOCLES,  
ing claim to his Sermon, and intreating him  
and again, to let us hear him, at large, in his  
*logical way*.

This he complain'd was persecuting him.  
you have seen Company, said he, often per-  
reputed Singer, not out of any fancy for the  
but to satisfy a malicious sort of Curiosity  
ends commonly in Censure and Dislike.

Now even it might be; we told him we were ~~so~~  
olv'd to persist. And I assur'd our Companions, ~~says~~  
that if they would second me heartily in the man-  
ner I intended to press him; we shou'd easily get  
the better.

In revenge then, said he, I will comply on this  
condition; That since I am to sustain the part of *the*  
*Divine* and *Preacher*, it shall be at Philecl's  
cost; who shall bear the Part of *the Infidel*, and  
stand for the Person *press'd* to.

TRUELY, said the old Gentleman, the *Part* you  
have propos'd for him is so natural and suitable, that,  
I doubt not, he will be able to act it without the  
least Pain. I cou'd wish rather, that you had spar'd  
your-self the Trouble of putting him thus in mind  
of his proper *Character*. He wou'd have been apt  
enough of his own accord to interrupt your Dis-  
course by his perpetual Cavils. Therefore since we  
have now had Entertainment enough by way of  
*Dialogue*, I desire the *Law of SERMON* may be strictly  
observ'd; and "That there be no *answering* to  
"whatever is *argu'd* or *advanc'd*."

I CONSENTED to all the Terms, and told  
Philecl's I wou'd stand his Mark willingly: And  
esides, if I really were that *Infidel* he was to sup-  
pose me, I shou'd count it no Unhappiness; since  
was sure of being so thorowly convinc'd by him, if  
wou'd vouchsafe to undertake me.

PHILECL'S then propos'd we shou'd walk out;  
Evening being fine, and the free Air fusing bet-  
(as he thought) with such Discourses, than a  
umber.

ACCORDINGLY we took our Evening-  
k in the Fields, from whence the laborious Hinds  
now retiring. We fell naturally into the Praises  
*Country-Life*; and discours'd a while of *Hus-  
by*, and the Nature of the *Soil*. Our Friends be-  
admire some of the Plants which grew here  
*it perfection*. And it being my fortune <sup>as</sup> having  
. II. Q.

Part 2. having acquir'd a little Insight into the nature of  
*Simples*) to say something they mightily approv'd,  
upon this Subject, THEOCLES immediately turning  
about to me ; " O my ingenious Friend ! " said he,  
" whose Reason, in other respects, must be allow'd  
so clear and happy ; How is it possible that with  
such Insight, and accurate Judgment in *the Parti-*  
*culars* of natural Beings and Operations, you shou'd  
no better judg of the Structure of Things *in gene-*  
*ral*, and of the Order and Frame of NATURE ?  
Who better than your-self can shew the Structure  
of each Plant and Animal-Body, declare the Of-  
fice of every Part and Organ, and tell the Uses,  
Ends, and Advantages to which they serve ? How  
therefore, shou'd you prove so ill a Naturalist in  
this WHOLE, and understand so little the Ana-  
tomy of the World and Nature, as not to discern  
the same Relation of Parts, the same Consistency  
and Uniformity in the Universe ?

" S O M E Men perhaps there are of so confus'd  
a Thought, and so irregularly form'd *within them-*  
*selves*, that 'tis no more than natural for them to  
find fault, and imagine a thousand Inconsistencies  
and Defects in this wider Constitution. "Twas not,  
we may presume, the absolute Aim or Interest of  
the Universal Nature, to render every private-one  
infallible, and without defect. "Twas not its In-  
tention to leave us without some Pattern of Im-  
perfection ; such as we perceive in Minds, like  
these, perplex'd with froward Thought. But  
you, my Friend, are Master of a nobler Mind.  
You are conscious of better Order *within*, and  
can see Workmanship and Exactness in your-self,  
and other *innumerable Parts* of the Creation. Can  
you answer it to your-self, allowing thus much,  
not to allow all ? Can you induce your-self ever  
to believe or think, that where there are Parts  
so variously united, and conspiring fitly within  
themselves, the Whole it-self shou'd have neither  
Union nor Coherence ; and what inferior an-

" private Natures are often found so perfect, *the Sect.*  
 " Universal-one shou'd want Perfection, and be  
 " esteem'd like whatfoever can be thought of, most  
 " monstrous, rude, and imperfect ?

" STRANGE ! That there shou'd be *in Nature*  
 " the Idea of an Order and Perfection, which NA-  
 " TURE her-self wants ! That Beings which arise  
 " from *Nature* shou'd be so perfect, as to discover  
 " Imperfection in her Constitution ; and be wise to  
 " correct that Wisdom by which they were made !

" NOTHIN G surely is more strongly imprinted  
 " on our Minds, or more closely interwoven with  
 " our Souls, than the Idea or Sense of *Order* and  
 " *Proportion*. Hence all the Force of *Numbers*, and *Prepar-*  
 " *tion*. those powerful *Arts* founded on their Management  
 " and Use. What a difference there is between  
 " *Harmony* and *Discord* ! *Cadency* and *Convulsion* !  
 " What a difference between compos'd and orderly  
 " Motion, and that which is ungovern'd and acci-  
 " dental ! between the regular and uniform Pile of  
 " some noble Architect, and a Heap of Sand or  
 " Stones ! between an organiz'd Body, and a Mist  
 " or Cloud driven by the Wind !

" Now as this difference is immediately per-  
 " ceiv'd by a plain internal Sensation, so there is  
 " withal in Reason this account of it ; That what-  
 " ever Things have *Order*, the same have *Unity of Union*,  
 " *Design*, and concur in one, are Parts constituent  
 " of one *WHOLE*, or are, in themselves, *intire Sys-*  
 " *tems*. Such is a *Tree*, with all its Branches ;  
 " an *Animal*, with all its Members ; an *Edifice*,  
 " with all its exterior and interior Ornaments.  
 " What else is even a *Tune* or *Symphony*, or any  
 " excellent Piece of *Musick*, than a certain *Systems*  
 " of proportion'd Sounds ?

" Now in this which we call the *UNIVERSE*, *System*  
 " whatever the Perfection may be of any particu-  
 " lar *Systems* ; or whatever single *Parts* may have  
 " Proportion, Unity, or Form within themselves ;

Part 2. " yet if they are not united all in general, in \* ONE System, but are, in respect of one another, as the driven Sands, or Clouds, or breaking Waves ; then there being no Coherence in the Whole, there can be infer'd no Order, no Proportion, and consequently no Project or Design. But if none of these Parts are independent, but all apparently united, then is the WHOLE a System compleat, according to one simple, consistent, and uniform DESIGN.

" HERE then is our main Subject, insisted on : That neither Man, nor any other Animal, tho ever so compleat a System of Parts, as to all *within*, can be allow'd in the same manner compleat, as to all *without* ; but must be consider'd as having a further relation abroad to the System of his Kind. So even this System of his Kind to the Animal-System ; this to the World (our Earth) ; and this again to the bigger World, and to the Universe.

*Animal-System.* " ALL things in this World are united. For as the Branch is united with the Tree, so is the Tree as immediately with the Earth, Air, and Water, which feed it. As much as the fertile Mould is fitted to the Tree, as much as the strong and upright Trunk of the Oak or Elm is fitted to the twining Branches of the Vine or Ivy ; so much

\* *Vid.* LOCKE of human Understanding, Book IV. Chap. 6. Sct. II.

*At mihi quidem Veteres illi majus quiddam anima complexi, multa plus etiam videntur, quam quantum nostrorum ingeniorum acit intueri potest : qui omnia hæc, quæ supra & subter, unum esse, & una vi, atque una consensione naturæ conficitur esse dixerunt. Nullum est enim genus rerum, quid aut avulsum à ceteris per seipsum confort, aut quo cetera si careant, vim suam, atque aeternitatem conservare possint.* Cicero de Oratore, lib. 3.

*Omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt, unum est : membra sumus corporis magni.* Seneca, Epist. 95.

*Societas nostra Lapidum fornicationi simillima est : quæ tajura, nisi invicem obstant, hec ipso justinetur.* Ibidem.

*Fine Dei sedes, nisi Terra, & Pontus, & Aether,  
Et Cælum, & Virtus? Superos quid quatinus ultra?  
Jupiter est quædunque videt, quæcumque movet.*

*Lucan. lib. 3.*

" are the very *Leaves*, the *Seeds*, and *Fruits* of Sect. 4.  
 " these Trees fitted to the various *Animals*: These ~~are~~  
 " again to one another, and to the *Elements* where  
 " they live, and to which they are, as Appendices, in  
 " a manner fitted and join'd; as either by *Wings* for  
 " the Air, *Fins* for the Water, *Feet* for the Earth,  
 " and by other correspondent inward Parts of a  
 " more curious Frame and Texture. Thus in con-  
 " templating all on Earth, we must of necessity  
 " view *All in One*, as holding to one common Stock.  
 " Thus too in the System of the bigger World.  
 " See there the mutual Dependency of Things!  
 " the Relation of one to another; of the Sun to  
 " this inhabited Earth, and of the Earth and other  
 " Planets to the Sun! the Order, Union, and Co-  
 " herence of the *Whole*! And know (my ingenious  
 " Friend) That by this Survey you will be oblig'd  
 " to own the *UNIVERSAL SYSTEM*, and coherent <sup>Universal</sup>  
 " Scheme of Things, to be establish'd on abundant <sup>sal Sy-</sup>  
 " Proof, capable of convincing any fair and just <sup>tem.</sup>  
 " Contemplator of the Works of Nature. For scarce  
 " wou'd any-one, till he had well survey'd this uni-  
 " versal Scene, believe a *Union* thus evidently demon-  
 " strable, by such numerous and powerful Instances  
 " of mutual Correspondency and Relation, from the  
 " minutest Ranks and Orders of Beings to the re-  
 " motest Spheres.

" Now, in this mighty UNION, if there be <sup>Appea-</sup>  
 " such Relations of Parts one to another as are not <sup>rance of</sup>  
 " easily discover'd; if on this account the End and <sup>Ill ne-</sup>  
 " cessary. <sup>cessary.</sup>  
 " Use of Things does not every-where appear, there  
 " is no wonder; since 'tis no more indeed than what  
 " must happen of necessity: Nor cou'd supreme  
 " Wisdom have otherwise order'd it. For in an In-  
 " finity of Things thus relative, a Mind which sees  
 " not *infinitely*, can see nothing *fully*: And since  
 " each Particular has relation to all in general,  
 " it can know no perfect or true Relation of  
 " any Thing, in a World not perfectly and <sup>fully</sup>  
 " known.

Part 2. "THE same may be consider'd in any dissected Animal, Plant, or Flower ; where he who is no *Solution*. "Anatomist, nor vers'd in natural History, sees that the many *Parts* have a relation to the *Whole* ; for thus much even a slight View affords : But he who like you, my Friend, is curious in the Works of Nature, and has been let into a Knowledge of the animal and vegetable Worlds, he alone can readily declare the just Relation of all these Parts to one another, and the several Uses to which they serve.

*Exam-*  
*ple.* "BUT if you wou'd willingly enter further into this Thought, and consider how much we ought not only to be satisfy'd with this our View of Things, but even to admire its Clearness ; imagine only some Person intirely a Stranger to Navigation, and ignorant of the Nature of the Sea or Waters, how great his Astonishment wou'd be, when finding himself on board some Vessel, anchoring at Sea, remote from all Land-prospect, whilst it was yet a Calm, he view'd the ponderous Machine firm and motionless in the midst of the smooth Ocean, and consider'd its Foundations beneath, together with its Cordage, Masts, and Sails above. How easily wou'd he see the *Whole* one regular Structure, all things depending on one another ; the Uses of the Rooms below, the Lodgments, and Conveniences of Men and Stores ? But being ignorant of the Intent or Design of all above, wou'd he pronounce the Masts and Cordage to be useless and cumb'rsom, and for this reason condemn the Frame, and despise the Architect ? O my Friend ! let us not thus betray our Ignorance ; but consider where we are, and in what a Universe. Think of the many Parts of the vast Machine, in which we have so little insight, and of which it is impossible we shou'd know the Ends and Uses ; when instead of seeing to the highest Pendants, we see only some

" lower Deck, and are in this dark Case of Flesh, Sect.  
" confin'd even to the Hold, and meanest Station of  
" the Vessel,

" Now having recogniz'd this uniform consist-  
" ent Fabrick, and own'd the *Universal System*, we  
" must of consequence acknowledg a *Universal Universe*  
" MIND; which no ingenuous Man can be tempted *to disown*, except thro the Imagination of Dis-  
" order in the Universe, its Seat. For can it be  
" suppos'd of any-one in the World, that being  
" in some Desart far from Men, and hearing there  
" a perfect Symphony of Musick, or seeing an exact  
" Pile of regular Architecture arising gradually from  
" the Earth in all its Orders and Proportions, he  
" shou'd be persuaded that at the bottom there  
" was no Design accompanying this, no secret Spring  
" of Thought, no active Mind? Wou'd he, because  
" he saw no Hand, deny the Handy-Work, and  
" suppose that each of these compleat and perfect  
" Systems were fram'd, and thus united in just  
" Symmetry, and conspiring Order, either by the  
" accidental blowing of the Winds, or rolling of  
" the Sands?

" WHAT is it then shou'd so disturb our Views *Distrur*  
" of *Nature*, as to destroy that Unity of Design and *balance,* *where*  
" Order of a Mind, which otherwise wou'd be so  
" apparent? All we can see either of the Heavens  
" or Earth, demonstrates Order and Perfection; so  
" as to afford the noblest Subjects of Contempla-  
" tion to Minds, like yours, enrich'd with Sciences  
" and Learning. All is delightful, amiable, rejoic-  
" ing, except with relation to *Man* only, and his *Huma*  
" Circumstances, which seem unequal. Here the *sudden*  
" Calamity and Ill arises; and hence the Ruin of this  
" goodly Frame. All perishes on this account; and  
" the whoie Order of the Universe, elsewhere so firm,  
" intire, and immoveable, is here o'erthrown, and  
" lost by this one View; in which we refer all things  
" to our-selves: submitting the Interest of the Whole *univ.*  
" to the Good and Interest of so small a Part.

" But

Part 2. " But how is it you complain of the ~~une~~  
 State of Man, and of the few Advantages ~~all~~  
 " him above the Beasts ? What can a ~~Crea~~  
 " claim, so little differing from 'em, or whose  
 " rit appears so little above 'em, except in ~~We~~  
 " and *Virtue*, to which so few conform ? Man  
 " be virtuous ; and being so, is happy. His ~~Mor~~  
 " is Reward. By Virtue he deserves ; and in ~~Vir~~  
 " tue only can meet his Happiness deserv'd. ~~Bu~~  
*Virtue and Vice.* " if even *Virtue* it-self be unprovided for, and *Vic*  
 " more prosperous, be the better Choice ; if this (a  
 " you suppose) be in the Nature of Things, then i  
 " all Order in reality inverted, and supreme Wi  
 " dom lost : Imperfection and Irregularity being,  
 " after this manner, undoubtedly too apparent in  
 " the moral World.

*Their Power, Effect.* " HAVE you then, e'er you pronounc'd this  
 Sentence, consider'd of the State of *Virtue* and  
 " *Vice* with respect to this *'Life merely* ; so as to  
 " say, with assurance, When, and how far, in what  
 " particulars, and how circumstantiated, the one or  
 " the other is *Good* or *Ill* ? You who are skill'd in  
 " other Fabricks and Compositions, both of Art  
 " and Nature, have you consider'd of the Fabrick  
*A Mind.* " of *the Mind*, the Constitution of the Soul, the  
 Connexion and Frame of all its Passions and Af  
 " fections ; to know accordingly the Order and  
 " Symmetry of the Part, and how it either im  
 " proves or suffers ; what its Force is, when na  
 " turally preserv'd in its sound State ; and what be  
 " comes of it, when corrupted and abus'd ? Till  
 " this (my Friend !) be well examin'd and under  
 " stood, how shall we judg either of the Force of  
 " *Virtue*, or Power of *Vice* ? Or in what manner  
 " either of these may work to our Happiness or  
 " Undoing ?

" HERE therefore is that INQUIRY we shou'd  
 " first make. But who is there can afford to make  
 " it as he ought ? If happily we are born of a  
 " good Nature ; if a liberal Education has form'd

With us a generous Temper and Disposition, well-<sup>Secd. 4</sup> regulated Appetites, and worthy Inclinations, 'tis well for us; and so indeed we esteem it. But *Temper* who is there endeavours to give these to himself, or to advance his Portion of Happiness in this kind? Who thinks of improving, or so much as of preserving his Share, in a World where it must of necessity run so great a hazard, and where we know an honest Nature is so easily corrupted? All other things relating to us are preserv'd with Care, and have some Art or Economy belonging to 'em; this which is nearest related to us, and on which our Happiness depends, is alone committed to Chance: And *Temper* is the only thing ungovern'd, whilst it governs all the rest.

Thus we inquire concerning what is good *Appetites.* and suitable to our Appetites; but what Appetites are good and suitable to us, is no part of our Examination. We inquire what is according to *Interest, Policy, Fashion, Vogue;* but it seems wholly strange, and out of the way, to inquire what is according to NATURE. The Ballance of EUROPE, of Trade, of Power, is strictly sought after; while few have heard of the Ballance of *Bal-* *their Passions,* or thought of holding these Scales *lance.* even. Few are acquainted with this Province, or knowing in these Affairs. But were we more so (as this Inquiry wou'd make us) we shou'd then see Beauty and Decorum here, as well as elsewhere in Nature; and the Order of the Moral World wou'd equal that of the Natural. By this the Beauty of VIRTUE wou'd appear; and hence (as has been shewn) the Supreme and *Virtue.* *Deity.* *Supreme Deity.* BEAUTY, the Original of all which is Good or Amiable.

But left I shou'd appear at last too like an *Enthusiast,* I chuse to express my Sense, and conclude this Philosophical Sermon in the words of one of those ancient Philologists, whom you <sup>are</sup> <sub>are</sub> <sup>to</sup> <sub>be</sub> <sup>to</sup> <sub>see</sub>

Part 2. " us'd to esteem. For Divinity it-self, says he, is  
 surely beauteous, and of all Beautys the brightest ;  
 tho' not a beauteous Body, but that from whence the  
 Beauty of Body is deriv'd : Not a beauteous Plain,  
 but that from whence the Plain looks beautiful. The  
 River's Beauty, the Sea's, the Heaven's, and Hea-  
 venly Constellations, all flow from hence as from a  
 Source Eternal and Incorruptible. As Beings par-  
 take of this, they are fair, and flourishing, and happy :  
 As they are lost to this, they are deform'd, perish'd  
 and lost."

WHEN THEOCLES had thus spoken, he was formally complimented by our Two Companions. I was going to add something in the same way : but he presently stop'd me, by saying, he shou'd be scandaliz'd, if instead of commanding him, I did not according to my Character, chuse rather to criticize some part or other of his long Discourse.

If it must be so then, reply'd I ; in the first place, give me leave to wonder that, instead of the many Arguments commonly brought for proof of a Deity, you make use only of one single-one to build on. I expected to have heard from you, in customary form, of a first Cause, a first Being, and a Beginning of Motion : How clear the Idea was of an immaterial Substance : And how plainly it appear'd,

*Matter and Thought* that at some time or other Matter must have been created. But as to all this, you are silent. As for what is said, of " A material unthinking Sub-stance being never able to have produc'd an immaterial thinking one ;" I readily grant it : but on the condition, that this great Maxim of *Nothing being ever made from Nothing*, may hold as well on my side as my Adversary's : And then, I suppose, that whilst the World endures, he will be at a loss how to assign a Beginning to Matter ; or how to suggest a Possibility of annihilating it. The spiritual Men may, as long as they please, represent to us, in the most eloquent manner,

## A R H A P S O D Y.

" That *Matter* consider'd in a thousand different Sc  
" Shapes, join'd and disjoin'd, vary'd and modi-  
" fy'd to Eternity, can never, of it-self, afford one  
" single Thought, never occasion or give rise to  
" any thing like Sense or Knowldg." Their Ar-  
gument will hold good against a DEMOCRITUS,  
an EPICURUS, or any of the elder or latter At-  
mists. But it will be turn'd on them by an ex-  
amining Academist: and when the two Substances are  
fairly set asunder, and consider'd apart, as different  
kinds; 'twill be as strong Sense, and as good Ar-  
gument, to say as well of the *immaterial kind*;  
" That do with it as you please, modify it a thou-  
sand ways, purify it, exalt it, sublime it, torture  
it ever so much, or rack it, as they say, with  
thinking; you will never be able to produce or  
force the contrary Substance out of it." The  
poor Dregs of sorry *Matter* can no more be made out  
of the simple pure Substance of immaterial *Thought*,  
than the high Spirits of *Thought* or *Reason* can be  
extracted from the gross Substance of heavy *Matter*.  
So let the *Dogmatists* make of this Argument what  
they can.

B U T for your part, continu'd I, as you have  
stated the Question, 'tis not about what was *first*,  
or *foremost*; but what is *instant*, and *now* in being.  
" For if DEITY be *now* really extant; if by any  
good Token it appears that there is *at this present*  
a universal Mind; 'twill easily be yielded there  
*ever was one.*" — This is your Argument. —  
You go (if I may say so) upon *Fact*, and would  
prove that things *actually are* in such a state and  
condition; which if they really *were*, there wou'd  
indeed be no dispute left. Your UNION is your  
main Support. Yet how is it you prove this?  
What Demonstration have you given? What have  
you so much as offer'd at, beyond bare Probability?  
So far are you from demonstrating any thing, that if  
this uniting Scheme be the chief Argument for

Part 2. Deity (as you tacitly allow) you seem rather to have demonstrated, " That the Case it-self is incapable of Demonstration." For, " How, say you, can a narrow Mind see *All Things*?" — And yet if, in reality, It sees not *All*, It had as good see *Nothing*. The demonstrable part is still as far behind. For grant that this *All*, which lies within our view or knowldg, is orderly and united, as you suppose: this mighty *All* is a mere Point still,

*Atheistical Hypothesis.* a very Nothing compar'd to what remains. " 'Tis only a separate *By-World* (we'll say) of which perhaps there are, in the wide Waite, Millions besides, as horrid and deform'd, as this of ours is regular and proportion'd. In length of time, amidst the infinite Hurry and Shock of Beings, this *single odd World*, by accident, might have been struck out, and cast into some Form (as among infinite *Chances*, what is there which may not happen?) But for the rest of *Matter*, 'tis of a different hue. Old *Father Chaos* (as the Poets call him) in these wild Spaces, reigns absolute, and upholds his Realms of Darkness. He presses hard upon our Frontier: and one day, belike, shall by a furious Inroad recover his lost Right, conquer his Rebel-State, and re-unite us to primitive *Discord* and *Confusion*."

THIS, said I, THROCKLES! (concluding my Discourse) is all I dare offer in opposition to your *Philosophy*. I imagin'd, indeed, you might have given me more Scope: But you have retrench'd yourself in narrower Bounds. So that to tell you truth, I look upon your *Theology* to be hardly so fair or open as that of our Divines in general. They are strict, it's true, as to *Names*; but allow a greater Latitude in *Things*. Hardly indeed can they bear a home-Charge, a downright questioning of *Duty*: But in return, they give always fair play against *NATURE*, and allow her to be challeng'd for her Failings. She may freely err, and we as freely

condone.

censure. *Deity*, they think, is not accountable for Sect. 4. her: Only she for her-self. But you are straiter, and more precise in this point. You have unnecessarily brought *Nature* into the Controversy, and taken upon you to defend her Honour so highly, that I know not whether it may be safe for me to question her.

LET not this trouble you, reply'd THEOCLES: but be free to censure *Nature*; whatever may be the Consequence. 'Tis only *my Hypothesis* can suffer. If I defend it ill, my Friends need not be scandaliz'd. They are fortify'd, no doubt, with stronger Arguments for a Deity, and can well employ those *metaphysical Weapons*, of whose Edge you seem so little apprehensive. I leave them to dispute this Ground with you, whenever they think fit. For my own Arguments, if they can be suppos'd to make any part of this Defence, they may be look'd upon only as distant Lines, or Outworks, which may easily perhaps be won; but without any danger to the Body of the Place.

NOTWITHSTANDING, then, said I, that you are willing I shou'd attack NATURE *in Form*, I chuse to spare her in all other Subjects, except MAN only. How comes it, I intreat you, that in <sup>NA.</sup> this noblest of Creatures, and worthiest her Care, <sup>TURE</sup> *in Man.* she shou'd appear so very weak and impotent; whilst in mere Brutes, and the irrational Species, <sup>In</sup> *Brutes.* she acts with so much Strength, and exerts such hardy Vigour? Why is she spent so soon in feeble *Man*, who is found more subject to Diseases, and of fewer years than many of the *wild Creatures*? They range secure; and proof against all the Injurys of Seasons and Weather, want no help from *Art*, but live in careless Ease, discharg'd of Labour, and freed from the cumbersome Baggage of a necessitous human Life. In Infancy more helpful, vigorous in Age, with Senses quicker, and more natural Sagacity.

Part 2. city, they pursue their Interests, Joys, Recreations, and cheaply purchase both their Food and Maintenance ; cloth'd and arm'd by Nature her-self provides them both a Couch and Mansion. Nature order'd for the rest of Creatures. See their Hardiness, Robustness, Vigour. Why no same for *Man*? —

*Nature in Man.* AND do you stop thus short, said THEO in your Expostulation? Methinks 'twere as well proceed, now you are in the way; and instead of laying claim to some few Advantages of other Creatures, you might as well stand for *All*, and plain " That *Man*, for his part, shou'd be less than a Consummation of all Abilities and Privileges which Nature can afford not merely, Why *Man* is naked, why unhandy flower-footed than the Beasts ? Ask, " he has not Wings also for the Air, Fins for Water, and so on; that he might take possession of *each* Element, and reign in *All*? "

NOT so, said I, neither. This wou'd rate him high indeed! As if he were, but Nature, *LORD of All*: which is more than I cou'ningly allow.

"Tis enough, reply'd he, that this is y<sup>t</sup> For if we allow once a Subordination in his *Nature* her-self be not for *MAN*, but *MATURE*; then must *Man*, by his good leave submit to the Elements of *NATURE*, and not the Elements to him. Few of these are at all fitting him, and none perfectly. If he be left in Earth, he falls headlong; for Wings were not assign'd to him. In Water he soon sinks. In Fire he cannot stand. Within Earth he suffocates. —

As for what Dominion he may naturally have over other Elements, said I, my concern truly is no great in his behalf; since by Art he can even obtain the Advantages Nature has given to other Creatures. But for the Air, methinks it had been wrong obliging in Nature to have allow'd him Wings.

AND what wou'd he have gain'd by it, reply'd Seft.+, THEOCLES? For consider what an Alteration of ~~the~~ Forces must have ensu'd. Observe in one of those ~~Volati-~~ wing'd Creatures, whether the whole Structure be not ~~tiler,~~ made subservient to this purpose, and all other Advantages sacrific'd to this single Operation. The *Anatomia* Anatomy of the Creature shews it, in a manner, to *my*, be all *Wing*: its chief Bulk being compos'd of two exorbitant Muscles, which exhaust the Strength of all the other, and engross (if I may say so) the whole OEconomy of the Frame. 'Tis thus the aerial Racers are able to perform so rapid and strong a Motion, beyond comparison with any other kind, and far exceeding their little share of Strength elsewhere: these Parts of theirs being made in such Superior proportion, as in a manner to *starve* their Companions. And in Man's Architecture, of so different an Order, were the flying Engines to be affix'd; must not the other Members suffer, and the multiply'd Parts starve one another? What think you of the Brain in this Partition? Is it not *The like* to prove a *Starveling*? Or wou'd you have *Brain*, it be maintain'd at the same high rate, and draw the chief Nourishment to it-self, from all the rest? —

I UNDERSTAND you, said I, THEOCLES (interrupting him:) The Brain certainly is a great *Starver*, where it abounds; and the thinking People of the World, the *Philosophers* and *Virtuoso's* especially, must be contented (I find) with a moderate Share of bodily Advantages, for the sake of what they call *Parts* and *Capacity* in another sense, *Parts*. The Parts, it seems, of one kind agree ill in their OEconomy with the Parts of the other. But to make this even on both sides, let us turn the Tables; and the Case, I suppose, will stand the same with the *Milo's* of the Age, the Men of bodily Prowess and Dexterity. For not to mention a vulgar sort, such as *Wrestlers*, *Vaulters*, *Racers*, *Hun-*

~~Partners~~; what shall we say of our ~~sons~~-herd. ~~Cavaliers~~-men, our *Riders*, *Fencers*, *Dancers*, *Tennis-players*, and such like? 'Tis the Body surely is the Brute here: and if the Brain were such a terrible Devourer in the other way; the Body and bodily Parts seem to have their Reprisals in this Rank of Men.

*Bal-*  
*ance.*

If then, said he, the Case stands thus between *Man* and *Man*, how must it stand between *Man* and a quite different Creature? If the *BALLANCE* be so nice, that the least thing breaks it, even in Creatures of the same Frame and Order; of what fatal effect must it be to change the *Order* it-self, and make some essential Alteration in the Frame? Consider therefore how it is we censure *Nature* in these and such-like Cases. "Why, says one, was I not made by Nature strong as a *Horse*? Why not hardy and robust as this *Brute-Creature*? or nimble and active as that other?" — And yet when uncommon Strength, Agility, and Feats of Body are subjoin'd, even in our own Species, see what befalls! So that for a Person thus in love with an *Athletick MILONEAN Constitution*, it were better, methinks, and more modest in him, to change the Expostulation, and ask, "Why was I not made in good earnest a very *BRUTE*?" For that wou'd be more suitable.

I AM apt indeed, said I, to think that the Excellence of *MAN* lies somewhat different from that of a *Brute*: and that such amongst us as are more truly *Men*, shou'd naturally aspire to manly Qualities, and leave the *Brute* his own. But *Nature*, I see, has done well to mortify us in this particular, by furnishing us with such slight Stuff, and in such a tender Frame, as is indeed wonderfully commodious to support that *Man-Excellence* of *Thought* and *Reason*; but wretchedly scanty and ineffectual for other Purposes. As if it were her very Design, "To hinder us from aspiring ridiculous to what was misbecoming our Character."

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Isr., said THEOCLES, you are not one of those Sect. 4  
notorious Arguers who tremble at every Objection  
is'd against their Opinion or Belief, and are so in-  
sat in upholding their own side of the Argument,  
as they are unable to make the least Concession on  
the other. Your Wit allows you to divert your-  
self with whatever occurs in the Debate : And you  
can pleasantly improve even what your Antagonist  
ings as a Support to his own Hypothesis. This  
deed is a fairer sort of Practice than what is com-  
on now-a-days. But 'tis no more than suitable to  
our Character. And were I not afraid of speaking  
with an Air of Compliment, in the midst of a phi-  
losophical Debate ; I shou'd tell you perhaps what I  
ought of the becoming manner of your SCEPTI-  
CISM, in opposition to a kind of Bigot-Scepticks ;  
who forfeit their Right to the philosopick Character,  
and retain hardly so much as that of the Gentleman  
*'Good-Companion.'* — But to our Argument.—

Such then, continu'd he, is the admirable Dis- *Distrin-*  
ibution of NATURE, her adapting and adjusting *bution,*  
not only the Stuff or Matter to the Shape and Form,  
but even the Shape it-self and Form to the Circum-  
stance, Place, Element or Region ; but also the Affec-  
tions, Appetites, Sensations, mutually to each other,  
as well as to the Matter, Form, Action, and all be-  
sides : " All manag'd for the best, with perfect Fru-  
gality and just Reserve : profuse to none, but  
bountiful to all : never employing in one thing  
more than enough ; but with exact Economy  
retrenching the superfluous, and adding Force to  
what is *principal* in every thing." And is not *Princi-*  
*'HOUGHT* and *REASON* *principal* in Man ? *Part,*  
You'd he have no Reserve for these ? no saving  
or this part of his Engine ? Or wou'd he have  
the same Stuff or Matter, the same Instruments or  
Organs serve alike for different purposes, and an-  
tence be equivalent to a Pound ? — It can't  
be. What Wonders, then, can we expect from a

Part 2. few Ounces of Blood in such a narrow Vessel, fitted for so small a District of Nature? Will he not rather think highly of that NATURE, which has thus manag'd his Portion for him, to best advantage, with this happy *Reserve* (happy indeed for him, if he knows and utes it!) by which he has so much a better Use of Organs than any other Reason. Creature? by which he holds his Reason, is a *Man*, and not a *Beast*?

*Infinis.* But \* Beasts, said I, have *Instincts*, which Man has not.

*Animals.* TAUZE, said he, they have indeed Perceptions, Sensations, and † *Pre-sensations* (if I may use the Expression) which Man, for his part, has not in any proportionable degree. Their Females, newly pregnant, and before they have bore Young, have a clear Prospect or *Pre-sensation* of their State which is to follow; know what to provide, and how, in what manner, and at what time. How many things do they pre-ponderate? How many at once comprehend? The Seasons of the Year, the Country, Climate, Place, Aspect, Situation, the Basis of their Building, the Materials, Architecture; the Diet and Treatment of their Offspring; in short the whole Economy of their Nursery: and all this as perfectly at first, and when unexperienc'd, as a *Human Kind* afterwards. And " *Wh-*

*Kind.* " *not this*, say you, in Human Kind?" Nay rather on the contrary, I ask " *Why this?* Where " was the Occasion or Use? Where the Necessity " Why this Sagacity for *Men*? Have they not what " is better, in another kind? Have they not Reason and Discourse? Does not this instruct them " What need then of the other? Where wou'd be " the prudent Management at this rate? Where " the Reserve?"

\* See also, p. 61, 62, and 86. AND VOL. III. p. 148, &c.

† L. 4. 2. p. 267.

the Young of most other Kinds, continu'd he, Sect. 4  
are instantly helpful to themselves, sensible, vigorous, know to shun Danger, and seek their Good :  
A human Infant is of all the most helpless, weak, infirm. And wherefore shou'd it not have been thus order'd ? Where is the loss in such a Species ?  
Or what is *Man* the worse for this Defect, amidst such large Supplys ? Does not this *Defect* engage him the more strongly to Society, and force him to own *Society*, that he is purposely, and not by accident, made rational and *sociable*; and can no otherwise increase or subsist, than in that *social* Intercourse and Community which is his *natural State*? Is not both conjugal Affection, and natural Affection to Parents, Duty to Magistrates, Love of a common City, Community, or Country, with the other Dutys and social Parts of Life, deduc'd from hence, and founded in these very *Wants*? What can be happier than such a Deficiency, as is the occasion of so much Good ? What better than a Want so abundantly made up, and answer'd by so many Enjoyments ? Now if there are still to be found among Mankind such as even in the midst of these Wants seem not ashame'd to affect a Right of Independency, and deny themselves to be by Nature *sociable*; where wou'd their Shame have been, had Nature otherwise supply'd these Wants ? What Duty or Obligation had been ever thought of ? What Respect or Reverence of Parents, Magistrates, their Country, or their Kind ? Wou'd not their full and self-sufficient State more strongly have determin'd them to throw off *Nature*, and deny the *Ends* and *Author* of their Creation ?

WHILST THROCLIS argu'd thus concerning NATURE, the old Gentleman, my Adversary, express'd great Satisfaction in hearing me, as he thought, refuted, and my Opinions expos'd. For he wou'd needs believe these to be strongly my Opinions, which I had only started as Objections in the

Part 2. the Discourse. He endeavour'd to reinforce the Argument by many Particulars from the common Topicks of the School-men and Civilians. He added withal, " That it was better for me to declare my Sentiments openly; for he was sure I had strongly State of Nature imbib'd that Principle, that \* the State of Nature was a State of War."

THAT it was no State of Government, or publick Rule, reply'd I, you your-self allow. I do so. Was it then a State of Fellowship, or Society? No: " For when Men enter'd first into Society, they pass'd from the State of Nature into that new one which is founded upon Compact."

And was that former State a tolerable one?

Had it been absolutely intolerable, there had never been any such. Nor cou'd we properly call that a State, which cou'd not stand or endure for the least time. If Man therefore cou'd endure to live without Society; and if it be true that he actually liv'd so, when in the State of Nature; how can it be said, " That he is by Nature sociable?"

The old Gentleman seem'd a little disturb'd at my Question. But having recover'd himself, he said in answer, " That MAN indeed, from his own natural Inclination, might not, perhaps have been mov'd to associate; but rather from some particular Circumstances."

HIS Nature then, said I, was not so very good, it seems; since having no natural Affection, or friendly Inclination belonging to him, he was forc'd into a social State, against his will: And this, not from any necessity in respect of outward Things (for you have allow'd him a tolerable Subsistence) but in probability from such Inconveniences as arose chiefly from himself, and his own malignant Temper and Principles. And indeed 'twas no wonder if Creatures who were naturally thus unso-

able, shou'd be naturally mischievous and trouble-  
com. If according to their *Nature*, they cou'd live out  
of Society, with a little affection for one another's  
Company, 'tis not likely that upon occasion they  
wou'd spare one another's Persons. If they were  
so fullen as not to meet for *Lout*, 'tis more than  
probable they wou'd fight for *Intreft*. And thus  
from your own Reasoning it appears, "That the <sup>State of</sup>  
" *State of Nature* must in all likelihood have been <sup>Nature,</sup>  
" little different from a *State of War.*"

He was going to answer me with some sharp-  
ness, as by his Looks appear'd; when THEOCLES  
interposing, desir'd, That as he had occasion'd this  
Dispute, he might be allow'd to try if he cou'd end  
it, by setting the Question in a fairer Light. You  
see, said he to the old Gentleman, what Artifice PHI-  
LOCLES made use of, when he engag'd you to al-  
low, that the State of Nature and that of Society  
were perfectly distinct. But let us question him now  
in his turn, and see whether he can demonstrate to  
us, "That there can be naturally any *Human State*  
" which is not *social.*"

WHAT is it then, said the old Gentleman, which  
we call the *State of Nature?*

NOT that imperfect rude Condition of Mankind,  
said THEOCLES, which some imagine; but which,  
if it ever were in Nature, cou'd never have been  
of the least continuance, or any way tolerable, or  
sufficient for the Support of human Race. Such a  
Condition cannot indeed so properly be call'd a *State.*  
For what if speaking of an Infant just coming into  
the World, and in the moment of the Birth, I shou'd  
fancy to call this a *State*; wou'd it be proper?

HARDLY so, I confess.

JUST such a *State*, therefore, was that which  
we suppose of MAN, e'er yet he enter'd into *Society*,  
and became in truth a *Human Creature.* 'Twas the  
rough Draught of Man, the *Essay* or first *Effort* of  
Nature, a Species in the Birth, a Kind as yet un-  
form'd,

Part 2. form'd; not in its *natural State*, but under *Violence*,  
 and still restless, 'till it attain'd its natural Perfection.

And thus, said TREOCLES (addressing still more particularly to the old Gentleman) the Case must necessarily stand, even on the supposal " That there was ever such a Condition or *State* of Men, when as yet they were unassociated, unacquainted, and consequently without any Language or Form of Art." But " That it was their *natural State*, to live thus separately," can never without Absurdity be allow'd. For sooner may you divest the Creature of all other Feeling or Affection, than that towards *Society* and his *Likeness*. Allowing you, however, the Power of divesting him at pleasure; allowing you to reduce even whole Parts and Members of his present Frame; wou'd you transform him thus, and call him still *a Man*? Yet better might you do this indeed, than you cou'd strip him of his *natural Affections*, separate him from all his *Kind*, and inclosing him like some solitary *Insect* in a Shell, declare him still *a MAN*. So might you call the human Egg, or Embrio, *the Man*. The Bug which breeds the Butterfly is more properly *a Fly*, tho without Wings, than this imaginary Creature is *a Man*. For tho his outward Shape were *human*, his Passions, Appetites, and Organs must be wholly different. His whole inward Make must be revers'd, to fit him for such a recluse Oconomy, and separate Subsistence.

To explain this a little further, continu'd he: Let us examine this pretended *State of Nature*; how and on what Foundation it must stand. " For either *Man* must have been from Eternity, or not. If from Eternity, there cou'd be no primitive or original *State*, no *State of Nature*, other than we see at present before our eyes. If not from Eternity, he arose either all at once (and consequently he was at the very first as he is now) or by degrees, thro several Stages and Conditions, to ~~the~~

" in which he is at length settled, and has continu'd Sect.,  
 " for so many Generations."

For instance, let us suppose he sprang, as the old Poets feign'd, from a *big-belly'd Oak*: and then belike he might resemble more a *Man-drake* than a *MAN*. Let us suppose him at first with little more of Life than is discover'd in that Plant which they call *the Sensitive*. But when *the Mother-Oak* had been some time deliver'd, and the false Birth by some odd Accident or Device was wrought into Form; the Members were then fully display'd, and the Organs of Sense began to unfold themselves. "Here sprang an *Ear*: there pesp'd an *Eye*. Per-  
 "haps a *Tail* too came in company. For what  
 "Superfluitys Nature may have been charg'd with  
 "at first, is difficult to determine. They dropt off,  
 "it seems, in time; and happily have left things,  
 "at last, in a good posture, and (to a wonder!)  
 "just as they shou'd be."

This surely is the lowest View of the *original Affairs* of human Kind. For if *A PROVIDENCE*, and not *CHANCE*, gave *Man* his being, our Argument for his *social Nature* must surely be the stronger. But admitting his Rise to be, as we have describ'd, and as a certain sort of Philosophers wou'd needs have it; Nature has then had no Intention at all, no Meaning or Design in this whole Matter. So how any thing can be call'd *natural* in the Case; how any *State* can be call'd a *State of Nature*, or *States according to Nature*, one more than another, I know *Natur* not.

Let us go on however, and on their Hypothesis consider, Which *State* we may best call *Nature's own*. "She has by Accident, thro many  
 "Changes and Chances, rais'd a Creature, which  
 "springing at first from rude Seeds of *Matter*, pro-  
 "ceeded till it became what now it is; and arriv'd  
 "where for many Generations it has been at a stay." In this long Procession (for I allow it any length  
 "whatever) I ask, "Where was it that this *State of*  
 "Nature,

Part 2. "Nature cou'd begin?" The Creature must have  
two endur'd many Changes: and each Change, whilst he  
<sup>State of</sup> was thus growing up, was as *natural*, one as an-  
<sup>Nature.</sup> other. So that either there must be reckon'd a hun-  
 dred different States of Nature; or if one, it can  
 be only *that* in which Nature was *perfect*, and her  
 Growth compleat. Here where She *rested*, and at-  
 tain'd her End, here must be her State, or no-where.

Cou'n she then *rest*, think you, in that deso-  
 late State before Society? Cou'd she maintain and  
 propagate the Species, such as it now is, without  
 Fellowship or Community? Shew it us in fact any-  
 where, amongst any of our own Kind. For as for  
 Creatures which may much resemble us in outward  
 Form, if they differ yet in the least part of their  
 Constitution, if their Inwards are of a different Tex-  
 ture, if their Skin and Pores are otherwise form'd  
 or harden'd; if they have other Excrescences of  
 Body, another Temper, other natural inseparable  
 Habits or Affections, they are not truly *of our Kind*.  
 If, on the other hand, their Constitution be as ours;  
 their natural Parts or inward Facultys as strong,  
 and their bodily Frame as weak as ours; if they have  
*Memory*, and *Senses*, and *Affections*, and a *Use of Or-  
 gans* as ours: 'tis evident they can no more by their  
 good-will abstain from *Society*, than they can possibly  
 preserve themselves without it.

AND here (my Friends!) we ought to remem-  
 ber what we discours'd a-while since, and was ad-  
 vanc'd by PHILOCLES himself, concerning the  
 Weakness of human Bodys, and the necessitous State  
 of *Man*, in respect of all other Creatures; "His long  
 " and helpless Infancy, his feeble and defenceless  
 " Make, by which he is more fitted to be a Prey him-  
 " self, than live by Prey on others." Yet 'tis im-  
 possible for him to subsist like any of those grazing  
 Kinds. He must have better Provision and choicer

Food than the raw Herbage; a better Couch and Sect. 4.  
Covering than the bare Earth or open Sky. How ~~many~~  
many Conveniences of other kinds does he stand in <sup>State of</sup> ~~Nature~~  
need of? What Union and strict Society is requir'd <sup>Nature</sup>  
between the *Sexes*, to preserve and nurse their growing  
*Offspring*? This kind of *Society* will not, surely,  
be deny'd to *MAN*, which to every Beast of Prey  
is known proper, and *natural*. And can we allow  
*this* social Part to *Man*, and go no further? Is it  
possible he shou'd *pair*, and live in Love and Fel-  
lowship with his *Partner* and *Offspring*, and remain  
still wholly wild, and speechless, and without those  
Arts of Storing, Building, and other OEconomy,  
as natural to him surely as to the *Beaver*, or to  
the *Ant*, or *Bee*? Where, therefore, shou'd He  
break off from this *Society*, if once begun? For  
that it began thus, as early as Generation, and grew  
into a Household and OEconomy, is plain. Must  
not this have grown soon into a *Tribes*? and this  
*Tribes* into a *Nation*? Or tho' it remain'd a *Tribes*  
only; was not this still a *Society* for mutual Defence  
and common Interest? In short, if Generation be  
*natural*, if natural Affection and the Care and Nur-  
ture of the *Offspring* be *natural*, Things standing as  
they do with *Man*, and the Creature being of that  
Form and Constitution he now is; it follows,  
"That *Society* must be also *natural* to him;" And  
"That out of *Society* and *Community* he never  
"did, nor ever can subsist."

To conclude, said he (addressing still to the  
two Companions) I will venture to add a word in  
behalf of PHILEOLES: That since the Learned  
have such a fancy for this Notion, and love to  
talk of this imaginary *State of Nature*, I think 'tis  
even Charity to speak as ill of it as we possibly  
can. Let it be a *State of War*, Rapine, and In-  
justice. Since 'tis unsocial, let it even be as un-  
comfortable and as frightful as 'tis possible. To  
speak well of it, is to render it inviting, and tem-  
pting.

Part 2. Men to turn Hermites. Let it, at least, be looked on as many degrees worse than the worst Government in being. The greater Dread we have <sup>State of</sup> Nature. *Anarchy*, the better Country-men we shall prove, and value more the *Laws* and *Constitution* under which we live, and by which we are protected from the outrageous Violences of such an unnatural State. In this I agree heartily with those Transformers of Human Nature, who considering it abstractedly and apart from Government or Society, represent it under monstrous Visages of *Dragons*, *Leviathans*, and I know not what devouring Creatures. They wou'd have done well however, to have express'd themselves more properly in their great Maxim. For to say in disparagement of *Man*, "That he is *to Man* *a Wolf*," appears somewhat absurd, when one considers that *Wolves* are *to Wolves* very kind and loving Creatures. The Sexes strictly *join* in the Care and Nurture of the Young: and this *Union* is continu'd still between 'em. They houl' to one another, to bring Company; whether to hunt, or invade their Prey, or assemble on the discovery of a good Carcase. Even the swinish Kinds want not *common Affection*, and run in Herds to the assistance of their distress'd Fellows. The meaning therefore of this famous Sentence (if it has any meaning at all) must be, "That *Man* is naturally *to Man*, as *a Wolf* is to a tamer Creature;" as, for instance, *to a Sheep*. But this will be as little to the purpose as to tell us, "That there are different Species or Characters of Men; That *all* have not this \* wolfish Nature, but That *one half* at least are naturally innocent and mild." And thus the Sentence comes to nothing. For without belying *Nature*, and contradicting what is evident from *natural History*, *Fact*, and the plain *Course of Things*; 'tis impossible to assent to this ill-natur'd Proposition,

we have even done our best to make tolerable Sect. 5.  
it.—But such is Mankind ! And even ~~the~~  
~~U~~~~M~~~~A~~~~N~~~~T~~~~N~~~~E~~~~R~~ shews it-self, such as it is ;  
fect, or absolutely successful, tho' rightly  
, and mov'd by proper and just Principles.  
, therefore, in *Philosophy*, as in the com-  
versations of the World. As fond as Men  
Company, and as little able to enjoy any Happi-  
ut of it, they are yet strangely addicted to  
y of Satir. And in the same manner as a  
Censure craftily worded, and pronounc'd  
urance, is apt to pass with Mankind for  
WIT ; so a virulent Maxim in bold Express-  
ho without any Justness of Thought, is rea-  
ziv'd for true PHILOSOPHY.

## S E C T. V.

These Discourses the Evening ended ; and Night  
incing, we return'd home from our Walk.  
per, and afterwards for the rest of that Night,  
LES said little. The Discourse was now  
chiefly by the two Companions, who turn'd  
a new fort of Philosophy ; such as you will  
me (good PALEMON !) if I pass over with  
ste.

RE was much said, and with great Learn- ~~the Nature of Spirits and Apparitions ; of~~  
~~the most astonishing Accounts were the most~~  
the most astonishing Accounts were the most <sup>of the</sup> ~~Prodi-~~  
g with our Friends : who endeavour'd to <sup>Q.</sup>  
one another in this admirable way ; and per-  
to a miracle in raising one another's Amaze-  
Nothing was so charming with them, as that  
was disagreeing and odd ; nothing so sooth-  
that which mov'd Horror. In short, what-  
is rational, plain, and easy, bore no relish ;  
hing came amiss which was crois to Nature,  
Sort and Order, and in no Proportion or  
y with the rest of Things. Monstrous Births,  
Enchantments, Elementary Wars, and Convol-  
fours

gious. But this was not a Face of Religion like to be enamour'd with. It was not I fear'd being made enthusiastick, or supererogative. I became so, I found it wou'd rather THEOCLES's manner. The Monuments and yards were not such powerful Scenes with the Mountains, the Plains, the solemn Groves; of whose Inhabitants I chuse more to hear, than of the other. And I was fancy Truth in those poetical Fictions which made use of, than in any of ghastly Storys, so pompously set off, after way, in a lofty Tone of Authority, and surmising Air of Truth.

*Septem-  
ber.* You may imagine, PALEMON, that criticism, with which you so often reproach me, not well forsake me here: Nor cou'd it be a disturbance to our Companions, especially a grave Gentleman who had clash'd with me before. He bore with me a-while; lost all patience, One must certainly, be Master of no small share of Assurance,

every Fancy of *their own*, that they can believe their *Sect* very *Dreams*. But I who cou'd never pay any such deference to my *sleeping Fancys*, am apt sometimes to question even my *waking Thoughts*, and examine, "Whether these are not *Dreams* too ;" fince Men have a Faculty of dreaming sometimes with their Eyes open. You will own 'tis no small pleasure with Mankind to make their *Dreams* pass for *Reality*; and that *the Love of Truth* is, in earnest, not half so prevalent as this *Passion for Novelty* and *Surprise*, join'd with a *Desire of making Impression*, and being admir'd. However, I am so charitable still, as to think, there is more of innocent *Delusion* than voluntary *Imposture* in the World : and that they *Imposture* who have most impos'd on Mankind, have been happy in a certain Faculty of imposing first upon themselves ; by which they have a kind of Salvo for their Consciences, and are so much the more successful, as they can act their Part more naturally, and to the life. Nor is it to be esteem'd a Riddle, that Mens Dreams shou'd sometimes have the good fortune of passing with 'em for Truth ; when we consider, that in some Cases, that which was never so much as *dreamt of*, or related as *Truth*, comes afterwards to be believ'd by one who has often told it.

So that the greatest *Impostor* in the World, reply'd he, at this rate may be allow'd sincere.

As to the *main* of his *Imposture*, said I, perhaps he may ; notwithstanding some pious Frauds made use of between whiles, in behalf of a Belief thought good and wholesom. And so very natural do I take this to be, that in all Religions, except the true, I look upon the greatest Zeal to be accompany'd with the strongest Inclination to deceive. For the Design and End being *the Truth*, 'tis not customary to hesitate or be scrupulous about the Choice of Means. Whether this be true or no, I appeal to the Experience of the last Age : in which 'twill not be difficult to find very remarkable Ex-

Part 2. amply where *Imposture and Zeal, Bigotry and Hypocrisy* have liv'd together, in one and the same Character.

LET this be as it will, reply'd he, I am sorry, upon the whole, to find you of such an *incredulous Temper*.

"Tis just, said I, that you shou'd pity me as a Sufferer, for losing that Pleasure which I see others enjoy. For what stronger Pleasure is there with Mankind, or what do they earlier learn, or longer retain, than the *Love of bearing and relating things strange and incredible?* How wonderful a thing is the *Love of wondering, and of raising Wonder!* 'Tis the Delight of Children to hear Tales they shiver at, and the Vice of Old Age to abound in strange Storys of Times past. We come into the World wondering at every thing; and when our Wonder about common things is over, we seek something new to wonder at. Our last Scene is to tell Wonders of our own, to all who will believe 'em. And amidst all this, 'tis well if TRUTH comes off, but moderately tainted.

"Tis well, reply'd he, if with this *moderate FAITH* of yours, you can believe any *Miracles* whatever.

*Credu-*  
*lity.* No matter, said I, how incredulous I am of modern Miracles, if I have a right Faith in those of former times, by paying the deference due to sacred Writ. "Tis here I am so much warn'd against *Credulity*, and enjoin'd never to believe even the greatest Miracles which may be wrought, in opposition to what has been already taught me. And this Injunction I am so well fitted to comply with, that I can safely engage to keep still in the same *Faith*, and promise never to believe amiss.

BUT is this a *Promise* which can well be made?

IF not, and that my Belief indeed does not absolutely depend upon my self, how am I accountable for it? I may be justly punish'd for Actions, in which my Will is free; but with what justice can I be challeng'd for my Belief, if in this I am not at my liberty? If Credulity and Incredulity are *Defects*, only in the Judgment; and the best-meaning Person

the world may err on either side, whilst a much Sect-worfe Man, by having better Parts, may judg far better of the Evidence of things: how can you punish him who *errs*, unless you wou'd punish *Weakness*, and say, 'tis just for Men to suffer for their Unhappiness, and not their Fault?

I AM apt to think, said he, that very few of those who are punish'd for their *Incredulity*, can be said to be Sufferers for their *Weakness*.

TAKING it for granted then, reply'd I, that *Simplicity* and *Weakness* is more the Character of the *Credulous* than of the *Unbelieving*; yet I see not, but that even this way still we are as liable to suffer by our *Weakness*, as in the contrary Case by an over-refin'd *Wis*. For if we cannot command our own Belief, how are we secure against those false Prophets, and their deluding Miracles, of which we have such Warning given us? How are we safe from Heresy and false Religion? *Credulity* being that which delivers us up to all Impostures of this sort, and which actually at this day hold the *Pagan* <sup>Credulity</sup> and *Mahometan* World in Error and blind Superstition. Either therefore there is no Punishment due to wrong Belief, because we *cannot* believe as we will our-selves; or if we *can*, why shou'd we not promise *never to believe amiss*? Now in respect of Miracles to come, the sureit way never to believe *amiss*, is never to believe *at all*. For being satisfy'd of the Truth of our Religion by past Miracles, so as to need no other to confirm us; the Belief of new may often do us harm, but can never do us good. Therefore as the truest Mark of a believing Christian is to seek after no Sign or Miracle to come; so the safest Station in Christianity is his who can be mov'd by nothing of this kind, and is thus Miracle-proof. For if the *Miracle* be on the side of his Faith, 'tis superfluous, and he needs it not; if against his Faith, let it be as great as possible, he will never regard it in the least, or believe *it any other* than Impoliture, the coming from an <sup>Angel</sup>

Part 2. Angel. So that with all that *Incredulity* for which  
you you reproach me so severely, I take my-self to be  
still the better and more Orthodox Christian. At  
least I am more sure of continuing so than you, who  
with your *Credulity* may be impos'd upon by such  
as are far short of *Angels*. For having this prepara-  
tory Disposition, 'tis odds you may come in time  
to believe Miracles in any of the different *Sects*,  
who, we know, all pretend to them. I am per-  
suaded therefore, that the best Maxim to go by, is  
that common one, "That *Miracles are ceas'd*;"  
And I am ready to defend this Opinion of mine to  
be the most probable in it-self, as well as most suit-  
able to Christianity.

THIS Question, upon further Debate, happen'd  
to divide our *two* Companions. For the elderly  
Gentleman, my Antagonist, maintain'd, "That the  
" giving up of Miracles for the time present, wou'd be  
" of great advantage to the Atheists." The younger  
Gentleman, his Companion, question'd, "Whether  
" the allowing 'em might not be of as great advan-  
" tage to the Enthusiasts and Sectarys, against the  
" National Church: This of the two being the  
" greatest Danger (he thought) both to Religion and  
" the State." He was resolv'd, therefore, for the  
future to be as cautious in examining these modern  
*Miracles*, as he had before been eager in seeking 'em.  
He told us very pleasantly what an Adventurer he  
had been of that kind; and on how many Partys  
he had been engag'd, with a fort of People who  
were always on the hot Scent of some new *Prodigy*  
or *Apparition*, some upstart *Revelation* or *Prophecy*,  
*Fanati-  
cism.* This, he thought, was true *Fanaticism errant*. He  
had enough of this visionary Chace, and wou'd  
ramble no more in blind Corners of the World, as he  
had been formerly accustom'd, in ghostly Company  
of Spirit-hunters, Witch-finders, and Layers-out for  
hellish Storys and diabolical Transactions. There  
was no need, he thought, of such Intelligence

from Hell, to prove the Power of Heaven, and Be-  
Sect. 5  
ing of a God. And now at last he begun to see the  
Ridicule of laying such a stress on these Matters :  
As if a Providence depended on them, and Religion  
were at stake, when any of these wild Feats were  
question'd. He was sensible there were many good  
Christians who made themselves strong Partisans in  
this Cause ; tho he cou'd not avoid wondring at it,  
now he began to consider, and look back.

THE HEATHENS, he said, who wanted Scrip-  
ture, might have recourse to *Miracles* : And Prov-  
idence perhaps had allow'd them their *Oracles* and  
*Prodigies*, as an imperfect kind of *Revelation*. The  
Jews too, for their hard Heart, and harder Under-  
standing, had this allowance ; when stubbornly  
they ask'd for *Signs* and *Wonders*. But CHRISTIANS,  
for their parts, had a far better and truer *Revelation* ;  
they had their plainer Oracles, a more rational Law,  
and clearer Scripture, carrying its own Force, and  
withal so well attested, as to admit of no dispute.  
And were I, continu'd he, to assign the exact time  
when Miracles probably might first have ceas'd, I  
shou'd be tempted to fancy it was when *Sacred Writ*  
took place, and was compleated.

THIS is Fancy indeed (reply'd the grave Gen-  
tleman) and a very dangerous one to that Scripture  
you pretend is of it-self so well attested. The At-  
testation of Men dead and gone, in behalf of Mi-  
racles past and at an end, can never surely be of equal  
force with Miracles present : And of these, I main-  
tain, there are never wanting a Number sufficient in  
the World to warrant a *Divine Existence*. If there  
were no Miracles now-a-days, the World wou'd be  
apt to think there never were any. The present  
must answer for the Credibility of the past. This is  
“ *GOD* *witnessing for himself* ;” not “ *Men for <sup>Him-</sup> GOD*.” For who shall witness for *Men*, if in  
the Case of Religion they have no Testimony from  
Heaven in their behalf ?

hot wrought by *Magick*? In short, “  
“ is there to any thing above, or below,  
“ are only of *Power*, and not of *Goodnes*.

AND are you so far improv'd then,  
severe Companion, under your new *scop*  
(pointing to me) that you can thus rea  
all Miracles, as useless? —

THE young Gentleman, I saw, was  
daunted with this rough Usage of his Fi  
was going on still with his *Invective*.  
(said I, interposing) 'tis I who am to  
this young Gentleman, whom you mak  
Disciple. And since his Modeity, I se  
allow him to pursue what he has so han  
gun, I will endeavour it my-self, if he li  
me leave.

THE young Gentleman assented; a  
on, representing his fair Intention of estab  
the first place a rational and just Four  
*our Faith*; so as to vindicate it from th  
of having no immediate Miracles to supp  
wou'd have done this (I said) undoub  
founding how good Proof we had alrea

men, than "By revealing himself to their Reason, Sect. 5. appealing to their Judgment, and submitting his ~~ways~~<sup>ways</sup> to their Censure, and cool Deliberation." The temptation of the Universe, its Laws and Government, was (I aver'd) the only means which I'd establish the *sound Belief* of a DEITY. For it tho' the innumerable *Miracles* from every part I'd the Sense, and gave the trembling Soul no note? What tho' the Sky shou'd suddenly open, *Miracles* all kinds of Prodigys appear, Voices be heard, <sup>no proof</sup> of Divinity. Characters read? What wou'd this evince more? "That there were *certain Powers* cou'd do all this?" But "What Powers; Whether One, or more; Whether Superior, or Subaltern; Mortal, or Immortal; Wise, or Foolish; Just, or Unjust; Good or Bad;" this wou'd still remain a mystery; as wou'd the true Intention, the Infallibility or Certainty of whatever *these Powers* af'd. Their Word cou'd not be taken in their case. They might silence Men indeed, but convince them: since "Power can never serve Proof for \* Goodness; and GOODNESS is the only Pledg of Truth." By GOODNESS alone, it is created. By GOODNESS *superior Powers* win Belief. They must allow their Works to be examined, their Actions criticiz'd: And thus, only, they may be confided in; "When by repeated Marks their Benevolence is prov'd, and their Character of Sincerity and Truth establish'd." whom therefore the Laws of this Universe and Government appear just and uniform; to him they give the Government of one JUST-ONE; to him they give and witness a God: and laying in him the foundation of this first Faith, they fit him for a <sup>a</sup> + subject One. He can then hearken to *Historical Revelation*, and is then fitted (and not till then) for the reception.

O.L. I. p. 64. And VOL. III. p. 80.

O.L. I. p. 201. And in this Volume, p. 175.

Partz, tion of any *Message* or miraculous Notice from Above  
 where he knows beforehand all is just and true  
 But this, no Power of Miracles, nor any Powe  
 besides his REASON, can make him know, or ap-  
 prehend.

BUT now, continu'd I, since I have been thus  
 long the Defendant only; I am resolv'd to take up  
 offensive Arms, and be Aggressor in my turn; pro-  
 vided THEOCLES be not angry with me for bor-  
 rowing Ground from his Hypothesis.

WHATEVER you borrow of his, reply'd my  
 Antagonist, you are pretty sure of spoiling it; And  
 as it passes thro your hands, you had best beware  
 lest you seem rather to reflect on *Him* than *Me*.

I'LL venture it, said I; whilst I maintain that  
 most of those Maxims you build upon, are fit only  
 to betray your own Cause. For whilst you are la-  
 bouring to unhinge Nature; whilst you are search-  
 ing Heaven and Earth for Prodigys, and studyin-  
 g how to *miraculize* every thing; you bring Confusion  
 on the World, you break its Uniformity, and de-  
 stroy that admirable Simplicity of Order from whence  
 the ONE infinite and perfect Principle is known  
 Perpetual Strifes, Convulsions, Violences, Breach o  
 Laws, Variation and Unsteddiness of Order, shew  
 either no Contro'l, or several uncontro'l'd and un-  
 subordinate Powers in Nature. We have before ou  
 eyes either the *Chaos* and *Atoms* of the ATHEISTS  
 or the *Magick* and *Dæmons* of the POLYTHEISTS  
 Yet is this tumultuous System of the Universe assert-  
 ed with the highest Zeal by some who wou'd main-  
 tain a DEITY. This is that Face of Things, an-  
 these the Features by which they represent Divi-  
 nity. Hither the Eyes of our more inquisitive and  
 ingenuous Youth are turn'd with care, lest they see  
 any thing otherwise than in this perplex'd and ama-  
 ing View. As if *Atheism* were the most natural In-  
 ference which cou'd be drawn from a regular an-  
922

*Atheism*  
 from  
 Supersti-  
 tion.

ly State of Things ! But after all this mangling Sect. 5.  
lisfigurement of *Nature* ; if it happens (as oft  
es) that the amaz'd Disciple coming to him-  
and searching leisurely into *Nature's Ways*,  
more of *Order*, *Uniformity*, and *Constancy* in  
ts than he suspected ; he is of course driven  
~~to~~ *Atheism* : And this merely by the Impressions he  
'd from that preposterous System, which taught  
o seek for *Deity* in *Confusion*, and to discover  
TIDENCE in an irregular disjointed *World*.

“D when you, reply'd he, with your newly-  
is'd System, have brought all things to be as  
m, plain, irregular, and simple, as you cou'd

I suppose you will send your Disciple to seek  
EITY in *Mechanism* ; that is to say, in some  
ite System of self-govern'd Matter. For what  
it you Naturalists make of the World, than  
te *Machine* ?

THING else, reply'd I, if to the Machine you  
a Mind. For in this case 'tis not a *Self-go-*  
, but a *God-govern'd Machine*.

D what are the Tokens, said he, which shou'd  
ice us ? What Signs shou'd this dumb *Machine*  
f its being thus govern'd ?

E present, reply'd I, are sufficient. It can-  
obably give stronger Signs of Life and stiddy  
ght. Compare our own *Machines* with this  
ONE ; and see, Whether by their Order, Ma-  
ient and Motions, they betoken either so per-  
Life, or so consummate an Intelligence. The  
regular, stiddy, permanent ; the other are ir-  
r, variable, inconstant. In one there are the  
s of Wisdom and Determination ; in the other,  
imsy and Conceit : In one there appears Judg-  
; in the other, Fancy only : In one, Will ; in  
her, Caprice : In one Truth, Certainty, Know-  
in the other, Error, Folly, and Madnes. —  
e convinc'd there is something above, which  
and acts, we want, it seems, the latter of  
igns ; as supposing there can be no Thought  
. II.

Part 2. or Intelligence beside what is like ~~our~~ ~~or~~  
~~—~~ ficken and grow weary with the orderly  
Atbeism gular Course of Things. Periods, and stat  
from and Revolutions just and proportionable,  
Supersti- upon us, nor win our Admiration. We  
tion. Riddles, Prodigys, Matters for Surprize  
for! By Harmony, Order and Concord,  
made Atbeists: By Irregularity and Discord  
convinc'd of DEITY! "The World is n  
dent, if it proceed in Course; but an  
"Wisdom, if it runs mad!"

THUS I took upon me the part of  
THEIST, whilst I endeavour'd to refute  
tagonist, and shew that his Principles  
Atbeism. The zealous Gentleman took  
fence: And we continu'd debating warmly  
at night. But THEOCLES was Moderate  
we retir'd at last to our Repose, all calm and  
ly. However, I was not a little rejoic'd  
that our Companions were to go away  
next Morning, and leave THEOCLES to me.

FOR now (PALEMON!) that Morning  
proaching, for which I so much long'd. W  
Longing may prove, I may have reason  
You have had enough, one wou'd think  
the edge of your Curiosity in this kind. C  
imagin'd, that after the Recital of Two si  
already past, you can with patience he  
other yet to come, more Philosophical tha  
— But you have made me promise; a  
whate'er it cost, take it you must, as follo

## PART III.

PHILOCLES to PALEMON.

IT WAS yet deep Night (as I imagin'd) when I wak'd with the noise of People up in the House. I call'd to know the matter; and was told that THROCTES had a little before parted with his Friends; after which he went out to take his Morning-Walk, but wou'd return (they thought) pretty soon: For so he had leit word; and that no-body in the mean time shou'd disturbe my Rest.

This was Disturbance sufficient, when I heard it. I presently got up; and finding it light enough to see the Hill, which was at a little distance from the House, I soon got thither; and, at the foot of it, overtook THROCTES; to whom I complain'd of his Unkindness. For I was not certainly (I told him) so effeminate and weak a Friend, as to deserve that he shou'd treat me like a Woman: Nor had I shown such an Aversion to his Manners or Conversation, as to be thought fitter for the dull Luxury of a soft Bed and Ease, than for Busines, Recreation, or Study, with an early Friend. He had no other way therefore of making me amends, than by allowing me henceforward to be a Party with him in his *serious Thoughts*, as he saw I was resolv'd to be in his *Hours and Exercises* of this sort.

You have forgot then, said THROCTES, the Affignation you had yesterday with the *Silvan Nymphs* at this Place and Hour? No, truly, said I: For, as you see, I come punctually to the Place appointed. But I never expected you shou'd have come hither without me. Nay then, said THROCTES, there's hope you may in time become a

Part 3. Lover with me : for you already begin to shew  
your Jealousy. How little did I think these Nymphs  
cou'd raise that Passion in you ? Truly, said  
I, for the Nymphs you mention, I know little of  
'em as yet. My Jealousy and Love regard You  
only. I was afraid you had a mind to escape me.  
But now that I am again in possession of you, I want  
no Nymph to make me happy here ; unless it were  
perhaps to join Forces against you, in the manner  
your belov'd Poet makes the Nymphs *ÆGLE* join  
with his two Youths, in forcing the God SILE-  
NUS to sing to 'em.

I D A R E trust your Gallantry, reply'd THEO-  
ELES, that if you had such fair Company as you  
speak of, you wou'd otherwise bestow your time  
than in an Adventure of *Philosophy*. — But do  
you expect I shou'd imitate the Poet's God you  
mention'd, and sing " The Rise of Things from  
" Atoms ; the Birth of Order from Confusion ;  
" and the Origin of *Union*, *Harmony*, and *Concord*,  
" from the sole Powers of *CHAOS*, and blind  
" *Chance* ? " The Song indeed was fitted to the  
God. For what cou'd better suit his jolly Charac-  
ter, than such a drunken Creation ; which he lov'd  
often to celebrate, by acting it to the life ? But  
even this Song was too harmonious for the Night's  
Debauch. Well has our Poet made it of the Morn-  
ing, when the God was fresh : For hardly shou'd  
we be brought ever to believe that such harmonious  
Numbers cou'd arise from a mere *Chaos* of the Mind.  
But we must hear our Poet speaking in the Mouth  
of some soberer *Demi-God* or *Hero*. He then pre-  
sents us with a different Principle of Things, and  
in a more proper Order of Precedency, gives  
*Thought* the upper hand. He makes MIND origi-  
nally to have govern'd BODY ; not BODY MIND ;  
For this had been a CHAOS everlasting, and must  
have kept all things in a *Chaos*-State to this day,  
and for ever, had it ever been. But,

*The active MIND, infus'd thro all the Space,  
Unites and mingles with the mighty Majt :  
Hence Men and Beasts. ——*

HERE, PHILOCLES, we shall find our sovereign Genius; if we can charm the Genius of the Place (more chaste and sober than your SILENUS) to inspire us with a truer Song of Nature, teach us some celestial Hymn, and make us feel Divinity present in these solemn Places of Retreat.

HASTE then, I conjure you, said I, good THEOCLES, and stop not one moment for any Ceremony or Rite. For well I see, methinks, that without any such Preparation, some Divinity has approach'd us, and already moves in you. We are come to the sacred Groves of the Hamadryads, which formerly were said to render Oracles. We are on the most beautiful part of the Hill; and the Sun, now ready to rise, draws off the Curtain of Night, and shews us the open Scene of Nature in the Plains below. Begin: For now I know you are full of those Divine Thoughts which meet you ever in this Solitude. Give 'em but Voice and Accents: You may be still as much *alone* as you are us'd, and take no more notice of me than if I were absent.

JUST as I had said this, he turn'd away his Eyes from me, musing a-while by himself; and soon afterwards, stretching out his Hand, as pointing to the Objects round him, he began.

" Ye Fields and Woods, my Refuge from the *Medita-*  
" *toilsome World of Business*, receive me in your *tran-*  
" quiet Sanctuaries, and favour my Retreat and  
" thoughtful Solitude. —— Ye verdant Plains,  
" how gladly I salute ye! —— Hail all ye blis-  
" ful Mansions! Known Seats! Delightful Pro-  
" spects! Majestick Beautys of this Earth, and all  
" ye Rural Powers and Graces! —— Blest d.  
" ye chaste Abodes of happiest Mortals, who her-

Part 3.—“in peaceful Innocence enjoy a Life unenvy'd, tho  
 ————— “ Divine ; whilst with its bleis'd Tranquillity it af-  
 “ fords a happy Leisure and Retreat for Man ; who,  
 “ made for Contemplation, and to search his own  
 “ and other Natures, may here best meditate the  
 “ Cause of Things ; and plac'd amidst the vari-  
 “ ous Scenes of Nature, may nearer view her  
 “ Works.

“ O gloriouſ Nature ! supremely Fair, and  
 “ ſovereignly Good ! All-loving and All-lovely,  
 “ All-divine ! Whose Looks are fo becoming, and  
 “ of ſuch infinite Grace ; whose Study brings ſuch  
 “ Wisdom, and whose Contemplation ſuch Delight ;  
 “ whose every tingle Work affords an ampler Scene,  
 “ and is a nobler Spectacle than all which ever Art  
 “ presented ! —— O mighty Nature ! Wise Sub-  
 “ ſtitute of Providence ! impower'd Creatress ! Or  
 “ Thou impowering D E I T Y, Supreme Creator !  
 “ Thee I invoke, and Thee alone adore. To theſe  
 “ this Solitude, this Place, theſe Rural Meditations  
 “ are ſacred ; whilst thus inſpir'd with Harmony  
 “ of Thought, tho unconfin'd by Words, and in  
 “ loose Numbers, I ſing of Nature's Order in crea-  
 “ ted Beings, and celebrate the Beautys which re-  
 “ ſolve in Thee, the Source and Principle of all  
 “ Beauty and Perfection.

“ Th' v Being is boundleſs, unſearcheable, impe-  
 “ netrable. In thy Immensity all Thought is loſt ;  
 “ Fancy gives o'er its Flight : and weary'd Ima-  
 “ gination ſpends itſelf in vain ; finding no Coaſt  
 “ nor Limit of this Ocean, nor, in the wideſt Tract  
 “ thro which it foars, one Point yet nearer the  
 “ Circumference than the firſt Center whence it  
 “ parted.—Thus having oft eſsay'd, thus falſily'd  
 “ forth into the wide Expanſe, when I return again  
 “ within myſelf, ſtruck with the Sense of this fo-  
 “ narrow Being, and of the Fulneſs of that Immense-  
 “ one ; I dare no more behold the amazing Depths,  
 “ nor found the Abyſs of Deity.—

" Y E T since by Thee (O Sovereign MIND !) I Seck, r.  
" have been form'd such as I am, intelligent and ~~wise~~  
" rational ; since the peculiar Dignity of my Nature ~~Mediæ-~~  
" is to know and contemplate Thee ; permit that ~~time~~.  
" with due freedom I exert those Facultys with  
" which thou hast adorn'd me. Bear with my ven-  
" trouis and bold Approach. And since nor vain  
" Curiosity, nor fond Conceit, nor Love of ought  
" save Thee alone, inspires me with such Thoughts  
" as these, be thou my Assistant, and guide me in  
" this Pursuit ; whilst I venture thus to tread the  
" Labyrinth of wide Nature, and endeavour to trace  
" thee in thy Works." —

HERE he stop'd short, and starting, as out of a Dream ; Now, PHILOCLES, said he, inform me, How have I appear'd to you in my Fit ? Seem'd it a sensible kind of Madnes, like those Transportes which are permitted to our Poets ? or was it downright Raving ?

I ONLY wish, said I, that you had been a little stronger in your Transport, to have proceeded as you began, without ever minding me. For I was beginning to see Wonders in that *Nature* you taught me, and was coming to know the Hand of your divine Artificer. But if you stop here, I shall lose the Enjoyment of the pleasing Vision. And already I begin to find a thousand Difficultys in fancying such a Universal Genius as you describe.

WRY, said he, is there any difficulty in fancying the Universe to be One Entire Thing ? Can one <sup>Unity,</sup>

from one another: And this tall  
the Company, as it is by it-self a different  
from all its Fellows of the Wood, so with its own  
Wood of numerous spreading Branches (which seem  
so many different TREES) 'tis still, I suppose, *one* and  
*the self-same TREE.* Now shou'd you, as a mere  
Caviller, and not as a fair Seepstick, tell me that if a  
Figure of Wax, or any other Matter, were cast in  
the exact Shape and Colours of this Tree, and tem-  
per'd, if possible, to the same kind of Substance, it  
might therefore possibly be a *real Tree* of the same  
Kind or Species; I wou'd have done with you, and  
and desir'd I shou'd satisfy you what I thought it  
was which made this *Oneness* or *Sameness* in the Tree  
or any other Plant; or by what it differ'd from the  
waxen Figure, or from any such Figure accidental-  
made, either in the Clouds, or on the Sand by  
Sea-shore; I shou'd tell you, that neither the *W*  
*nor Sand, nor Cloud* thus piec'd together by  
Hand or Fancy, had any real relation within them-  
selves, or had any Nature by which they corre-  
sponded any more in that near Situation of Parts,  
if scatter'd ever so far asunder. But this I  
affirm, " That wherever there was such a  
" *thizing of Parts,* as we saw here, in a  
" TREE; Wherever there was such a pla-  
" currence in one common End, and to the  
" we cou'd not be mistaken in saying th-  
" at peculiar *Nature* belonging to this *Form*,  
" mon to it with others of the same  
" wishes, and is still *One and the same Tree*;  
" Vegetation and Change of Substance, ev-  
" erie in it remains *the same*.  
At this rate indeed, said I, you  
way to make very adorable Places  
Habitations. For besides the living

ice, the Woods too, which, by your  
animat'd, have their *Hamadryads*, no  
the Springs and Rivulets their *Nymphs*  
longing to 'em: And these too, by w  
prehend, of immaterial and immortal:

WE injure 'em then, reply'd THEO  
“they belong to these Trees;” and not  
“Trees to them.” But as for their In  
them look to it themselves. I only kn  
theirs and all other *Nature*s must for t  
depend alone on that *Nature* on whic  
depends: And that every *Genius* else i  
ordinate to that One ~~and Country~~ w  
willingly persuade

*World*, according to .

LEAVING, the  
he, to personate the  
us examine this thi  
and me; and confid  
*You*, and I'm *My-self*.  
sympathy of Parts in thel  
in those of *Marble* form'd by a PHIDIAS or PRAXI  
TELIS; Sense, I believe will teach us. And yet  
that our own *Marble*, or *Stuff* (whate'er it be, of  
which we are compos'd) wears out in seven, or, at  
the longest, in twice seven Years, the meanest Anato  
mist can tell us. Now where, I beseech you, will  
that same *One* be found at last, supposing it to lie  
in the *Stuff* it-self, or any part of it? For when that  
is wholly spent, and not one Particle of it left, we  
are *Ourselves* still as much as before.

WHAT you Philosophers are, reply'd I, may  
be hard perhaps to determine: But for the rest of  
Mankind, I dare affirm, that few are so long them  
selves as half seven Years. 'Tis good fortune if a  
Man be *one and the same* only for a day or two. A  
Year makes more Revolutions than can be number'd.

TRUE, said he: But tho this may happen to a  
Man, and chiefly to one whose contrary Vices for  
him

I can ap  
stances.

ES, to say  
her “these  
rtality, let  
that both  
Duration  
he World  
t be sub  
n I wou'd  
ng to this  
speaking.

, continu'd

hey can, let  
y between you <sup>person</sup>  
<sub>Self.</sub>

PHILOCLES, are

For ~~was~~ here is a Sympa

Figures of ours, other than

Part 3. him at odds so often with himself ; yet when he comes to suffer, or be punish'd for those Vices, he finds himself, if I mistake not, still *one and the same*. And you (PHILOCLES !) who, tho' you disown Philosophy, are yet so true a Proselyte to Pyrrhonism ; shou'd you at last, feeling the Power of Identity, the GENIUS I preach, be wrought upon to own the divine Hypothesis, and from this new Turn of Thought admit a total Change in all your Principles and Opinions ; yet wou'd you be still the self-same PHILOCLES : tho' better yet, if you will take my Judgment, than the present-one, as much as I love and value him. You see therefore, there is a strange Simplicity in this You and Me, that in reality they shou'd be still *one and the same*, when neither one Atom of Body, one Passion, nor one Thought remains the same. And for that poor Endeavour of making out this *Sameness* or Identity of Being, from some self-same Matter, or Particle of Matter, suppos'd to remain with us when all besides is chang'd ; this is by so much the more contemptible, as that Matter it-self is not really capable of such Simplicity. For I dare answer, you will allow this You and Me to be each of us simply and individually *One*, better than you can allow the same to any thing of mere Matter ; unless quitting your Inclination for Scepticism, you fall so in love with the Notion of an ATOM, as to find it full as intelligible and certain to you, as that You are YOURSELF.

*Form.* But whatever, continu'd THEOCLES, be suppos'd of uncompounded Matter (a Thing, at best, pretty difficult to conceive) yet being compounded, and put together in a certain number of such Parts as unite and conspire in these Frames of ours, and others like them ; if it can present us with so many innumerable Instances of particular Forms, who share this simple Principle, by which they are really *One*, live, act, and have a Nature or Genius peculiar to themselves, and provident for their own Welfare.

how shall we at the same time overlook this in the Sect. i.  
*Whole*, and deny the Great and General-ONE of the ~~whole~~  
 World? How can we be so unnatural as to dis-*The Su-*  
 own divine Nature, our common Parent, and refuse <sup>praise</sup> to recognize <sup>One.</sup> the universal and sovereign GENIUS?

SOVEREIGNS, said I, require no Notice to be taken of 'em, when they pass *incognito*, nor no Homage where they appear not in due Form. We may even have reason to presume they shou'd be displeas'd with us for being too officious, in endeavouring to discover them, when they keep themselves either wholly invisible, or in very dark disguise. As for the Notice we take of these *invisible Powers* in the common way of our Religion, we have our *visible Sovereigns* to answer for us. Our lawful Superiors teach us what we are to *own*, and to *perform*, in Worship. And we are dutiful in complying with them, and following their Example. But in a philosophical way, I find no warrant for our being such earnest Recognizers of a controverted Title. However it be, you must allow one at least to understand the Controversy, and know the Nature of these *Powers* describ'd. May one not inquire, "What Substances they are of? <sup>sub-</sup>  
 " whether material or immaterial?" <sup>stance,  
 Mater-  
 ial,  
 immati-</sup>

MAY one not, on the other hand, reply'd THE-  
 OCLES, inquire as well, "What Substance, or which  
 " of these two Substances you count your real and <sup>real.</sup>  
 " proper SELF." Or wou'd you rather be *no*  
 Substance, but chuse to call your-self a Mode or Acci-  
 dent?"

TRULY, said I, as accidental as my Life may be, or as that random Humour is, which governs it; I know nothing, after all, so *real* or *substantial* as MY-SELF. Therefore if there be that Thing you call a Substance, I take for granted I am one. But for any thing further relating to this Question, you know my Sceptick Principles: I determine neither way.

Part 3. Allow me then, reply'd he (good PHILOSOPHER!) the same Privilege of Scepticism in this respect; since it concerns not the Affair before us, Which way we determine, or Whether we come to any Determination at all in this point. For be the Difficulty ever so great; it stands the same, you may perceive, against *your own Being*, as against *that which I am pretending to convince you of*. You may raise what Objections you please on either hand; and your Dilemma may be of notable force against the manner of such a supreme Being's Existence. But after you have done all, you will bring the same Dilemma home to you, and be at a loss

*Meta-physics.* still about *YOUR-SELF*. When you have argu'd ever so long upon these Metaphysical Points of *Mode* and *Substance*, and have philosophically concluded

*A Mind.* from the Difficultys of each Hypothesis, "That  
 " there cannot be in Nature such a *Universal-One* as  
 " This;" you must conclude, from the same Reasons, "That there cannot be any such *particular One as Your-self*." But that there is actually such a one as *this latter*, your own Mind, 'tis hop'd, may satisfy you. And of this *Mind* 'tis enough to say, "That it is something which *acts* upon a Body,  
 " and has something *passive* under it, and subject  
 " to it: That it has not only *Body* or *mere Matter* for its Subject, but in some respect even *itself* too, and what proceeds from it: That it  
 " superintends and manages its own *Imaginations*,  
 " *Appearances*, *Fancies*; correcting, working, and  
 " modelling these, as it finds good; and adorning  
 " and accomplishing, the best it can, this composite Order of *Body* and *Understanding*." Such a MIND and governing Part, I know there is somewhere in the World. Let PYRRHO, by the help of such another, contradict me, if he pleases. We

*Particular Minds.* have our several Understandings and Thoughts, however we came by 'em. Each understand and thinks the best he can for his own particular V

## A R H A P S O D Y.

Himself ; I for another *Self*. And who, I beseech you, for the *Whole*? —— No-one? Nothing at all? —— The World, perhaps, you suppose to be mere *Body*: A Mass of modify'd Matter: Bodys of *Men* are part therefore of this *Body*: Imaginations, Sensations, Apprehensions, &c. are included in this *Body*, and inherent in it, produc'd out of it, and resum'd again into it; the *Body*, it seems, never dreams of it! The *WORLD* itself is never the wiser for all the *WISDOM* it breeds! It has no Apprehension at all what is doing; no Thought kept to *it-self*, for its own proper use, or purpose; not a single Imagination or Reflection, by which to discover or be conscious of the manifold Imaginations and Intentions which it sets afoot, and deals abroad with full open hand! The goodly Bulk so prolific, kindly yielding for every-one else, has nothing left for its own share; having unhappily lavish'd away! —— By what Chance I wou'd fain understand. “How? or by what necessity?” —— Who gives the Law? —— Who orders and distributes? ”

NATURE, say you.

A

What is Nature? Is it Sense? Is it a Person? Is it Reason or Understanding? No. Who understands for her, or is interested or concerned in her behalf? No-one; not a Soul *Every one for himself*.

Come on then. Let us hear further, Is it Nature still a *SELF*? Or, tell me, I beseech you, How are You *one*? By what *Token*? or *ture* of *What*? “By a Principle which joins certain Parts, and which thinks and acts consonantly for the Use and Purpose of the Parts.” Say, therefore, What is your whole a Part of? Or is it, indeed, no *Part*, but *Whole*, by *it-self*, absolute, independent, and related to any thing besides? If it be indeed *part*, and really *related*; to what else, I beseech you.

## The M O N

3. you, than to the Whole of NATURE? Is there  
such a uniting Principle in NATURE? If so, how  
are you then a Self, and Nature not so? How have  
you something to understand and act for you,  
NATURE, who gave this Understanding, nothing  
all to understand for her, advise her, or help her  
(poor Being!) on any occasion, whatever Necessity  
she may be in? Has the WORLD, whatever such fortune &  
the main? Are there so many particular understand-  
ing active Principles every-where? And is there  
Nothing, at last, which thinks, acts, or under-  
stands for All? Nothing which administers or looks  
after All?

Contrary to this. No (says one of a modern Hypothesis) for the  
WORLD was from Eternity, as you see it; and is  
no more than barely what you see: " Matter  
" dify'd; a Lump in motion, with here and there  
" Thought, or scatter'd Portion of dissoluble Incell  
" gence." — No (says one of an antienter Hypo-  
thesis) For the World was once without any I-

Two parts. telligence or Thought at all; " Mere Matter, Cb.  
" and a Play of Atoms; till Thought, by chan-  
" came into play, and made up a Harmony wh-  
" was never design'd, or thought of." — Ad-  
Faith of atheism. share (thank Providence) I have a MIND in  
possession, which serves, such as it is, to keep  
Body and its Affections, my Passions, Imagi-  
nations, Fancies, and the rest, in tolerable  
mony and Order. But the Order of the Universe  
I am persuaded still, is much the better  
two. Let ERICRUS, if he please, think  
better; and believing no Genius or Wisdom ab-  
own, inform us by what Chance 'twas deal-  
and how Atoms came to be so wise.

In fine, continu'd THOCLES (raising his  
and Action) being thus, even by Scepticism  
convinc'd the more still, of my own Being  
Faith of this Self of mine, " That 'tis a real Self  
Twixt 'out, and copy'd from another principle."

"*general SELF* (the *Great-one* of the World)" I en-Sect.r.  
 deavour to be really *one* with it, and conformable *to* it, as far as I am able. I consider, That as there is *one* general Mass, *one* Body of the Whole; so to this Body there is *an Order*, to this *Order* a *MIND*: That to this *general MIND* each *particular-one* must have relation; as being of like Substance (as much as we can understand of *Substance*) alike active upon Body, original to Motion and Order; alike simple, uncompounded, individual; of like Energy, Effect, and Operation; and more like still, if it co-operates with it to *general Good*, and strives *to will* according to the best of *Wills*. So that it cannot surely but seem natural, "That the *particular MIND* shou'd seek its Happiness in conformity with the *general-one*, and endeavour to resemble it in its highest Simplicity and Excellence."

THEREFORE, Now, said I, good Thracles, be once against the *Enthusiasm*; and let me hear a-new that divine Song with which I was lately charm'd. I am already got over my *Qualm*, and begin better than ever to fancy such a *Nature* as you speak of; insomuch that I find my-self mightily in its Interest, and concern'd that all shou'd go happily and well with it. Tho at the rate it often runs, I can scarce help being in some pain on its account.

FEAR not, my Friend, reply'd he. For know *Energy of Nature* that every *particular NATURE* certainly and constantly produces what is good to it-self; unless something *foreign* disturbs or hinders it, either by overpowering and corrupting it *within*, or by Violence *from without*. Thus *Nature* in the Patient struggles to the last, and strives to throw off the Distemper. Thus even in these Plants we see round us, every *particular NATURE* thrives, and attains its Perfection, if nothing from *without* obstructs it, nor any thing *foreign* has already impair'd or wounded

Part 3. it: And even in this case, it does its utmost to redeem it-self. What are all Weaknesses, Diseases, Sicknesse, imperfect Births, and the like. Contradictions and Pervertys of Nature, of this sort? And how ignorant must all natural Causes and Operations, to think of these Disorders happen by a Miscarriage particular Nature, and not by the Foreign Nature which over-powers it? If every particular Nature be thus constantly ringly true to it-self, and certain to pro what is good for it-self, and conduced to right State; shall not the general one, *The State of the Whole*, do full as much? Shall I miscarry or fail? Or is there any thing for shou'd at any time do violence upon it, out of its natural way? If not, then <sup>General Good.</sup> duces is to its own advantage and good of All in general: And what is for the all in general, is *Just* and *Good*. I, I confess,

*Then* you ought to rest satisfy'd, and not only so, but be pleas'd and rejoic <sup>Resignation.</sup> happens, knowing whence it comes, an Perfection it contributes.

BLESS me! said I, THEOCLES, in Superstition are you like to lead me! it heretofore the Mark of a superstitious search for Providence in the common A Life, and ascribe to the Divine Power the Disasters and Calamitys which Nature has on Mankind. But now, I find, I must in general to one Account; and viewing a kind of Magical Glasses, I am to see the Ills transform'd to Good, and admire equally comes from one and the same perfect Hand no matter; I can surmount all. GO ON, and let me advise you in my

that since you have rekindled me, you do not by de- Sect'r, laying give me time to cool again.

I wo n'd have you know, reply'd he, I scorn to take the advantage of a warm Fit, and be beholden to Temper or Imagination for gaining me your Assent. Therefore e'er I go yet a step farther, I am resolv'd to enter again into cool Reason with you, and ask, If you admit for Proof what I advanc'd yesterday upon that head, " Of a *Universal UNION, Coherence, or Sympathizing of Things?*"

By Force of Probability, said I, you overcame *Principle* me. Being convinc'd of a Consent and Correspondence in all we saw of Things, I consider'd it as unreasonable not to allow the same throughout!

UNREASONABLE indeed! reply'd he. For in the infinite *Residue*, were there no Principle of Union; it wou'd seem next to impossible, that things within our Sphere shou'd be consistent, and keep their Order. " For what was infinite, wou'd be ~~very~~<sup>univer-</sup> predominant."

It seems so.

TELL me then, said he, after this *Union* own'd, how you can refuse to allow the name of Demonstration to the remaining Arguments, which establish the Government of a perfect Mind.

You a Solymians, said I, of the ill *Appearances* phenomena are not perfect enough to pass for Demonstration, <sup>mensa</sup> of And whatever seems vicious or imperfect in the <sup>III.</sup> Creation, puts a stop to further Conclusions, till the thing be solv'd.

Do you not then, said he, agree with me, when I aver'd that the *Appearances* must of necessity stand as they are, and things seem altogether as imperfect, even on the Concession of a perfect Supreme Mind existent?

I did so.

And is not the same Reason good will, when " That is an Infinity of Things, mutually relative, a Mind which sees us infinitely, can see nothing fully <sup>and</sup>

Part 3. "and must therefore frequently see that as imperfect,  
 — " which in it-self is really perfect."

The Reason is still good.

ARE the Appearances, then, any Objection to our Hypothesis?

None, whilst they remain Appearances only.

CAN you then prove them to be any more? For if you cannot, you prove nothing. And that it lies on you to prove, you plainly see: since the Appearances do not only agree with the Hypothesis, but are a necessary Consequence from it. To bid me prove, therefore, in this case, is, in a manner, the same as to bid me be infinite. For nothing beside what is infinite can see infinite Connexions.

THE Presumption, I must confess, said I, by this reckoning, is wholly on your side. Yet still this is only Presumption.

*Demonstration.* TAKE Demonstration then, said he, if you can endure I shou'd reason thus abstractedly and drily. The Appearances of ILL, you say, are not necessarily that ILL they represent to us.

I own it.

THEREFORE what they represent may possibly be Good.

It may.

AND therefore there may possibly be no real ILL in things: but all may be perfectly concurrent to one Interest; the Interest of that Universal ONE.

It may be so.

WHY, then, if it may be so (be not surpriz'd) "It follows that it must be so;" on the account of that great Unit, and simple Self-Principle which you have granted in the WHOLE. For whatever is possible in the Whole, the Nature or Mind of the Whole will put in execution for the Whole's Good: And if it be possible to exclude ILL, it will exclude it. Therefore since notwithstanding the Appearances, 'tis possible that ILL may actually be excluded; count upon it, "That actually it is excluded." For nothing merely passive can oppose this universally, affin-

Principle. If any thing active oppose it, 'tis *an*-Sect, i.  
other Principle.

Allow it.

"Tis impossible. For were there in Nature *Two* or more Principles, either they must agree, or not. If they agree not, all must be Confusion, till one be predominant. If they agree, there must be some natural Reason for their Agreement; and this natural Reason cannot be from *Chance*, but from some particular *Design*, *Contrivance*, or *Thought*: which brings us up again to ONE Principle, and makes the other *two* to be subordinate. And thus when we have compar'd each of the *Three* Opinions, *vix.*

"That there is no designing active Principle; That *Conclus.*  
"there is more than one;" or, "That finally *there is*.  
"is but ONE;" we shall perceive, that the only consistent Opinion is *the last*. And since *one* or *other* of these Opinions must of necessity be true; what can we determine, other than that the *last* is, and must be so, demonstrably? If it be Demonstration,  
"That in *Three* Opinions, *One* of which must ne-  
cessarily be true, *Two* being plainly absurd, the  
"Third must be the Truth."

ENOUGH, said I, THEOCLES. My Doubts are vanish'd. MALICE and CHANCE (vain Phantoms!) have yielded to that *all-prevalent WISDOM* which you have establish'd. You are Conqueror in the cool way of *Reason*, and may with Honour now grow warm again, in your *partick Vein*. Return therefore, I intreat you, once more, to that *Perfection of Being*; and address your-self to it as before, on our Approaches to these Silvan Scens, where first it seem'd to inspire you. I shall now no longer be in danger of imagining either *Magick* or *Superstition* in the case; since you invoke no other Power than that single ONE, which seems so natural.

THUS I continue then, said THEOCLES, ad-  
dressing my-self, as you woud have me, to that  
Guardian-DEITY and Inspire, whom we are to  
*intellige*.

be MORA L I S

it-self remains still; REASON  
ought maintains its Elderhip,  
are we in a manner conscious of,  
and eternally existent THOUGHT, w  
e our own. And thus the AII  
of the Existence of Beings above  
of THEE (the great Exemplar of  
ies from Thee, the ALL-TRUE,  
so hast thus communicated thy-self  
ately to us, so as in some man  
within our Souls; Thou who art C  
lissive, vital in all, inspiriting the  
“ ALL Nature's Wonders serve  
perfect this Idea of their Author  
suffers us to see, and even conve  
“ a manner suitable to our Frailt  
“ is it to contemplate him, in  
“ Works apparent to us, The  
“ World ! ”

HERE I must own, “ two  
to me, to find that, as our I  
were likely to get clear of a  
Philosophy. I was in hopes of a  
ceeded, might stick cloier t  
now come upon the Borde  
here I woud willingly h  
I thought it safe at present  
terruption.

“ BESIDES the ne  
tinu'd he, in his rapture  
“ tudes of fix'd STAR  
“ an hour ago, in t  
“ had hardly yielded  
“ others are discover  
“ how many remain  
“ Discovery! Croud  
“ from each other i  
“ the Distance bet  
“ are naturally ta

" cerning Sense, join'd with the greatest Art, or Seſt. r.  
" the acuteſt Reaſon, can penetrate or unſold.

" B U T 'tis in vain for us to ſearch the bulky  
" Maſs of MATTER; ſeeking to know its Na-  
" ture; how great the Whole it-ſelf, or even how  
" small its Parts.

" I F knowing only ſome of the Rules of Mo-  
" TION, we ſeek to trace it further, 'tis in vain  
" we follow it into the Bodys it has reach'd. Our  
" tardy Apprehenſions fail us, and can reach no-  
" thing beyond the Body it-ſelf, thro which it is  
" diſſus'd. Wonderful Being, (if we may call it ſo)  
" which Bodys never receive, except from others  
" which loſe it; nor ever loſe, unleſs by imparting  
" it to others. Even without Change of Place it  
" has its Force: And Bodys big with Motion la-  
" bor to move, yet stir not; whilſt they express  
" an Energy beyond our Compreheſion.

" I N vain too we purſue that Phantom TIME,  
" too ſmall, and yet too mighty for our Grap:   
" when shrinking to a narrow point, it ſcapes our  
" Hold, or mocks our scanty Thought by ſwelling  
" to Eternity an Object unproportion'd to our Ca-  
" pacity, as is thy Being, O thou Antient Cause!  
" older than Time, yet young with freih Eternity.

" I N vain we try to fathom the Abyss of SPACE,  
" the Seat of thy extensive Being; of which no  
" Place is empty, no Void which is not full.

" I N vain we labour to understand that Prin-  
" ciple of SENSE and THOUGHT, which ſeeming  
" in us to depend ſo much on Motion, yet differs  
" ſo much from it, and from Matter it-ſelf, as not  
" touffer us to conceive how Thought can more  
" reſult from this, than this arife from Thought.  
" But Thought we own pre-eminent, and conſefs  
" the realeſt of Beings; the only Existence of  
" which we are made ſure of, by being conſcious.  
" All else may be only Dream and Shadow. All  
" which even Sense ſuggests may be deceptiſal. The  
" SENSE

Part 3. "SENSE it-self remains still; REASON subsists;  
 "and THOUGHT maintains its *Eldership* of Being.  
*Meditation.* "Thus are we in a manner conscious of that *original* and *eternally existent* THOUGHT, whence we  
 "derive our own. And thus the Assurance we  
 "have of the Existence of Beings above our Sense,  
 "and of THEE (the great Exemplar of thy Works)  
 "comes from Thee, the ALL-TRUE, and Perfect,  
 "who hast thus communicated thy-self more imme-  
 "diately to us, so as in some manner *to inhabit*  
 "within our Souls; Thou who art *Original Soul,*  
 "diffusive, vital in all, inspiriting the *Whole!*  
 "ALL Nature's Wonders serve to excite and  
 "perfect this Idea of their *Author.* 'Tis here he  
 "suffers us to see, and even converse with him, in  
 "a manner suitable to our Frailty. How glorious  
 "is it to contemplate him, in this noblest of his  
 "Works apparent to us, The *System of the bigger*  
 "World!'"

HERE I must own, 'twas no small Comfort to me, to find that, as our Meditation turn'd, we were likely to get clear of an entangling abstruse Philosophy. I was in hopes THEOCLES, as he proceeded, might stick closer to *Nature*, since he was now come upon the Borders of our World. And here I wou'd willingly have welcom'd him, had I thought it safe at present to venture the least Interruption.

"BESIDES the neighbouring Planets (continu'd he, in his rapturous Strain) "what Multitudes of fix'd STARS did we see sparkle, not an hour ago, in the clear Night, which yet had hardly yielded to the Day? How many others are discover'd by the help of Art? Yet how many remain still, beyond the reach of our Discovery! Crowded as they seem, their Distance from each other is as unmeasurable by Art, as is the Distance between them and us. Whence are naturally taught the Immensity of that By-

" who thro these immense Spaces has dispos'd such Sects,  
" an Infinite of Bodys, belonging each (as we may  
" well presume) to Systems as compleat as our own  
" World : Since even the smaleſt Spark of this  
" bright Galaxy may vie with this our SUN ; which  
" ſhining now full out, gives us new Life, exalts  
" our Spirits, and makes us feel DIVINITY more  
" preſent.

" PRODIGIOUS ORB ! Bright Source of vital  
" Heat, and Spring of Day ! — Soft Flame, yet  
" how intense, how active ! How diſſufive, and how  
" vailt a Substance ; yet how collected thus within  
" itſelf, and in a glowing Maſſ conſin'd to the Center  
" of this planetary World ! — Mighty Being !  
" Brightest Image, and Representative of the AL-  
" mighty ! Supreme of the corporeal World ! Un-  
" periſhing in Grace, and of undecaying Youth !  
" Fair, beautiful, and hardly mortal Creature ! By  
" what ſecret ways doſt thou receive the Supplys  
" which maintain Thee ſtill in ſuch unweary'd  
" Vigour, and un-exhausted Glory ; notwithstanding  
" those eternally emitted Streamſ, and that con-  
" tinual Expence of vital Treasures, which inlighten  
" and invigorate the surrounding Worlds ? —

" AROUND him all the PLANETS, with this  
" our Earth, ſingle, or with Attendants, continually  
" move ; ſeeking to receive the Bleſſing of his Light,  
" and lively Warmth ! Towards him they ſeem to  
" tend with prone deſcent, as to their Center ; but  
" happily controul'd ſtill by another Impulſe,  
" they keep their heavenly Order ; and in just  
" Numbers, and exacteſt Meaſure, go the eternal  
" Rounds.

" BUT, O thou who art the Author and Modi-  
" fier of these various Motions ! O ſouverain and  
" ſole Mover, by whose high Art the rolling Spheres  
" are govern'd, and these ſtupendous Bodys of our  
" World hold their unrelenting Course ! O wise  
" Economist, and powerful Chief, whom all the  
" Elements

Part 3. " Elements and Powers of Nature serve ! H  
—  
Medita- " thou animated these moving Worlds ?  
tion. " Spirit or Soul infus'd ? What Bias fix'd  
" how encompass'd them in liquid *Aëter*,  
" them as with the Breath of living Wind,  
" active and unwearied Ministers in this i  
" and mighty Work ?  
" Thus powerfully are the *Systems* held  
" and kept from fatal interfering. Thus  
" ponderous *GLOBE* directed in its annual C  
" daily revolving on its own Center : whilst  
" sequious *Moon* with double Labour, n  
" surrounding this our bigger Orb, attends t  
" ion of her Sister-Planet, and pays in o  
" her circular Homage to the *Sun*.  
" Yet is this *Mansion-GLOBE*, this *Ma*  
" tainer, of a much narrower compass eve  
" other its Fellow-Wanderers of our System.  
" narrow then must it appear, compar'd w  
" capacious *System* of its own *Sun* ? And ho  
" row, or as nothing, in respect of those *in*  
" *bie Systems* of other apparent *Suns* ? Yet h  
" incite a Body it seems, compar'd with  
" human Form, a borrow'd Remnant of its  
" and oft-converted Surface ? tho' animated  
" sublime Celestial Spirit, by which we have  
" Tendency to *Thee* our Heaven  
" Center of Souls ; to whom these Spirits  
" by Nature tend, as earthly Bodys to their  
" Center. — O did they tend as unerring  
" constantly ! — But *Thee* alone compostest  
" orders of the corporeal World, and from t  
" less and fighting *Elements* raised that peacef  
" cord, and conspiring Beauty of the ever-f  
" ing Creation. Even so canst thou conve  
" jarring Motions of intelligent Beings, and  
" time and manner cause them to find thei  
" making them contribute to the Good a  
" scction of the *UNIVERSE*, thy all-good and  
" Work." —

"**H**ERE again he broke off, looking on me as if Sect. i.  
he expected I shou'd speak; which when he found ~~~~~~  
plainly I wou'd not, but continu'd still in a posture  
of musing Thought: Why **PHILOCLES**! (said he,  
with an Air of Wonder) What can this mean, that  
you shou'd suffer me thus to run on, without the  
least Interruption? Have you at once given over  
your scrupulous Philosophy, to let me range thus at  
pleasure thro' these aerial Spaces and imaginary Re-  
gions, where my capricious Fancy or easy Faith has  
led me? I wou'd have you to consider better, and  
know, my **PHILOCLES**, that I had never trusted my-  
self with you in this *Vein of Enthusiasm*, had I not  
rely'd on you to govern it a little better.

I F I N D then, said I (rouzing my-self from my  
musing Posture) you expect I shou'd serve you in  
the same capacity as that Musician, whom an an-  
tient Orator made use of at his Elbow, to strike  
such moving Notes as rais'd him when he was per-  
ceiv'd to sink; and calm'd him again, when his  
impetuous Spirit was transported in too high a  
Strain.

You imagine right, reply'd **THEOCLES**; and  
therefore I am resolv'd not to go on, till you have  
promis'd to pull me by the Sleeve when I grow  
extravagant. Be it so, said I; You have my  
Promise. But how if instead of rising in  
my Transports, I shou'd grow flat and tiresom:  
What Lyre or Instrument wou'd you employ to  
raise me?

**T**H E Danger, I told him, cou'd hardly be sup-

Part 3. to hear one of those amorous *Shepherds* complaining  
 to his *Flock*, and making the Woods and Rocks re-  
 sound the Name of *Her* whom he ador'd. —— Begin  
 therefore (continu'd I, still pressing him) Begin  
 a-new, and lead me boldly thro your *Elements*.  
 Wherever there is danger, be it on either hand, I  
 promise to give you warning, when I perceive it.

LET us begin then, said he, with this our *Element* of EARTH, which yonder we see cultivated with such Care by the early Swains now working in the Plain below. —— “Unhappy restless Men, who first disdain'd these peaceful Labours, gentle rural Tasks, perform'd with such Delight! What Pride or what Ambition bred this Scorn? Hence all those fatal Evils of your Race, Enormous Luxury, despising homely Fare, ranges thro Seas and Lands, rifies the Globe; and Men ingenious to their Misery, work out for themselves the means of heavier Labour, anxious Cares, and Sorrow: Not satisfy'd to turn and manure for their Use the wholsom and beneficial Mould of this their EARTH, they dig yet deeper, and seeking out imaginary Wealth, they search its very Entrails.

“HERE, led by Curiosity, we find Minerals of different Natures, which by their Simplicity discover no less of the Divine Art, than the most compounded of Nature's Works. Some are found capable of surprizing Changes; others as durable, and hard to be destroy'd or chang'd by Fire, or utmost Art. So various are the Subjects of our Contemplation, that even the Study of these inglorious Parts of Nature, in the nether World, is able it-self alone to yield large Matter and Employment for the busiest Spirits of Men, who in the Labour of these Experiments can willingly consume their Lives. — But the noisom poisonous Steams which the Earth breathes from these dark Caverns, where

" she conceals her Treasures, suffer not prying Mor-Sect.  
" tals to live long in this search.

" How comfortable is it to those who come  
" out hence alive, to breathe a purer Air ! to see  
" the rejoicing Light of *Day* ! and tread the fertile  
" Ground ! How gladly they contemplate the Sur-  
" face of the Earth, their Habitation, heated and  
" enliven'd by the *Sun*, and temper'd by the fresh  
" Air of fanning *Breezes* ! These exercise the resty  
" Plants, and scour the unactive Globe. And  
" when the *Sun* draws hence thick clouded Steams  
" and Vapours, 'tis only to digest and exalt the  
" unwholesom Particles, and commit 'em to the  
" sprightly Air ; which soon imparting its quick  
" and vital Spirit, renders 'em again with im-  
" provement to the Earth, in gentle Breathings,  
" or in rich Dews, and fruitful Showers. The  
" same Air, moving about the mighty Mafs, en-  
" ters its Pores, impregnating the Whole : And  
" both the *Sun* and *Air* conspiring, so animate  
" this *Mother-Earth*, that tho ever breeding, her  
" Vigour is as great, her Beauty as fresh, and her  
" Looks as charming, as if she newly came out of  
" the forming Hands of her Creator.

" How beautiful is the WATER among the  
" inferior Earthly Works ! Heavy, liquid, and  
" transparent : without the springing Vigour and  
" expansive Force of *Air* ; but not without Acti-  
" vity. Stubborn and un-yielding, when com-  
" preſ'd ; but placidly avoiding Force, and bend-  
" ing every way with ready Fluency ! Insinuating,  
" it dissolves the lumpish Earth, frees the intangled  
" Bodys, procures their Intercourse, and summons  
" to the Field the keen terrestrial Particles ; whose  
" happy Strifes soon ending in strict Union, pro-  
" duce the various Forms which we behold. How  
" vast are the Abysses of the *Sea*, where this soft  
" Element is stor'd ; and whence the Sun and  
" Winds extracting, raise it into Clouds ! These

*The MORALISTS,*

converted into Rain, water the thirsty Grou  
upply a-fresh the Springs and Rivers ;  
ort of the neighbouring Plains, and fw  
lment of all Animals.

T whither shall we trace the Sources  
IGHT ? or in what Ocean comprehend  
ous Matter so wide diffus'd thro the i  
Spaces which it fills ? What Seats fl  
sign to that fierce Element of FIRE,  
act to be confin'd within the Compass of  
Sun even the Bowels of  
heat it-self submits to it,  
serves instrument. Even this  
Sun, with a neroous Suns, the glitter  
Host of Heav, to receive from he  
the vast Supply. h keep them ever in t  
splendid State. *One invisible ethereal Substa*  
penetrating both liquid and solid Bodys, is  
fus'd throughout the Universe. It cherishes  
cold dull massy *Globe*, and warms it to its Cer  
It forms the Minerals ; gives Life and Growt  
Vegetables ; kindles a soft, invisible, and  
*Flame* in the Breasts of living Creatures ; fra  
animates, and nurses all the various Fon  
sparing, as well as employing for their Use, t  
sulphurous and combustible Matters of which  
are compos'd. Benign and gentle amidst a  
still maintains this happy Peace and Concord,  
cording to its stated and peculiar Laws.  
these once broken, the acquitted *Being* take  
Course unl'd. It runs impetuous thro  
fatal Breach, and breaking into visible and t  
*Flames*, passes triumphant o'er the yielding Fo  
converting all into it-self, and dissolving  
those Systems, which it-self before had for  
'Tis thus' —

HERE THEOCLES stopt on a sudden, whe  
he imagin'd) I was putting my Hand out, &  
hold on his Sleeve.

O PHILOCLES, said he, 'tis well remember'd. Sect. 7.  
I was growing too warm, I find; as well I might indeed, in this *hot* Element. And here perhaps I might have talk'd yet more mysteriously, had you been one who cou'd think otherwise than in the common way of the soft Flames of *Love*. You might, perhaps, have heard Wonders in this kind :  
" How all things had their Being *henc*, and How  
" their noblest End was to be *here* wrapt up, con-  
" sum'd and lost." — But in these high Flights, I might possibly have gone near to burn my Wings.

INDEED, said I, you might well expect the Fate of ICARUS, for your high-soaring. But this, indeed, was not what I fear'd. For you were got above Danger; and, with that devouring Element on your side, had master'd not only the Sun himself, but every thing which stood in your way. I was afraid it might, in the issue, run to what they tell us of a *universal Conflagration*; in which I knew not how it might go, possibly, with our GENIUS.

I AM glad, said he, PHILOCLES! to find this grown such a Concern with you. But you may rest secure here, if the Case you meant were that *periodical Conflagration* talk'd of by some Philosophers. For there the GENIUS wou'd of Necessity be *all in all*: And in those Intervals of Creation, when no Form, nor Species existed any-where out of the Divine Mind, all then was DEITY! All was that ONE, collected thus within it-self, and subsisting (as they imagin'd) rather in a more simple and perfect manner, than when multiply'd in more ways; and becoming productive, it unfold'd it-self in the various Map of Nature, and this fair visible World.

BUT for my part, said I (interrupting him) who can much better see DIVINITY unfold'd, than in that *involv'd* and *solitary* Stage before Creation; I cou'd wish you wou'd go a little farther with me in the Map of Nature; especially a descending from your lofty Flights, you wou'd be content.

Part 3. to pitch upon this humble Spot of Earth where I cou'd better accompany you, wh  
you led me.

BUT you, reply'd he, who wou'd come to this heavy Earth, must yet allow me the Wings of Fancy. How else shall I fly with thro' different Climates, from Pole to Pole, and the Frigid to the Torrid Zone?

O, SAID I, for this purpose I will all the PEGASUS of the Poets, or that Griffin which an Italian Poet of the 1 gave to one of his Heroes: Yet on this condition, that you take no such extravagant flight as his was, to the Moon; but keep close to the Orb of Earth.

SINCE you will have it so, reply'd The Sun let us try first on the darkest and most inhospitable Parts of our Map, and see how you can improve your Prospect. "How oblique and faintly I see the Sun on yonder Climates, far remov'd from the Equator! How tedious are the Winters there! How dark the Horrors of the Night, and how unendurable even the Light of Day! The freezing Winds employ their fiercest Breath, yet are not able to blow with blowing. The Sea, which elsewhere scarce confin'd within its Limits, lies here in Walls of Chrystral. The Snow covers the Earth and almost fills the lowest Valleys. How deep it lies, incumbent o'er the Plain, oppressing the sluggish Rivers, the Shrubs, and the Dens of Beasts, and Mansions of Men and feeble Men! — See! where they have fin'd, hardly secure against the raging Winds, the Attacks of the wild Beasts, now Miserable in the wasted Field, and forc'd by Hunger to the naked Woods. — Yet not dispair (such is the Force of human Breasts) provided for, by Art and Prudence, the dispensing Gifts of Heaven, Men and

" may wait for a Release. For at length the Sun Sect. 1.  
" approaching, melts the Snow, sets longing Men at liberty, and affords them Means and Time to make provision against the next Return of Cold.  
" It breaks the icy Fetters of the Main; where *Meditation*. vast Sea-Monsters pierce thro floating Islands,<sup>item</sup> with Arms which can withstand the Chrystal Rock: whilst others, who of themselves seem great as Islands, are by their Bulk alone arm'd against all but Man; whose Superiority over Creatures of such stupendous Size and Force, shou'd make him mindful of his Privilege of Reason, and force him humbly to adore the great Composer of these wondrous Frames, and Author of his own superior Wisdom.

" BUT leaving these dull Climates, so little favour'd by the Sun, for those happier Regions, on which he looks more kindly, making perpetual Summer; How great an Alteration do we find? His purer *Light* confounds weak-fighted Mortals, pierc'd by his scorching *Beams*. Scarce can they tread the glowing Ground. The Air they breathe cannot enough abate the *Fire* which burns within their panting Breasts. Their Bodys melt. O'ercome and fainting, they seek the Shade, and wait the cool Refreshments of the Night. Yet oft the bounteous CREATOR bestows other Refreshments. He casts a veil of *Clouds* before 'em, and raises gentle *Gales*; favour'd by which, the Men and Beasts pursue their Labours; and Plants refresh'd by Dews and Showers, can gladly bear the warmest Sun-beams.

" AND here the varying Scene opens to new Wonders. We see a Country rich with *Gems*, but richer with the fragrant *Spices* it affords. How gravely move the largest of *Land-Creatures* on the Banks of this fair River! How ponderous are their Arms, and vast their Strength, with Courage, and a Sense superior to the other Beasts' <sup>in the</sup>

Part 3." Yet are they tam'd (we see) by Manki  
" brought even to fight their Battles, rather  
*Medita-* " and Confederates, than as Slaves. — Bu-  
*tion.* " turn our Eyes towards these smaller, an-  
" curious Objects ; the numerous and de-  
" " Insects on the Trees in these wide Plains.  
" shining, strong, and lasting are the subtle  
" spun from their artful Mouths ! Who, be-  
" All-wise, has taught 'em to compose the  
" soft Shells, in which recluse and bury'd,  
" alive, they undergo such a surprizing C-  
" when not destroy'd by Men, who clothe an-  
" themselves with the Labours and Lives  
" weak Creatures, and are proud of wear-  
" inglorious Spoils ? How sumptuously ap-  
" gay, and splendid, are all the various *Insect*,  
" feed on the other Plants of this warm P-  
" How beautiful *the Plants* themselves in a  
" various Growths, from the triumphant *Pah*  
" to the humble *Moss* !

" Now may we see that happy Country  
" precious Gums and *Balsams* flow from  
" and Nature yields her most delicious Fruits,  
" tame and tractable, how patient of Labo-  
" rs of Thirst, are those large Creatures ; who  
" up their lofty Heads, go led and loaden thi-  
" dry and barren Places ! Their Shape and  
" show them fram'd by Nature to submit to  
" and fitted for his Service : who from hence  
" to be more sensible of his Wants, and of  
" vine Bounty, thus supplying them.

" But see ! not far from us, that *fer*-  
" Lands, water'd and fed by a friendly ge-  
" Stream, which *plot* it *enters* the *Co* - *dri*

things, and, Parent-like, out of her many Breasts Sect.  
" sends the nutritious Draught in various Streams  
" to her rejoicing Offspring! — Innumerable  
" are the dubious Forms and unknown Species  
" which drink the slimy Current: whether they  
" are such as leaving the scorch'd Desarts, satiate  
" here their ardent Thirst, and promiscuously en-  
" g'dring, beget a monstrous Race; or whether  
" (as 'tis said) by the Sun's genial Heat, active on  
" the fermenting Ooze, new Forms are generated,  
" and issue from the River's fertile Bed. — See  
" there the noted Tyrant of the Flood, and Terror  
" of its Borders! when suddenly displaying his hor-  
" rid Form, the *amphibious* Ravager invades the  
" Land, quitting his watry Den, and from the  
" deep emerging, with hideous rush, sweeps o'er  
" the trembling Plain. The Natives from afar be-  
" hold with wonder the enormous Bulk, sprung  
" from so small an Egg. With Horror they relate  
" the Monster's Nature, cruel and deceitful: how  
" he with dire Hypocrisy, and false Tears, beguiles  
" the Simple-hearted; and inspiring Tenderness and  
" kind Compassion, kills with pious Fraud.—Sad  
" Emblem of that spiritual Plague, dire *Superstition!*  
" Native of this Soil; where first \* Religion grew  
" unsociable, and among different Worshippers bred  
" mutual Hatred, and Abhorrence of each others  
" Temples. The Infection spreads: and Nations  
" now profane one to another, war fiercer, and  
" in Religion's Cause forget Humanity: whilst sa-  
" vage *Zeal*, with meek and pious Semblance,  
" works dreadful Massacre; and for Heaven's sake  
" (horrid Pretence!) makes desolate the Earth.—  
" HERE let us leave these Monsters (glad if  
" we cou'd here confine 'em!) and detesting the  
" dire prolifick Soil, fly to the vast *Desarts* of these  
" Parts. All ghastly and hideous as they appear,

Part 3, " they want not their peculiar Be-  
ness pleases. We seem to liv-  
Medita- " ture. We view her in her ini-  
tion. " contemplate her with more D-  
ginal Wilds, than in the artific-  
" feign'd Wildernesses of the Pal-  
" of the place, the scaly Serpents,  
" and poisonous insects, how terri-  
" contrary to human Nature, are hi-  
" selves, and fit to raise our The-  
" sion of that *Divine Wisdom*, so i-  
" short Views. Unable to declare  
" vice of all things in this Univers-  
" sur'd of the Perfection of *all*, a-  
" of that *OEconomy*, to which a  
" servient, and in respect of whi-  
" cingly deform'd are amiable ;  
" regular ; Corruption wholsor-  
" (such as these we have seen) p-  
" beneficial.

" But behold ! thro a vast  
" fore us, the mighty ATLAS rea-  
" cover'd with Snow, above the  
" the Mountain's foot, the rocky C-  
" Hills, a proper Basis of the ponde-  
" where huge embody'd Rocks lie  
" other, and seem to prop the hi-  
" ven. — See ! with what trem-  
" Mankind tread the narrow Bi-  
" Precipices ! From whence with g-  
" look down, mistrusting even th-  
" bears 'em ; whilst they hear th-  
" of Torrents underneath, and se-  
" impending Rock ; with falling ?  
" with their Roots upwards, and  
" more Ruin after 'em. Here  
" seiz'd with the Newness of suc-  
" thoughtful, and willingly cov-  
" fant Changes of this Earth's

is our *Globe*; whose Youth and first Forma- *Medita-*  
they consider, whilst the apparent Spoil and *then*,  
separable Breaches of the wasted Mountain shew  
em the World it-self only as a noble Ruin, and  
ake them think of its approaching Period. —  
it here mid-way the *Mountain*, a spacious Bor-  
r of thick Wood harbours our weary'd Trav-  
ellers: who now are come among the ever-  
een and lofty Pines, the Firs, and noble Cedars,  
hose towring Heads seem endless in the Sky;—  
the rest of Trees appearing only as Shrubs beside  
em. And here a different Horror seizes our shel-  
l'd Travellers, when they see the Day diminish'd by  
the deep Shades of the vast Wood; which clo-  
ing thick above, spreads Darknes and eternal  
ight below. The faint and gloomy Light looks  
errid as the Shade it-self: and the profound  
illness of these Places imposes Silence upon  
em, struck with the hoarse Echoings of every  
und within the spacious Caverns of the Wood.  
re Space astonishes. Silence it-self seems preg-  
nt; whilst an unknown Force works on the  
ind, and dubious Objects move the wakeful  
nse. Mysterious *Voces* are either heard or  
icy'd: and various Forms of *Deity* seem to  
sent themselves, and appear more manifest in  
e sacred Silvan Scenes; such as of old gave  
e to Temples, and favour'd the Religion of  
antient World. Even we our-selves, who  
plain Characters may read DIVINITY from  
many bright Parts of Earth, chuse rather these  
scurer Places, to spell out that mysterious Be-  
, which to our weak Eyes appears at best  
der a Veil of Cloud." —

ERE he paus'd awhile, and began to cast  
his Eyes, which before seem'd fix'd. He  
look'd

METHINKS, said he, PHILOCLES  
ing to a familiar Voice) we had b  
these unsociable Places, whither our  
transported us, and return to our-selves  
in our more converstable Woods, and  
Climates. Here no fierce Heats nor C  
us, no Precipices nor Cataracts amaze us.  
we here be afraid of our own Voices ;  
hear the Notes of such a chearful Quire  
the Echoes rather agreeable, and invit  
talk.

I CONFESS, said I, those foreign  
there were any belonging to those  
Woods) were much too awful Beauty  
me. I found our familiar Home-Nym  
deal more to my humour. Yet for  
cannot help being concern'd for your b  
just when we were got half the World  
wanted only to take AMERICA in our  
Indeed as for EUROPE, I cou'd excuse  
ing any great Tour there, because of th

out of Curiosity, to ask him his Thought.

OTHING, said he ; nothing but *this very Sub-it-self*. — Go on. — I see you'll finish it for me.

Spirit of this sort of Prophecy has seiz'd you.

PHILOCLES, the cold indifferent PHILOSOPH, is become a Pursuer of the same mysterious UTILITY.

This true, said I, (THROCLIS !) I own it. *or Genius*, the Genius of the Place, and the *Art Genius* have at last prevail'd. I shall longer resist the Passion growing in me for ings of a natural kind ; where neither Art, nor Natural Conceit or Caprice of Man has spoil'd their *gen-Beautys*. Order, by breaking in upon that primitive . Even the rude Rocks, the mossy Caverns, irregular unwrought Grotto's, and broken Falls Waters, with all the horrid Graces of the Wil-*es* it-self, as representing NATURE more, will be more engaging, and appear with a Magnifice beyond the formal Mockery of princely Gardens. — But tell me, I intreat you, how comes it, t, excepting a few Philosophers of your sort, only People who are enamour'd in this way, *Passion* see the Woods, the Rivers, or Sea-shores, are <sup>of this</sup> poor vulgar LOVERS ?

AY not this, reply'd he, of LOVERS only. is it not the same with POETS, and all those Students in NATURE, and the Arts which after her ? In short, is not this the real Cafel who are Lovers either of the Muses or the *scies* ?

Part 3. However, said I, a  
 few this *romantick* way, are I  
 EN. as a People either plain  
 THU. over-run with *Melancholy*,  
 GLASM. We always endeavour to  
 literary Places. And I must  
 I have found my Fancy  
 check'd my-self; not know  
 me, when I was passionate  
 this kind.

*Sha-  
dows.*

*Firſt  
Beauty.*

No wonder, reply'd I  
 when we pursue the *Shad*  
 if we may trust to what  
 us; whatever in Nature is  
 only the faint Shadow of  
 every *real Love* dependin  
 only the *Contemplation of B*  
 in it-self, or as it appear  
 jects which strike the *Sen*  
 Mind rest here, or be sati  
 joyment which reaches the

FROM this time forw  
 no more have reason to  
 strike a fort of *Melancholy*  
 nam'd, or like these id  
 shall I avoid the moving  
 fly from the *enchanting Fa*  
*Face.*

If you are already, re  
 in this *new Love*, that  
 mire the *Representative-B*  
 of the *Original*; nor aim  
 of the *rational* kind; you

I am so; and pr  
 fwer for my-self. Howev  
 fy'd, if you explain'd you

\* See Letter of Enthusiasm,  
 p. 50. And VOL. III. p. 2

~~You will not let the Fancy be a little author:~~ 100  
ough, in conscience. The next thing I shou'd  
is likely, upon this Frenzy, wou'd be to hire a  
ark, and go in Nuptial Ceremony, VENETI-  
ze, to wed the *Gulf*, which I might call perh  
i properly *my own*.

LET who will call it theirs, reply'd TH-  
LES, you will own *the Enjoyment* of this kind  
; very different from that which shou'd natur-  
lly flow from the Contemplation of the Oce-  
eauty. The Bridegroom-Doge, who in his sta-  
uccentaur floats on the Bosom of his THETIS,  
is *Possession* than the poor Shepherd, who fror-  
ming Rock, or Point of some high Promontory  
etch'd at his ease, forgets his feeding Flor-  
hile he admires *her Beauty*.—But to come ne-  
xme, and make the Question still more famil-  
ipose (my PHILOCLES !) that, viewing suc-  
ract of Country ; as this delicious *Val*: we see-  
zath us, you shou'd for *the Enjoyment* of the I-  
ect, require the *Property* or *Possession* of the Lar-  
~~THE covetous Fancy, reply'd I, wou'd be as~~  
~~and alaramshou as that other ambition one~~

Part 3. HOWEVER, said I, all those who are deep in  
 this *romantick* way, are look'd upon, you know,  
 as a People either plainly out of their wits, or  
 over-run with *Melancholy* and \* ENTHUSIASM.  
 We always endeavour to recall 'em from these *solitary* Places. And I must own, that often when  
 I have found my Fancy run this way, I have  
 check'd my-self; not knowing what it was possest'd  
 me, when I was passionately struck with Objects of  
 this kind.

*Sha-*  
*dows.* No wonder, reply'd he, if we are at a loss,  
 when we pursue the *Shadow* for the *Substance*. For  
 if we may trust to what our Reasoning has taught  
 us; whatever in Nature is beautiful or charming, is  
 only the faint Shadow of that *First Beauty*. So that  
 every *real Love* depending on the *Mind*, and being  
 only the *Contemplation of Beauty*, either as it really is  
 in *it-self*, or as it appears imperfectly in the Ob-  
 jects which strike the *Sense*; how can the rational  
 Mind rest here, or be satisfy'd with the absurd *En-  
 joyment* which reaches the *Sense alone*?

From this time forward then, said I, I shall  
 no more have reason to fear those *Beautyz* which  
 strike a sort of *Melancholy*, like the Places we have  
 nam'd, or like these solemn *Groves*. No more  
 shall I avoid the moving Accents of soft *Musick*, or  
 fly from the enchanting Features of the fairest *human  
 Face*.

*Origi-*  
*nal.* If you are already, reply'd he, such a *Proficient*  
 in this *new Love*, that you are sure never to ad-  
 mire the *Representative-BEAUTY*, except for the sake  
 of the *Original*; nor aim at other *Enjoyment*, than  
 of the *rational* kind; you may then be confident.

I am so; and presume accordingly, to an-  
 swer for my-self. However I shou'd not be ill satisfy'd, if you explain'd your-self a little better as to

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\* See Letter of Enthusiasm, towards the end. Vol. the 2d  
 p. 50. And VOL. III. p. 244 &c.

take of mine you seem to fear.      Wou'd Sect. 2.  
 my help to tell you, " That the Absurdity —  
 seeking *the Enjoyment* elsewhere than in the Enjoy-  
*ment*? " The Matter, I must confess,  
 mysterious. Imagine then, good PHILO-  
 CLES being taken with the Beauty of the Ocean  
 you see yonder at a distance, it shou'd come  
 ir head, to seek how to command it; and  
 e mighty Admiral, ride Master of the Sea;  
 or the Fancy be a little absurd?      Absurd  
 in conscience. The next thing I shou'd do,  
 y, upon this Frenzy, wou'd be to hire some  
 ad go in Nuptial Ceremony, VENETIANA +  
 wed the *Gulf*, which I might call perhaps  
 erly *my own*.

who will call it theirs, reply'd THEO-  
 you will own *the Enjoyment* of this kind to  
 different from that which shou'd naturally  
 from the Contemplation of the Ocean's

The Bridegroom-Doge, who in his stately  
 r floats on the Bosom of his THETIS, has  
 effion than the poor Shepherd, who from a  
 Rock, or Point of some high Promontory,  
 at his ease, forgets his feeding Flocks,  
 e admires *her Beauty*.—But to come nearer  
 nd make the Question still more familiar.

(my PHILOCLES !) that, viewing such a  
 f Country; as this delicious Vale we see be-  
 , you shou'd for *the Enjoyment* of the Pro-  
 quire the *Property or Possession* of the Land.

covetous Fancy, reply'd I, wou'd be as ab-  
 together, as that other ambitious one.

PHILOCLES! said he; May I bring this yet  
 earer? And will you follow me once more?  
 that being charm'd, as you seem to be, with  
 ty of *these TREES*, under whose shade we  
 i shou'd long for nothing so much as to  
 ne delicious *Fruit* of theirs; and having ob-  
 Nature some certain Relish by which these  
 r *Berrys* of the Wood became as palatable

Part 3, as the *Figs* or *Peaches* of the Garden, you find afterwards, as oft as you revisited these *Groves*, seek hence the *Enjoyment* of them, by satiating yourself in these new Delights.

The Fancy of this kind, reply'd I, wou'd be sordidly *luxurious*; and as absurd, in my opinion, as either of the former.

CAN you not then, on this occasion, said he, call to mind some other *Forms* of a fair kind among us, where the Admiration of Beauty is apt to lead to as irregular a Consequence?

I FEAR'D, said I, indeed, where this would end, and was apprehensive you wou'd force me at last to think of certain powerful *Forms* in ~~the~~ Kind, which draw after 'em a Set of eager Desires, *Wishes* and *Hopes*; no way suitable, I must confess, to your rational and refin'd Contemplation of Beauty. The Proportions of this *living Architecture*, as wonderful as they are, inspire nothing of a studious or contemplative kind. The more they are view'd, the further they are from satisfying by mere View. Let that which satisfies be ever so disproportionateable an Effect, or ever so foreign to its Cause; censure it as you please, you must allow however that it's *natural*. So that you, THEOCLES, ought I see, are become the *Accuser* of NATURE, by condemning a *natural Enjoyment*.

FAR be it from us both, said he, to condemn a Joy which is from NATURE. But when we speak of the *Enjoyment* of these Woods and Prospects, we understand by it a far different kind from that of the inferior Creatures, who rifling in these places, find here their choicest Food. Yet we too live by tasteful Food; and feel those other Joys of *State* in common with them. But 'twas not here (my PATROCLES!) that we had agreed to place our *Good*, nor consequently our *Enjoyment*. We who were rational, and had Minds, methought, shou'd place it rather in those MINDS; which were indeed abus'd, and cheated of their real Good, when drawn

: in the pursuit of *Beauty*; which lies very ab-  
sconded and deep: And if so, I am well assur'd that  
my *Enjoyments* hitherto have been very shallow. I  
have dwelt, it seems, all this while upon the Sur-  
face, and enjoy'd only a kind of slight superficial  
*Beautys*; having never gone in search of *Beauty it-  
self*, but of what I fancy'd such. Like the rest of  
the unthinking World, I took for granted that what  
I liked was *beautiful*; and what I rejoic'd in, was  
my *Good*. I never scrupled loving what I fancy'd;  
and aiming only at the Enjoyment of what I lov'd,  
I never troubled my-self with examining what the  
*Subjects* were, nor ever hesitated about their *Choice*.

BEGIN then, said he, and abuse. See what the  
*Subjects* are; and which you wou'd prefer: which  
honour with your Admiration, Love and Esteem.  
For by these again you will be honour'd in your  
turn. Such, PHILOCLES, as is the Worth of these  
Companions, such will your Worth be found. As  
there is Emptiness or Fulness here, so will there be  
in your Enjoyment. See therefore where *Fulness* is,  
and where *Emptiness*. See in what Subject resides  
the chief Excellence: where BEAUTY reigns: where  
'tis intire, perfect, absolute; where broken, imperfect,  
short. View these terrestrial Beautys, and what-  
ever has the appearance of Excellence, and is able  
to attract. See that which either really is, or  
stands as in the room of Fair, Beautiful, and Good:

## The MORALISTS,

arting it the Privilege of its Fellow-Passions. For is there a fair and plausible *Enthusiasm*, a reasonable *Ecstasy* and *Transport*: allow'd to other Subjects, such as Architecture, Painting, Musick; and shall it be exploded here? Are there Senses by which all those other Graces and Perfections are perceiv'd? and none by which this higher Perfection and Grace is comprehended? Is it so preposterous to bring that *Enthusiasm* hither, and transfer it from those ~~secondary~~<sup>secon-</sup> and scanty Objects, to this original and ~~comparative~~<sup>compar-</sup> ~~benign~~<sup>benign</sup> One? Observe how the Case stands in all those other Subjects of Art or Science. What difficulty to be in any degree knowing! How less *A Judge-* *er* a true Taste is gain'd! How many things shocking, how many offensive at first, which afterwards are known and acknowledg'd the highest *Beauty*? For 'tis not instantly we acquire the *Sense* by which these Beautys are discoverable. *Labour* and *Pain*, are requir'd, and *Time* to cultivate a natural Genius, ever so apt or forward. But Who is the once thinks of cultivating this Soil, or of improving any Sense or Faculty which Nature may be given of this kind? And is it a wonder we find be dull then, as we are, confounded, and at a in these Affairs, blind as to this higher Scene, nobler Representations? Which way shou'd come to understand better? Which way being in these Beautys? Is Study, Science, or Learning necessary to understand all Beautys else? for the Sovereign BEAUTY, is there no Science requir'd? In Painting there are Shad masterly Strokes, which the Vulgar understand but find fault with: in Architecture there Russick; in Musick the Chromatick kind, and Mixture of Diffonancess: And is there nothing answers to this, in The Work?

I must confess, said I, I have hitherto one of those Vulgar, who cou'd never see Shades, the Russick, or the Diffonancess: I have never dreamt of such Mischief.

e. 'Twas my way to censure freely on the Sect. 2.  
view. But I perceive I am now oblig'd to go ~~on~~  
in the pursuit of *Beauty*; which lies very ab-*Beauty*.  
led and deep: And if so, I am well assur'd that  
*Enjoyments* hitherto have been very shallow. I  
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ls as in the room of Fair, Beautiful, and Good:  
Mass of Metal; a Tract of Land; a Num-  
r of Slaves; a Pile of Stones; a human  
dy of certain Lineaments and Proportions:"  
is the highest of the kind? Is BEAUTY found-  
hen in Body only; and not in Action, Life, or  
ition? —

OLD! hold! said I (good THROCLIS!) you  
this in too high a Key, above my reach.  
u wou'd have me accompany you, pray  
lower

Part 3. lower this Strain a little ; and talk in a more familiar way.

*Beauty,*

THUS THEN, said he, (smiling) Whatever Passion you may have for other Beautys ; I know, good PHILOCLES, you are no such Admirer of *Wealth* in any kind, as to allow much Beauty to it ; especially in a rude Heap or Mass. But in Medals, Coins, Imbost-work, Statues, and well-fabricated Pieces, of whatever sort, you can discern *Beauty*, and admire the Kind. True, said I, but not for the Metal's sake. 'Tis not then the Metal or Matter which is beautiful with you.

No. But the Art. Certainly.

The Art then is the Beauty. Right.

And the Art is that which beautifies. The fame. So that the Beautifying, not the Beauty'd, is the really *Beautiful*. It seems so.

For that which is beautify'd, is beautiful only by the accession of something beautifying : and by the receipt or withdrawing of the same, it ceases to be beautiful. Be it. In respect of Bodys therefore, *Beauty* comes and goes. So we see.

Nor is the Body it-self any Cause either of its coming or staying. None. So that there is no Principle of Beauty in Body.

None at all. For Body can no-way be the Cause of Beauty to it-self. No way.

Nor govern nor regulate it-self. Not yet this. Nor mean nor intend it-self.

Nor this neither. Must not that therefore which means and intends for it, regulates and orders it, be the Principle of Beauty to it ? O necessity. And what must that be ? Men I suppose ; for what can it be else ?

HERE then, said he, is all I wou'd have explain'd to you before : " That the Beautiful, the Fair, the Comely, were never in the Matter, but in the Art and Design ; never in Body it-self, but in the Form or forming Power." *Well then* &

beautiful Form confess this, and spek the Beauty Sect. 2  
 of the Design, whene'er it strikes you? What is it  
 but the Design which strikes? What is it you ad-  
 mire but MIND, or the Effect of Mind? 'Tis Mind  
 alone which forms. All which is void of Mind is  
 horrid: and Matter formles is Deformity it-self.

Or all Forms then, said I, Those (according to  
 your Scheme) are the most amiable, and in the first  
 Order of Beauty, which have a power of making  
 other Forms themselves: From whence methinks  
 they may be stil'd the forming Forms. So far I can  
 easily concur with you, and gladly give the ad-  
 vantage to the human Form, above those other Beau-  
 tys of Man's Formation. The Palaces, Equipages *Beauty*,  
 and Estates shall never in my account be brought in  
 competition with the original living Forms of Flesh  
 and Blood. And for the other, the dead Forms of  
 Nature, the Metals and Stones, howver precious  
 and dazzling; I am resolv'd to resist their Splen-  
 dour, and make abject Things of 'em, even in their  
 highest Pride, when they pretend to set off hu-  
 man Beauty, and are officiously brought in aid of  
 the Fair.

Do you not see then, reply'd Throcles, that orders  
 you have establish'd Three Degrees or Orders of *Beauty*? As how? Why first, the dead <sup>1.</sup>  
*Forms*, as you properly have call'd 'em, which bear <sup>First Order.</sup>  
 a Fashion, and are form'd, whether by Man, or  
 Nature; and have no forming Power, no Action,  
 or Intelligence. Right. Next, and as the <sup>Second Order.</sup>  
 second kind, the Forms which form; that is, which  
 have Intelligence, Action, and Operation. Right  
 still. Here therefore is double Beauty. For  
 here is both the Form (the Effect of Mind) and  
 Mind it-self: The first kind low and despizable in  
 respect of this other; from whence the dead Form  
 receives its Lustre and Force of Beauty. For *whole*  
 is a mere Body, tho' a human-on, and ever so  
 exactly fashion'd, if inward Form be wanting, and  
 the Mind be monstrous and imperfect, as in *Idiot*.

Figures of men? Or did you thin  
nearer Life?

I cou'd easily, said I, have a  
*Forms* of ours had a virtue of prod-  
ing *Forms*, like themselves. But  
theirs, I thought, was from *ano-*  
them, and cou'd not properly be  
tue or Art; if in reality there was  
or something *Artist-like*, which gui-  
and made Tools of them in this spe-

H A R R I V thought, said he!  
vented a Censure which I hardly im-  
e scape. And here you have unav-  
that *third Order* of Beauty, which  
such as we call mere *Forms*, but  
*which form*. For we our-selves at-  
tects in Matter, and can shew lifele-  
into Form, and fashion'd by our  
that which fashions even Minds the  
in it-self all the Beautys fashion'd  
and is consequently the Princip-  
Fountain of all *Beauty*.

It seems so.

*Third  
Order.*

Antiquities, Musick, and all which is seen  
in Invention, resolves it-self into this last  
one, said I : and thus all the Extravagances of other  
s resolve themselves into ours. The fashionable  
is borrow from us, and are nothing without us.  
have undoubtedly the Honour of being *Originals*.

O W therefore say again, reply'd TROGLES ;  
ther are those Fabricks of Architecture, Sculpture,  
the rest of that sort, the greatest Beautys which  
forms ; or are there greater and better ?  
which I know, reply'd I. Think, think  
n, said he : and setting aside those Productions  
at just now you excepted against, as Master-  
es of another Hand ; think What there are which  
immediately proceed from us, and may more  
y be term'd our *Iffus*. I am barren, said I,  
this time : you must be plainer yet, in helping  
to conceive. How can I help you, reply'd  
Wou'd you have me be conscious for you, of  
which is immediately *your own*, and is solely  
and from *your-self*? You mean my *Senti-*  
*ts*, said I. Certainly reply'd he : and toge  
with your *Sentiments*, your *Resolutions*, *Princi-*  
*mer*, *Determinations*, *Actions* ; whatsoever is hand-  
and noble in the kind ; whatever flows from  
good *Understanding*, *Sense*, *Knowledg* and *Will* ;  
ever is engender'd in your *Heart* (good PHILO-Off.  
! or derives it-self from your *Parent-MIND*.  
Spr

## The MORALISTS,

I TOOK the Compliment, and will'd (I  
him) the Case were really as he imagin'd, <sup>that</sup>  
might justly merit his Esteem and Love. My <sup>way of</sup>  
therefore shou'd be to grow *beautiful*, in his <sup>way of</sup>  
*Beauty*; and from this time forward I wou'd <sup>do all</sup>  
I cou'd to propagate that lovely Race of <sup>mental</sup>  
Children, happily sprung from such a high Enjoy-  
ment, and from a Union with what was Fairst and  
Best. But 'tis you, THEOCLES, continu'd I, must  
help my labouring Mind, and be as it were the Mid-  
wife to those Conceptions; which else, I fear, will  
prove abortive.

You do well, reply'd he, to give me the Mid-  
wife's part only: For the Mind conceiving of <sup>itself</sup>, can only be, as you say, *afflissed in the Birth*  
*Pregnancy* is from its *Nature*. Nor cou'd it ever  
have been thus *impregnated* by any other *Mind*  
than that which form'd it at the beginning; &  
which, as we have already prov'd, is Original  
all *mental*, as well as other *Beauty*.

Do you maintain then, said I, that these  
real Children, the Notions and Principles of  
*Just*, and *Honest*, with the rest of these Ideas  
*innate*?

ANATOMISTS, said he, tell us that the  
which are Principles in Body, are *innate*;  
form'd already in the *Fætus* before the Birth.  
When it is, whether *before*, or *at*, or *after* the Birth,  
or at *What* time after, that either *after* these  
Principles, Organs of Sensation, or Sensation  
selves, are first form'd in us, is a matter, of  
of curious Speculation, but of no great Impor-  
The Question is, whether the Principles  
are from *Art*, or *Nature*? If from *Nature*,  
'tis no matter for the Time: nor wou'd  
with you, tho' you shou'd deny *Life* it-self  
*natur*, as imagining it follow'd rather than  
the moment of Birth. But this I am  
that *Life*, and the *Sensation*, which are

come when they will, are from mere *Nature*, and Scott: n. nothing else. Therefore if you dislike the word ~~Innate~~, let us change it, if you will, for **INSTINCT**; and call *Instinct*, that which *Nature* teaches, exclusive of *Art*, *Culture* or *Discipline*.

Content, said I.

**L**EAVING then, reply'd he, those admirable Speculations to the *Virtuosi*, the *Anatomists*, and *School-Divines*; we may safely aver, with all their Consents, that the several Organs, particularly those of Generation, are form'd by *Nature*. Whether is there also from *Nature*, think you, any *Instinct* for the after-Use of them? Or whether must *Learning* and *Experience* imprint this Use? "Tis imprinted, said I, enough in Conscience. The Impression, or *Instinct*, is so strong in the Case, that 'twou'd be absurdity not to think it *natural*, as well in our own Species, as in other Creatures: amongst whom (as you have already taught me) not only the mere engendering of the Young, but the various and almost infinite Means and Methods of providing for them, are all foreknown. For thus much we may indeed discern in the preparatory Labours and Arts of these wild Creatures; which demonstrate their anticipating *Fancies*, *Pre-conceptions*, or *Pre-sensations*; if I may ~~presumptions~~ use a word you taught me \* yesterday.

I ALLOW your Expression, said **THEOCLES**, and will endeavour to show you that the same *Pre-conceptions*, of a higher degree, have place in human kind. Do so, said I, I intreat you: For so far am I from finding in my-self these Pre-conceptions of *Fair* and *Beautiful*, in your sense, that methinks, till now of late, I have hardly known of any thing like them in *Nature*. How then, said he, wou'd you have known that *enraptured Fair* and *Beautiful* of human Kind; if

Part 3. such an Object (a fair fleshly one) in all its Beauty, had for the first time appear'd to you, by your-self, this morning, in these Groves? Or do you think perhaps you shou'd have been unmov'd, and have found no difference between this Form and any other; if first you had not been instructed?

I HAVE hardly any Right, reply'd I, to plead this last Opinion, after what I have own'd just before.

WELL then, said he, that I may appear to take no advantage against you; I quit the darlist Form, which carrys such a Force of complicated Beauty; and am contented to consider separately each of those simple Beautys, which taken all together, create this wonderful effect. For you wil allow, without doubt, that in respect of Body, whatever is commonly said of the unexpressible, the unintelligible, the *I-know-not-what* of Beauty; there can lie no Mystery here, but what plainly belongs either to *Figure*, *Colour*, *Motion*, or *Sound* of Body. Omitting therefore the three latter, and their dependent Charms; let us view the Charm in what is simplest of all, mere *Figure*. Nor need we go so high as Sculpture, Architecture, or the Designs of those who from this Study of Beauty have rais'd such delightful Arts. 'Tis enough if we consider the simplest of Figures; as either a round Ball, a Cube, or Dye. Why is even an Infant pleas'd with the first View of these Proportions? Why is the Sphere or Globe, the Cylinder and Obelisk prefer'd; and the irregular Figures, in respect of these, rejected and despis'd?

I AM ready, reply'd I, to own there is in certain Figures a natural \* Beauty, which the Eye takes as soon as the Object is presented to it.

Is there then, said he, a natural Beauty of *Soft.*, *Figures*? and is there not as natural a one of *ACTIONS*? No sooner the Eye opens upon *Figures*, *Beauty*, the Ear to *Sounds*, than straight the Beautiful <sup>of Self,</sup> *re-*  
*faults*, and *Grace* and *Harmony* are known and ac- <sup>As real,</sup> *knowledg'd*. No sooner are *ACTIONS* view'd, no <sup>And ne-</sup> sooner the *human Affections* and *Passions* discern'd <sup>cearly</sup> *distinc-*  
*tions* (and they are most of 'em as soon discern'd as felt) <sup>mosting</sup> than straight an inward Eye distinguishes, and sees *the Fair and Shapely, the Amiable and Admirable*, apart from *the Deform'd, the Foul, the Odious, or the Despicable*. How is it possible therefore not to own, " That as these *Distinctions* have their Foundation in *Nature*, the Discernment it-self is *natural*, and from *NATURE alone*?"

If this, I told him, were as he represented it ; there cou'd never, I thought, be any Disagreement among Men concerning Actions and Behaviour : as which was *Base*, which *Worthy* ; which *Handsom*, and which *Deform'd*. But now we found perpetual Variance among Mankind ; whose Differences were chiefly founded on this Disagreement in Opinion ; " The one affirming, the other denying that *this, or that, was fit or decent.*"

E V E N by this then, reply'd he, it appears there is Fitnes and Decency in Actions ; since *the Fit and Decent* is in this Controversy ever pre-suppos'd : And whilst Men are at odds about the Subjects, the Thing it-self is universally agreed. For neither is there Agreement in Judgments about other *Beautys*. "Tis controverted " Which is the finest *Pile*, the " *loveliest Shape or Face* :" But without controversy, 'tis allow'd " There is a BEAUTY of each kind." This no-one goes about to teach : nor is it learnt by any ; but confess'd by All. All own the Standard, *Rule*, and *Measure* : But in applying it to Things, <sup>distr.</sup> Disorder arises, Ignorance prevails, Interest and <sup>own'd.</sup> Passion breed Disturbance. Nor can it otherwise happen in the Affairs of Life, whilst that which interests and engages Men as *Good*, is thought different from

Part 3. from that which they admire and praise as *Honor*.  
 — But with us (*PHILOCLES!*) 'tis better settled :  
 since for our parts, we have already decreed " That  
 \* *Beauty and Good are still the same.*"

*Confirmation.*

I REMEMBER, said I, what you forc'd me  
 to acknowledg more than once before. And now  
 (good *THEOCLES!*) that I am become so willing a  
 Disciple, I want not so much to be *convinc'd*, methinks,  
 as to be *confirm'd* and *strenghtben'd*. And I  
 hope this last Work may prove your easiest Task.

NOT unless you help in it *your-self*, reply'd  
*THEOCLES*: For this is necessary, as well as be-  
 coming. It had been indeed shameful for you to  
 have yielded without making good Resistance. To  
 help one's-self to be *convinc'd*, is *to prevent Reason*, and bespeak Error and Delusion. But upon fair  
 Conviction, to give our heart up to the evident side,  
 and reinforce the Impression, this is *to help Reason*  
 heartily. And thus we may be said *bosomly to per-*  
*suade our-selves.* Shew me then how I may  
 best persuade my-self.

HAVE courage, said he, *PHILOCLES!* (raising  
 his Voice) Be not offended that I say, *Have Courage!*  
 'Tis Cowardice alone betrays us. From whence  
 can *false Shame* be, except from Cowardice ? To  
 be ashamed of what one is sure can never be shameful,  
 must needs be from the want of Resolution. We seek the *Right* and *Wrong* in things ; we ex-  
 amine what is *Honourable*, what *Shameful* ; and having  
 at last determin'd, we dare not stand to our  
 own judgment, and are ashamed to own there  
 a *Shameful* and an *Honourable*. " Hear me first  
 " one who pretends to value *PHILOCLES*, and be  
 " valu'd by him) There can be no such thing as real  
 " *Valueableness* or *Worth* ; nothing in it-self estim-  
 " able or amiable, odious or shameful. All is  
*Opinion*, " *OPINION* : 'Tis *Opinion* which makes Beauty,

and unmakes it. The Graceful or Ungraceful in Sect. 2, things, the Decorum and its Contrary, the Amiable and Unamiable, Vice, Virtue, Honour, Shame, *Measure* all this is founded in *Opinion* only. *OPINION* is of *Virtue* and *the Law and Measure*. Nor has *Opinion* any Rule *True and Vice*, besides mere *CHANCE*; which varies it, as *Custom* varies: and makes now this, now that, to be thought worthy, according to the Reign of *Fashion*, and the ascendent Power of *Education*."

What shall we say to such-a-one? How *Falshood* present to him his Absurdity and Extravagance? *of this* ill he desist the sooner? Or shall we ask *what shame*, of one who acknowledges no *Shameful*?

Yet he derides, and cries, *Ridiculous!*

By what Right? what Title? For thus, if I were *PHILOCLES*, wou'd I defend my-self: "Am I ridiculous? As how? What is ridiculous? Every-thing? or Nothing?" Ridiculous deed! But something then, something there *Ridiculous*: and the Notion, it seems, is right, "of a *Shameful* and a *Ridiculous*, in things." *Shame*. How then shall we apply the Notion? For this being wrong apply'd, cannot it-self but be ridiculous. Or will he who cries *SHAME*, refuse to acknowledg *any* in his turn? Does he not blush, or seem discountenanc'd on any occasion? If he does, the Case is very distinct from that of mere *Trief* or *Fear*. The Disorder he feels is from a sense of what is shameful and odious in it-self, not of what is hurtful or dangerous in its Consequences. For the greatest Danger in the world can ever breed *Shame*: nor can the *Opinion* of all the World compel us to it, where our own *Opinion* is ot a Party. We may be afraid of appearing impudent, and may therefore feign a Modesty. But we in never really blush for any thing beside what we think truly *Shameful*, and what we shou'd still blush for, were we ever so secure as to our Interest, and ut of the reach of all Inconvenience which cou'd happen to us from the thing we were ashamed of.

Part 3. Thus, continuing my Argumentation, to defend my-self; and into Mens Lives, and that which influenc'd me into this Opinion, I shou'd have Testimony enough to make me say within my-self, " Let who will be my Adversary in this Opinion, I shall find him some way or other prepossess'd with that of which he wou'd endeavour to dispossess me." Has he Gratitude or Resentment, Pride or Shame? Which-ever were it be, he acknowledges a Sense of *Just* and *Unjust*, *Beauty* and *De-Worthy* and *Mean*. If he be Grateful, or exp'formly. Gratitude, I ask " Why?" and on What account If he be angry, if he indulges Revenge, I Anger. " How? and in what Case? Reveng'd of Who of a Stone, or Madman?"

Anger, " mad?" But for What? For a *Ch*  
 an Ac-  
 know-  
 ledgment " hurt?" an Accident against Thought, or  
 of *Just* and *Un-*  
*Just*. fore there is *Just* and *Unjust*? Who is so unjust?  
 a natural Presumption or Anticipation, on whi  
 RESENTMENT or ANGER is founded. Fo  
 else shou'd make the wickedest of Mankind  
 prefer the Interest of their Revenge to o  
 terests, and even to Life it-self, except  
 Sense of Wrong, natural to all Men, and  
 to prosecute that Wrong at any rate? Not  
 own sakes, since they sacrifice their very  
 it; but out of hatred to the imagin'd *W*  
 a certain Love of JUSTICE, which e  
 Example shewn to

Giveness ; and may be either a just Modesty, or ~~just~~  
just Humility. But this is certain, that whoever <sup>An A-</sup>  
is proud, must be proud of something. And we <sup>know-</sup>  
know that Men of thorow Pride will be proud even <sup>Judgment</sup>  
in the meanest Circumstances, and when there is <sup>of</sup> Worth  
no visible Subject for them to be proud of. But <sup>and</sup>  
they descry a Merit in themselves, which others <sup>Bafe-</sup>  
cannot : And 'tis this Merit they admire, No <sup>ness.</sup>  
matter whether it be really in them, as they ima-  
gine : It is a Worth still, an Honour, or Merit which  
they admire, and wou'd do, wherever they saw it,  
in any Subject besides. For then it is, then only,  
that they are humbled, " When they see in a more  
" eminent degree in others, What they respect and  
" admire so much in themselves." — And thus as  
long as I find Men either angry or revengeful, proud  
or affam'd, I am safe : For they conceive an Ho-  
nourable and Dishonourable, a Foul and Fair, as well  
as I. No matter where they place it, or how they  
are mistaken in it : This hinders not my being fa-  
tisfy'd " That the Thing is, and is universally ac-  
" knowledg'd ; That it is of Nature's Impression,  
" naturally conceiv'd, and by no Art or Counter-Na- <sup>Natural</sup>  
" ture to be eradicated or destroy'd." <sup>Impres-  
sion.</sup>

AND NOW, what say you, PHILOCLES, (con-  
tinu'd he) to this Defence I have been making for  
you ? 'Tis grounded, as you see, on the Supposi-  
tion of your being deeply engag'd in this philoso-  
phical Cause. But perhaps you have yet many  
Difficultys to get over, e'er you can so far take  
part with Beauty, as to make this to be your  
*Good.*

I HAVE no difficulty so great, said I, as not  
to be easily remov'd. My Inclinations lead me  
strongly this way : for I am ready enough to yield  
*there is no real Good beside the Enjoyment of Beauty.*

And I am as ready, reply'd THUCOCLES, to  
*yield.*

Part 3, yield There is no real  
what is *Good.*

tion, I fear I am littl  
Concession. As I  
I offer to contend for a  
of your mental Way, the  
Enjoyment of mine al  
fore. Undoubt

*Mental Enjoy-  
ment.*  
*Body.*  
*Sense.*

shou'd enjoy, or be capable  
MIND ? or shall we say  
help of *Sense*, perhaps  
*BEAUTY*, then, the  
Which way ? For of  
nothing in the Case :  
capable, and *Sense* no  
enjoy Beauty, there re  
is capable either to app

" *TRUE*, said I ; b

" *BEAUTY* may not

Shew me first,  
" or in *What* you fa  
Is it not *Beauty* which  
feeds it afterwards in

Say in the same

" first excites the Sen

" the Passion we call

say it. The Thought,

great as the Pleasure is

to apply the Notion

which create it. You

the preposterous Fanc

of old, who cou'd rel

hearing it was comp

beautiful Feather, or

of being incited by

Meats, you wou'd be

Appetite, the more y

descended into the Kit

veral Forms and Char

they were sev'd at t

the neighbouring herds, delights the brawling Rawn, or Kid, and spreads the Joy we see amidst the feeding Flocks : 'Tis not the *Form* rejoices ; but that which is beneath the *Form* : 'tis *Savouriness*, attracts, *Hunger* impels ; and *Thirst* better allay'd by the clear Brook than the thick Puddle, makes the *fair NYMPH* to be prefer'd, whose *Form* is otherwise slighted. For never can the *Form* be of real force where it is uncontemplated, unjudg'd of, unexamin'd, and stands only as the accidental Note or Token of what appears provok'd Sense, and satisfies the brutish Part. Are you perswaded of this, good PHILOCLES ? or rather than not give Brutus the advantage of *Enjoyment*, will you allow them also a Mind and rational Part ?

Not so, I told him.

If BAUTUS therefore, said he, be incapable of knowing and enjoying Beauty, as being *Bruta*, and having *Sauax* only, (the brutish part), for their own share ; it follows, " That neither can MAN by the same *Sense* or brutish Part, conceive or enjoy *Beauty* : But all the *Beauty*, and *Good* he enjoys, is in a nobler way, and by the help of what is noblest, his *MIND* and *REASON*." Here *Reason*. lies his *Dignity* and highest *Interest* : Here his Capacity toward Good and Happiness. His Ability on Incompetency, his Power of Enjoyment, or his Imperfections is founded in this alone. As this is sound, fair, noble, worthy ; so are its Subjects, Acts and Employments. For as the riotous *MIND*, captive to *Sense*, can never enter in competition, or contend for

where than in the Mind ; *The Enjoyment* it  
be no beautiful Subject, nor of any gra  
agreeable Appearance. But when you thin  
*Friendship* is enjoy'd, how Honour, *Gratitu  
dour*, *Benignity*, and all internal Beauty ;  
the social Pleasures, *Society* it-self, and all  
constitutes the Worth and Happiness of Man  
you will here surely allow Beauty in the  
think it worthy to be view'd, and pass'd in  
often by the glad Mind, happily conscious  
generous Part, and of its own Advancem  
Growth in Beauty.

*Etatis,* **THUS, PHILOCLES,** (continu'd he, after  
*Exultation.* Pause) thus have I presum'd to treat of *Be  
auty* before so great a Judg, for such a skilful Adm  
your-self. For taking rise from Nature's  
which transported me, I gladly ventur'd  
in the Chase ; and have accompany'd  
search of Beauty, as it relates to us, and  
our highest *Good*, in its sincere and natu  
joyment. And if we have not idly sp  
hours, nor rang'd in vain thro' these deser

sets, and passing over Bodys, and the common  
Arms (where only a Shadow of Beauty rests) am-  
bitiously presses onward to its Source, and views *the*  
*Original* of Form and Order in that which is intel-  
ligent. And thus, O PHILOCLES ! may we im-  
prove and become Artists in the kind ; learning *Knowl-*  
“ To know *Our-selves*, and what *That* is, which by *Improv-*  
“ improving, we may be sure to advance our Worth, *out-*  
“ and real Self-Interest.” For neither is this *Knowl-*  
*edge* acquir’d by Contemplation of Bodys, or the  
outward Forms, the View of Pageantrys, the Study  
of Estates and Honours : nor is he to be esteem’d  
that self-improving Artist, who makes a Fortune out *Ably*,  
of these ; but he (*He* only) is the *wise* and *able*  
Man, who with a slight regard to these Things, ap-  
plies himself to cultivate another Soil, builds in a  
different Matter from that of Stone or Marble ;  
and having righter Models in his Eye, becomes in  
truth the *Architect* of *his own Life* and *Forture* : by  
laying within himself the lasting and sure Founda-  
tions of *Order, Peace* and *Concord*. —— But now  
’tis time to think of returning home. The Morn-  
ing is far spent. Come ! Let us away, and leave  
these uncommon Subjects ; till we retire again to  
these remote and unsrequted Places.

AT THESE words THEOCLES mending his  
pace, and going down the Hill, left me at a good  
distance ; till he heard me calling earnestly after  
him. Having join’d him once again, I begg’d  
he wou’d stay a little longer : or if he were re-  
solv’d so soon to leave both the Woods, and that  
Philosophy which he confin’d to ‘em ; that he  
wou’d let me however part with ‘em more gra-  
dually, and leave the best impression on me ; he cou’d,  
against

Part 3. against my next Return. For as much convinc'd  
 as I was, and as great a Convert to his Doctrine,  
 my Danger still, I own'd to him, was very great :  
 and I foresaw that when the Charm of these Places,  
 and his Company was ceas'd, I shou'd be apt to  
 relapse, and weakly yield to that too powerful  
 Charm, *the World*. Tell me, continu'd I, how is  
 it possible to hold out against it, and withstand  
 the general Opinion of Mankind, who have so  
 different a Notion of that which we call *Good*?  
 Say truth now, TEZOCLES, can any thing be  
 more odd, or dissonant from the common Voice  
 of the World, than what we have determin'd in  
 this matter?

Who m<sup>o</sup>n shall we follow then? reply'd he.  
 Whose Judgment or Opinion shall we take, con-  
 cerning What is *Good*, What *contrary*? If All, or  
 any part of Mankind are consonant with themselves,  
 and can agree in this; I am content to leave Phi-  
 losophy, and follow them: If otherwise; Why shou'd  
 we not adhere to what we have chosen?—Let us  
 then, in another View, consider how this Matter  
 stands.

### S E C T. III.

**W**E THEN walk'd gently homewards (it be-  
 ing almost Noon) and he continu'd his Dis-  
 course.

*Manners of Men.* ONE Man, said he, affects the *Hero*; esteem's  
 it the highest Advantage of Life, to have seen War,  
 and been in Action in the Field. Another laughs at  
 this Humour; counts it all Extravagance and Folly;  
 prizes his own  *Wit* and *Prudence*; and wou'd take  
*Contrary Pur- suits.* it for a Disgrace to be thought adventurous. One  
 Person is assiduous and indefatigable in advancing  
 himself to the Character of a *Man of Business*. An-  
 other on the contrary thinks this impertinent; va-  
 lious not Fame, or a Character in the World; and  
 by his good-will wou'd always be in a Despatch, and  
 ready

## A Rhapsody.

27

27

A R H A P S O D Y.

never live out of the Stews; or Taverns; where he ~~sees~~ enjoys, as he thinks, his highest Good. One va-  
lues Wealth, as a means only to indulge his Palat, and to eat finely. Another loathes this, and affects ~~Moral~~ Popularity, and a Name. One admires Musick and Paintings, Cabinets-curiosities, and in-door Ornaments. Another admires Gardens, Architecture, and the Pomp of Building. Another, who has no Gusto of either sort, believes all those they call VIRTUOSI to be half-distracted. One looks upon all Expence to be Madness; and thinks only Wealth it-self to be Good. One games; another dresses, and studies an Equipage; another is full of Heraldry, Points of Honour, a Family, and a Blood. One recommends Gallantry and Intrigue; Disagree-<sup>ment</sup> another ordinary Good-fellowship; another Buffonery, with one Satir, and the common Wits; another Spotts, and the <sup>another</sup> Country; another a Court; another Travelling, and the sight of foreign Parts; another Poetry, and the fash-<sup>ionable</sup> Learning.—All these go different ways. All censure one another, and are despicable in one <sup>and</sup> another's eyes. By fits too they are despicable <sup>with</sup> their own, and as often out of conceit with them-selves, as their Humour changes, and their Passion turns from one thing to another.—What is it then I shou'd be concern'd for? Whose Censure do I fear? Or by whom, after all, shall I be guided?  
If I ask, "Are RICHES good, when only heap'd <sup>RICHES,</sup> up, and unemploy'd?" One answers, "They art." The rest deny. "How is it then they are to be employ'd in order to be good?" All disagree. All tell me different things.  
Since therefore RICHES are not, of themselves, good (as most of you declare;) And since there is no Agreement among you which way they become good; why may not I hold it for my Opinion, that they are neither good in themselves, nor directly any Cause or Means of Good?  
If there be those who wholly despise FAME, and if among those who ~~despise~~ FAME, one thing

三

Part 3, seeks it with some Men, despises  
 Why may not I say, " That ne  
 " how any *Fame* can be call'd a *G*

*Pleas-* I y of those who covet *PLEAS*  
*ture.* admire it in *one* kind, are superior  
 Why may not I say, " That nei  
 " which of these *Pleasures*, or how  
 " can be call'd *Good*? "

*Life.* I y among those who covet *LIFE*  
 ly, that *Life* which to *One* is eligible  
 to *Another* despicable and vile; WI  
 " That neither do I know how *L*  
 " *it-self*, be thought a *Good*? "

*Inflaue-* I N the mean time, This I l  
*ment.* " That the necessary Consequence o  
 " things highly, is to be a *Slave*,  
 " ly miserable." — But perhaps  
 you are not yet enough acquainte  
 kind of Reasoning.

M O R Z, said I, than I believe yo  
 gine. I perceiv'd the goodly Lady  
 Beauty, was about to appear a-ne  
 LIEER-knew again that fair Face of LI  
 TY. had seen but once in the \* Picture  
 day of that Moral Dame. I can af  
 fects of her as highly as possible: and  
*Fortune*, her Help, to raise one above the  
 fential Goods, and make one easy a  
 wards *Life*, and towards a *Fortun*  
 hardest thing in the world to enjo  
 tude, Cares, and Anxiety, will be  
 in this unhappy Dependency, 'tis n  
 court, and be not a little servile.  
 Great, to bear Insults, to stoop, at  
 jectly resign one's Sense and Manho  
 courageously be endur'd, and car  
 free an Air, and good Countenanc

y be its outward Looks) How is it possible but I must find the Happiness of that other contrary to ? Can you not call to mind what we resolv'd concerning Nature ? Can any thing be more desirable than to follow her ? Or is it not by this Free, & from our Passions and low Interests, that we reconcil'd to the goodly Order of the Universe ; & we harmonize with Nature ; and live in Friendship both with God and Man ?

Let us compare, continu'd he, the Advantages <sup>Goods</sup> <sub>of the Mind.</sub> each State, and set their Goods one against another : On one side, those which we found were certainly so ; and depended both on Fortune, Age, <sup>Compa-</sup> <sub>rison.</sub> Circumstances and Humour : On the other side, so which being certain themselves, are founded on Contempt of those others so uncertain. Is man-Liberty, Generosity, Magnanimity, not a Good ? By we not esteem as Happiness, that Self-Enjoyment which arises from a Consistency of Life and Manners, a Harmony of Affections, a Freedom from Reproach of Shame or Guilt, and a Consciousness of Worth and Merit with all Mankind, our Country, and Friends : all which is found in Virtue only ? A Mind subordinate to Reason, a proper humaniz'd, and fitted to all natural Affections ; an Exercise of Friendship uninterrupted ; a true Cordor, Benignity, and Good Nature ; with instant Security, Tranquillity, Equanimity (if I may such philosophical Terms) are not these ever, at all seasons Good ? Is it of these one can at time nauseate and grow weary ? Are there any particular Ages, Seasons, Places, Circumstances, which must accompany these, to make 'em agreeable ?

Part 3. able? Ate these variable and inconstant? Do these by being ardently belov'd, or fought, occasion any Disturbance or Misery? Can these be at any time overvalu'd? Or, to say more yet, can these be ever taken from us, or can we ever be hinder'd in the Enjoyment of 'em, unless by our-selves? How can we better praise the Goodness of Providence, than in this, "That it has plac'd our Happiness and Good in things We can bestow upon ourselves?"

If this be so, said I, I see no reason we have to accuse Providence on any account. But Men, I fear, will hardly be brought to this good Temper, while their Fancy is so strong, as it naturally is, towards those other movable Goods. And in short, if we may depend on what is said commonly, "All Good is merely as we fancy it. 'Tis *Conceit* which

*Opinion* " makes it. All is *OPINION* and *Fancy* only."

All. WHEREFORE then, said he, do we *act* at any time? Why *choose*, or why *prefer* one thing to another? You will tell me, I suppose, 'tis because we fancy it, or fancy *Good* in it. Are we therefore to follow every *present* Fancy, Opinion, or Imagination of Good? If so, then we must follow that at *one* time, which we decline at *another*; approve at *one* time, what we disapprove at *another*; and be at perpetual variance with ourselves. But if we are not to follow *all* Fancy or *Opinion*, Opinion alike; If it be allow'd, "That of *Fancy*, some are *true*, some *false*;" then we are to examine every Fancy; and there is some *Rule* or other, by which to *judg*, and *determine*. 'Twas the Fancy of one Man to set fire to a beautiful Temple, in order to obtain immortal Memory or Fame. 'Twas the Fancy of another Man to conquer the World, for the same Reason, or what was very like it. If this were really the Man's *Good*; Why do we wonder at him? If the Fancy were *wrong*; say plainly in What it was so; or Why the Subject was not *Good to him*, as he fancy'd? Either therefore, "That

" is every Man's Good which he *fancies*, and be- Sec'd  
" cause he *fancies* it, and is *not content* without it." —  
Or otherwise, " There is *That* in which the Na-  
" ture of Man is *satisfy'd*; and which alone must  
" be *his Good*." If *That* in which the *Nature of*  
*Man* is *satisfy'd*, and can *rest contented*, be *alone his*  
*Good*; then he is a Fool who follows that with-  
out, and yet be *satisfy'd* and *contented*. In the same  
manner is he a Fool who flies that *earnestly* as *his*  
*Ill*, which a Man may *endure*, and yet be *easy* and  
*contented*. Now a Man may possibly not have burnt  
a Temple (as EROSTRATUS) and yet may be *con-  
tent*ed. Or tho' he may not have conquer'd the  
World (as ALEXANDER) yet he may be *easy* and  
*contented*: as he may still without any of those Ad-  
vantages of *Power, Riches, or Renown*; if his *Fancy*  
hinders not. In short, we shall find, " That with-  
out any one of those which are commonly call'd  
" *Goods*, a Man may be *contented*." As, on the con-  
trary, " He may possess them all, and still be *dis-  
contented*, and not a jot the happier." If so; it  
follows, " That Happiness is from *within*, not from  
" *without*." *A good Fancy* is the Main.  
And thus, you see, I agree with you, " That \* *Opin-  
tion* is all in all." — But what is this, All,  
PHILEOLES, which has *seiz'd* you? You seem of *sen-*  
*a sudden grown deeply thoughtful.*

To tell you truth, said I, I was considering What  
wou'd become of me, if, after all, I shou'd, by  
your means, turn *Philosopher*. The Change,  
truly, wou'd be somewhat extraordinary, reply'd  
THEOCLES. But be not concern'd. The Danger is  
not so great. And Experience shews us every day,  
That for talking or writing *Philosophy*, People are not  
at all the nearer being *Philosophers*.

Part 3. But, said I, the very Name is a kind of Re-  
proach. The word IDIOT stood formerly as the  
Opposite to Philosopher: but now-a-days it means  
nothing more commonly than the PHILOSOPHER  
himself.

Philoso-  
phy. Yet, in effect (reply'd he) what else is it we  
all do in general, than philosophize? If PHILOSO-  
PHY be, as we take it, the Study of Happiness; must  
not every-one, in some manner or other, either skil-  
fully or unskilfully philosophize? Is not every Deli-  
beration concerning our main Interest, every Cor-  
rection of our Taste, every Choice and Preference  
in Life to be reckon'd of this kind? For "If Hap-  
" piness be not allow'd to be from Self, and from  
" within; then Either is it from outward Things  
" alone, or from Self and outward Things together."  
If from outward Things alone; shew it us, in fact,  
" That all Men are happy in proportion to these;  
" and that no-one who possesses them is ever miser-  
" able by his own fault." But this, it seems,  
hardly any-one will pretend to evince: All own the  
contrary. Therefore "If Happiness be partly  
" from Self, partly from outward Things; then Each  
" must be consider'd, and a certain Value set on the  
" Concerns of an inward kind, and which depend  
" on Self alone." If so: and that I consider "How,  
" and in What these are to be prefer'd; When and  
" on what occasion they are in season, or out of  
" season; When properly to take place, when  
" yield:" What's this, after all, but to phi-  
losophize? Yet even this, still, is enough  
one out of the ordinary way of thinking,  
one an unhappy turn for Business, and  
Right! For this also is to be consider'd  
weigh'd. And therefore This, still is P  
" To inquire Where, and in wh  
" be most a Loser; Which ar  
" the most profitable Exch  
in this World goes by Exch

Nothing. *Favour* requires Courtship: *Interest* is seek'd, made by Sollicitation: *Honours* are acquir'd with ~~much~~ Hazard; *Ribes* with Pains; *Learning* and *Accomplishments* by Study and Application. *Security*, *Rest*, *Indolence* are to be had at other Prices. They may be thought, perhaps, to come easy. For "What Hardship is there? Where is the Harm?" 'Tis only to abate of *Fame* and *Fortune*. 'Tis only to wave the Point of *Honour*, and share somewhat less of *Interest*. If this be easy; all is well. Some *Patience*, you see, is necessary in the case. *Privacy* must be endur'd; even *Obscurity* and *Contempt*.—Such are the Conditions. And thus Every-thing has ~~its~~ <sup>its</sup> *Power* and *Preferments* are to be <sup>by</sup> had at one rate; *Pleasures* at another; *LIBERTY* and *HONESTY* at another. A good *MIND* must be paid for, as other things. But we had best beware lest, perhaps, we pay too dear for it. Let us be assur'd we have a good Bargain. Come on then.—Let us account.—What is a "MIND" worth? What *Allowance* may one handsomly make for it? or What may one well afford it for? —If I part with it, or abate of it, 'tis not for *Nothing*. Some value I must needs set upon my *Liberty*, some upon my inward *Character*. Something there is in what we call *WORTH*; something in *Sincerity*, and a sound *HEART*. *Orderly Affections*, generous *Thoughts*, and a commanding *REASON*, are fair Possessions, not lightly to be given up. I am to consider first, "What may be their Equivalent? Whether I shall find my Account in letting these inward Concerns run as they please; or Whether I shall not be better secur'd against Fortune by adjusting matters at home, rather than by making Interest abroad, and acquiring first one great Friend, then another, to add still more and more to my Estate or Quality?" For Where am I to take up? Begin; and set the Bounds. Let me hear positively "How far I am to go, and Why no further?" What is a moderate Ter-

Part 3. *tunc, a Competency*, and those other Degrees commonly talk'd of? Where is my Anger to stop; or how High may I suffer it to rise? How far may I ingage in Love? How far give way to Ambition? How far to other Appetites? Or am I to let all loose? Are the Passions to take their swing; and no Application to be given to 'em, but all to the outward Things they aim at? Or if any Application be requisite; say plainly, "How much to one, and how much to the other?" How far are the Appetites to be minded, and how far outward Things? Give us the Measure and Rule. See Whether this be not to philosophize? and Whether willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or unknowingly, directly or indirectly, Every-one does not as much? "Where, then, is the Difference? Which Manner is the best?"

Here lies the Question. This is what I wou'd have you weigh and examine. "But the Examination (say you) is troublesome; and I had better be without it." Who tells you thus? "Your REASON, you say, whose Force, of necessity, you must yield to." Tell me therefore, have you fitly cultivated that REASON of your's, polish'd it, bestow'd the necessary Pains on it, and exercis'd it on this Subject? Or is it like to determine full as well when un-exercis'd, as when thorowly exercis'd, or ever so expert? Consider, pray, in *Mathematicks*; Whose is the better REASON of the two, and fitter to be rely'd on? The Practiser's? or his who is unpractis'd? Whose in the way of *War*, of *Policy*, or *Civil Affairs*? Whose in *Merchandize*, *Law*, *Physick*? — And in MORALITY and LIFE, I ask still, Whose? May he not, perhaps, be allow'd the best Judg of Living, who studies LIFE, and endeavours to form it by some Rule? Or is he indeed to be esteem'd most knowing in the matter, who slightly examines it, and who accidentally and unknowingly philosophizes?

THUS, PHILOCLES (said he, concluding his <sup>Seft. 3.</sup> Discourse) Thus is PHILOSOPHY establish'd. For Every-one, of necessity, must reason concerning his own Happiness; "What his *Good* is, and what "his *Ill.*" The Question is only, "Who rea-  
"sons best?" For even He who rejects this *rea-  
soning or deliberating Part*, does it from *a certain  
Reason*, and from a Persuasion "That this is best."

BY this time we found our-selves insensibly got home. Our *Philosophy* ended, and we return'd to the common Affairs of Life.

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*The End of the Second Volume.*







